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ABSTRACT 
The Malaysian co-operative sector, even after almost a century of its existence, 
remains a movement that has not made a significant contribution to the Malaysian 
economy. The usual problems associated with the weaknesses of co-operatives, such as 
issues related to management, finance, leadership, and members' participation have 
been raised, over and over again, in Malaysia. This thesis, therefore, contributes to our 
knowledge and understanding of co-operatives in Malaysia by presenting original 
empirical analysis of a unique primary data source. As such, to our knowledge, the 
thesis presents the first econometric study of co-operatives in Malaysia based on co-
operative level data. 
In countries where co-operatives have made a significant economic impact, it 
appears to be related to the work of secondary co-operatives, which are organisations of 
the primary co-operatives. Not one of the 35 secondary co-operatives in Malaysia has 
been noted, however, for any significant economic contribution. The possible cause of 
this may lie in the kind of primary co-operatives, which have individuals as members, 
that exist in the Malaysian co-operative movement, which may have contributed to the 
weakness of secondary co-operatives. The existing literature suggests that secondary 
co-operatives function better if primary co-operatives are small and if the primary co-
operative's activity reflects the members' business. The empirical analysis presented in 
this thesis explores the relationship between primary co-operatives and secondary co-
operatives in Malaysia, focusing on issues such as the benefits received by primary co-
I 
operatives from secondary co-operatives. The findings suggest that increased primary 
co-operative membership represents an important source of benefits to primary co-
operatives. A related issue explored in this thesis concerns the determinants of the level 
of trust in co-operatives among Malaysian co-operators. Finally, we present analysis of 
the relationship between the level of trust in the co-operative and co-operative size. The 
findings support an inverse relationship between co-operative size and trust, which may 
be the result of the institutional framework in Malaysia, which specifies that a minimum 
of 100 individuals are required to form a co-operative in Malaysia. 
Acknowledgements 
List of Tables 
List of Abbreviations 
Definitions 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
1.2. Organisation of the Thesis 
Contents 
v 
vi 
ix 
x 
1 
1 
7 
Chapter 2 - Overview of the Emergence and Expansion of Co-operatives 11 
2.1. Introduction 11 
2.2. The Origins and Foundations of Co-operatives 12 
2.2.1. The Development of Co-operative Thought 12 
2.2.2. The Meaning of Co-operation 13 
2.2.3. The Idea of Co-operation 14 
2.2.4. From Co-operation to Co-operatives 15 
2.2.5. The Foundation of Co-operatives 17 
2.2.6. The Spirit of Self-Help 18 
2.3. The Expansion of the Co-operative Movement 19 
2.4. Specific Case Studies: UK, Germany and India 24 
2.4.1. The Development of Consumer Co-operatives in the UK 25 
2.4.2. The Development of Co-operatives in Germany 29 
2.4.3. The Development of Co-operatives in India 31 
2.5. Summary 34 
Chapter 3 - The Operation of Co-operatives 35 
3.1. Introduction 35 
3.2. The Definition and the Concept of Co-operatives 36 
3.3. The Organizational and Operational Aspects of Co-operatives 40 
3.3.1. The Co-operative Principles 41 
3.3.2. Co-operatives' Capital, Income and Assets 42 
3.3.3. Authority and Control in Co-operatives 45 
3.3.4. The Common Interest 47 
3.3.5. The System Structure of the Co-operative Movement 48 
3.3.6. The Legal Frameworkfor Co-operatives 52 
3.4. Co-operative Performance 
3.5. Summary 
Chapter 4 - The Co-operative Movement in Malaysia 
54 
58 
59 
4.1. Introduction 59 
4.2. Malaysia, The Country 60 
4.3. Growth and Development of the Co-operative Movement 62 
4.3.1. The Movement's Early Days 62 
4.3.2. The Transplant of the Co-operative Institution in Malaysia 65 
4.3.3. The Early Impact of Co-operatives 66 
4.3.4. The Expansion Phase 67 
4.3.5. The Movement's Structural Expansion 
4.3.6. The Co-operative Legislature 
4.4. Support for Co-operative Development 
4.4.1. The Ministry 
4.4.2. The Department of Co-operative Development (DCD) 
4.4.3. The Co-operative College of Malaysia (CCM) 
70 
73 
75 
75 
75 
79 
4.5. Economic Statistics on the Co-operative Movement 80 
4.5.1. The Growth of Co-operatives 80 
4.5.2. The Distribution of Co-operatives 82 
4.5.3. The Distribution of Co-operative Members 84 
4.5.4. Share Capital and Assets 85 
4.5.5. The Composition of Co-operative Members according to Social 
and Economic Groups 86 
4.5.6. The Business Performance of Co-operatives 88 
4.5.7. Employment in Co-operatives 89 
4.6. The Secondary Co-operatives 90 
4.6.1. Distribution and Group Size of Secondary Co-operatives 90 
4.6.2. The Active and the Inactive Secondary Co-operatives 91 
4.6.3. Secondary Co-operatives in Government Development Schemes 92 
4.6.4. Trends in the Establishment of Secondary Co-operatives 93 
4.6.5. Secondary Co-operatives' Performance 94 
4.7. Summary 95 
Appendix A4.1: The States of Malaysia 99 
Appendix A4.2: The Bank Rakyat 100 
Appendix A4.3: Tables Relating to the Analysis of the Malaysian Co- 101 
operative Movement 
Chapter 5 - The Sunrey of Co-operatives in Malaysia 113 
5.1. Introduction 113 
5.2. The Mail Survey Questionnaire 114 
5.2.1. The Questionnaire 115 
5.2.2. The Population and the Sample 118 
5.2.3. The Data 120 
5.3. Profile of the Primary Co-operatives: Summary Statistics 123 
5.3.1. The Number of Members, Share Capital and Assets 123 
5.3.2. The Composition of Members by Occupation and by Race; the 124 
Distribution of the Co-operative's Members; and the Co-
operative's Area of Operation 
5.3.3. The Co-operative 's Area of Activity 125 
5.3.4. Membership and the Tenure of Membership in Secondary Co- 127 
operatives 
5.4. The Perceived Roles of Secondary Co-operatives 129 
5.5. Summary 130 
Appendix A5.1: The Questionnaire 132 
Appendix A5.2: Letter 1 - Translated Version of the Researcher's Letter to 138 
Members of the Co-operative Board, which accompanied 
the Questionnaire 
ii 
Appendix AS.3: Letter 2 - Translated Version of the DCD's Letter to the Co- 139 
operatives 
Appendix AS.4: List of Primary Co-operatives in the Sample 140 
Appendix AS.S: Summary Statistics for the Co-operatives in the Sample 144 
Chapter 6 - The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Co- 151 
operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 151 
6.2. A Review of the Literature on Secondary Co-operatives 154 
6.3. Data and Methodology for the Analysis of the Primary-Secondary Co- 160 
operative Relationship 
6.4. The Results 165 
6.4.1. The Primary Co-operatives' Membership and Secondary Co-
operatives 165 
6.4.2. The Primary Co-operatives' Share Capital and Secondary Co-
operatives 172 
6.4.3. The Primary Co-operatives' Assets and Secondary Co-
operatives 175 
6.4.4. An Aggregate Measure of Primary Co-operative Size 177 
6.4.5. Summary 182 
6.S. Analysis of the Relevance of Secondary Co-operatives 183 
6.5.1. Satisfaction with Secondary Co-operatives 185 
6.5.2. The Perception of the Need/or Secondary Co-operatives 193 
6.6. Summary 197 
Appendix A6: Results Table 200 
Chapter 7 - An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of the Level 216 
of Trust among Malaysian Co-operators 
7.1. Introduction 216 
7.2. Trust in the Formation of Co-operative Groups 219 
7.3. Trust 222 
7.3.1. The Definition of Trust 222 
7.3.2. The Measurement of Trust 224 
7.3.3. The Determinants of Trust 226 
7.4. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Co-operators' Trust 228 
7.4.1. Co-operators' Trust in the Co-operative Institution 228 
7.4.2. Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Co-operators' 
Trust in Co-operatives and Other Types o/Trust 238 
7.4.3. Empirical Analysis of Willingness to Invest in a Co-operative 
Business and Trust in Co-operatives 242 
7.4.4. Comparing the General Level of and Pattern of Trust ofCo-
operators with a General Sample of Individuals 246 
7.5. Summary 251 
Appendix A 7.1: Results Tables 254 
Appendix A7.2: Summary of the vast literature exploring the determinants 265 
of trust 
iii 
Appendix A7.2: Translation of the e-mail introducing the survey and the 266 
attached e-mail questionnaire 
Chapter 8 - Co-operative Size and Trust in the Co-operative 270 
8.1. Introduction 270 
8.2. Trust in the Co-operative and the Size of a Co-operative Group 272 
8.3. Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Trust in the Co- 275 
operative and Co-operative Size 
8.3.1. The Effect olCo-operative Size on Trust in the Co-operative 275 
8.3.2. The Level olTrust in Co-operatives and Different Categories 01 
Co-operative Size 278 
8.3.3. Trust in the Co-operative and Membership Size: Bivariate 
Probit Analysis 280 
8.4. Trust in the Co-operative and Co-operative Performance 282 
8.5. Summary 287 
Appendix AS.l: Results Tables 289 
Appendix A8.2: Co-operative's Income and Profit/Loss for Year ending 291 
31.12.2003 
Chapter 9 - Conclusion 294 
References 303 
lV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Throughout this study period, I have received support and encouragement from 
many individuals and organisations. I would like to thank the Malaysian Public 
Service Department (PSD) for granting me the scholarship and the study leave 
and the Department of Co-operative Development (DCD) of Malaysia for 
supporting in administrative matters related to my service of employment and in 
the collection of the data, without which this study would have not been possible. 
I gratefully acknowledge the many individuals in supporting me throughout this 
study. I would like to thank Professor Paul Mosley and Professor Sarah Brown 
for their intellectual guidance and assistance. My heartfelt gratitude and 
appreciation specifically goes to Professor Sarah Brown for her constant support, 
for her time and attention, and for her expert advice on econometrics and on the 
content of the written results. 
I also wish to thank my father and my siblings for their prayers and 
encouragement. My dearest thoughts however go to my late mother, who 
supported my decision to accept the offer to study for a PhD but she sadly passed 
away even before the study commenced. lowe a debt of gratitude to the family of 
Hadi and Ratna, and Dzul and Ros, who have helped with matters back in 
Malaysia while I am here in the UK. To my colleagues in the Economics 
Department and my friends in Sheffield, who each in their own way have 
motivated me to believe in my own strengths. I am fortunate to have such friends. 
My utmost gratitude goes to my children Danial, Natasha, Ellis, Kevin and Emil 
for their tolerance and co-operation, who were sometimes deprived of my fullest 
attention. Also many special thanks to my husband, Zainuddin Taib, for his 
sacrifice, patience, and support all through the years, without whom I am sure this 
work would have not been concluded. I am deeply grateful to GOD for 
everything, for giving me the opportunity to learn and the strength to carry on 
throughout. 
I bear the sole responsibility for any views expressed, errors and omissions in this 
thesis. 
v 
List of Tables 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1: Growth of Co-operatives in Malaysia (1990-2003) 101 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Co-operatives by State and by Activity in 2003 102 
Table 4.3: Distribution of Co-operative Members by State and by 
Activity in 2003 103 
Table 4.4: Distribution of Share Capital and Assets by Activity in 2003. 104 
Table 4.5: Composition of Co-operatives according to Social and 
Economic Group in 2003 105 
Table 4.6: Co-operatives' Business Performance by Activity for 2003 106 
Table 4.7: Number of Employees across Types of Co-operatives 106 
Table 4.8: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by State and by 
Activity in 2003 107 
Table 4.9: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by Number of 
Primary Members 108 
Table 4.10: Active and Inactive Secondary Co-operatives (SCs) and their 
Primary Members 109 
Table 4.11: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by Performance and 
by Activity 110 
Table 4.12: Activity and Business Performance of the 35 Secondary Co-
operatives in 2003 111 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1: Number of Samples by Types of Activity 144 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of the Number of Members, the Share 
Capital and the Assets of the Primary Co-operatives in the 
145 Sample 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of the Profile of the Primary Co-operatives 
in the Sample 146 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the Single-activity and the Multipurpose Co-
operatives 147 
Table 5.5: Distribution of the Co-operatives in the Sample by Main 
Activity and by Response Rate according to the Stratified 
148 Sampling 
Table 5.6: Involvement of the Co-operatives in the Sample in the Various 
Types of Activity 148 
Table 5.7: Secondary Co-operatives to the Primary Co-operatives in the 
Sample 149 
Table 5.8: Perceived Roles of Secondary Co-operatives 150 
vi 
Chapter 6 
Table 6.1: Determinants of the Number of Members of Primary Co-
operatives 200 
Table 6.2: Marginal Effects (ME) for the Significant Coefficients in 
Table 6.1 201 
Table 6.3: Determinants of the Share Capital of Primary Co-operatives 202 
Table 6.4: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.3 203 
Table 6.5: Relationship between Share Capital and the Number of 
Members 203 
Table 6.6: Determinants of the Assets of Primary Co-operatives 204 
Table 6.7: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.6 205 
Table 6.8: Distribution of Co-operatives by the Aggregate Index 178 
Table 6.9a: Determinants of the Size of Primary Co-operatives (Aggregate 
Measure) 206 
Table 6.9b: Determinants ofthe Size of Primary Co-operatives (collapsed 
categories of the aggregate measure) 207 
Table 6.1 Oa: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.9a 208 
Table 6.1 Ob: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 209 
Specification 2 in Table 6.9a (continued) 
Table 6.1 Oc: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 210 
Specification 2 in Table 6.9b 
Table 6.11: The Level of Satisfaction with Secondary Co-operatives 185 
Table 6.12a: Determinants of the Primary Co-operative's Satisfaction with 
Secondary Co-operatives 211 
Table 6.12b: Determinants of the Primary Co-operative's Satisfaction with 
Secondary Co-operatives (collapsed categories of the 
dependent variable) 212 
Table 6.13: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients in Table 213 
6.12a 
Table 6.14: Determinants of the Need for Secondary Co-operatives 214 
Table 6.15: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients in Table 6.14 215 
Chapter 7 
Table 7.1: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operatives 254 
Table 7.2: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients 
in Table 7.1 255 
Table 7.3: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operatives 
Controlling for Benefits from Membership in Secondary Co-
operatives 256 
Table 7.4: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients 
in Table 7.3 257 
vii 
Table 7.5: Summary Statistics of Co-operators' Levels of Trust in 
Various Groups of People and Trust in Values 258 
Table 7.6: Correlation Matrix between the Different Types of Trust from 
the Sample of Co-operators 259 
Table 7.7: Trust in Various Groups of People and Trust in Values as the 
Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operative 260 
Table 7.8: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operatives 
Controlling for Willingness to make Financial Commitments 261 
Table 7.9: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients 
in Table 7.8 262 
Table 7.10: Summary Statistics of Trust in Various Groups of People and 
Trust in Values (Sample = Respondents from E-mail Survey) 263 
Table 7.11: Summary Statistics of Trust in Lending between the Sample of 
Co-operators and the Sample of Individuals from the E-mail 
Survey 264 
Chapter 8 
Table 8.1: Relationship between Trust in the Co-operative and Co-
operative Size 289 
Table 8.2: Trust in the Co-operative and Co-operative Financial 
Performance 290 
Vlll 
List of Abbreviations 
ANGKASA 
BCIC 
BNM 
BoD 
CCM 
CDTF 
CETF 
DCD 
EPU 
FELCRA 
FELDA 
ICMA 
IOFs 
KIK 
KL 
KPD 
MCWS 
MIA 
NARSCO 
NCP 
NDP 
NEP 
NVP 
RISDA 
SHO 
SME 
Angkatan Koperasi Kebangsaan 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
Bank Negara Malaysia 
Board of Directors 
Co-operative College of Malaysia 
Co-operative Development Trust Fund 
Co-operative Education Trust Fund 
Department of Co-operative Development 
Economic Planning Unit 
Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority 
Federal Land Development Authority 
Institute of Co-operative and Management Accountants 
Investors-owned Firms 
Koperasi Industri Kampung 
Kuala Lumpur 
Koperasi Pembangunan Daerah 
Malayan Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
National Rubber Smallholder Co-operatives 
National Co-operative Policy 
National Development Policy 
New Economic Policy 
National Vision Policy 
Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority 
Self-Help Organisation 
Small and Medium Enterprise 
ix 
Definitions: 
Primary co-operatives are co-operatives whose members comprise individuals, 
who come together to pool their resources to enable them to accomplish some 
activities, which otherwise could not possibly be undertaken. The individuals that 
form a co-operative may either be entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial 
individuals. The number of individuals required to form a co-operative varies from 
one country to another. In Malaysia, in general, a minimum of 100 individuals are 
required by law to form a primary co-operative. 
Secondary co-operatives are co-operatives that have primary co-operatives as 
members. In general, 2 primary co-operatives may form a secondary co-operative. 
Secondary co-operatives are owned and run by the groups of primary co-operatives 
that make up its members. As an organization created by primary co-operatives, the 
roles of the secondary co-operatives are to support, strengthen and promote the 
primary co-operatives. 
x 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The co-operative movement has existed for almost a century in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, due to a shortage of data, the movement's development can only be 
assessed in terms of the annual growth in the number of co-operatives, the number 
of co-operative members, the share capital and the assets of co-operatives. In 2003, 
for example, there were 4,469 co-operatives registered with the Malaysian 
Department of Co-operative Development (DCD), with a total of S.21 million 
members, RMS.S7 billion in total share capital and RM2S.14 billion in total assets as 
compared to 4,330 co-operatives with a total of S.03 million members, RM4.40 
billion in total share capital and RM19 billion in total assets in 2002.1 The number 
of co-operatives and co-operative members in Malaysia has grown every year, with 
the annual average growth rate of co-operatives and membership at 3% and 3.58% 
respectively from 1990 to 2003. There is an attraction to forming a primary co-
operative in Malaysia, which is the result of the Government providing grants up to 
RM30,OOO.00 to newly-formed primary co-operatives.2 However, there is no 
published statistical evidence available on the significance of the economic 
achievement of co-operatives in Malaysia in contrast to, for example, India, where 
the co-operative sector employed 32.9% of the working population in 1997 (Haan et 
aI., 2003). In addition, in Malaysia, the role of co-operatives in poverty reduction is 
I RM (Ringgit Malaysia) is the Malaysian currency, where the exchange rate is £1 for approximately 
RM7. RM5.57 billion is equivalent to £0.8 billion; RM25.14 billion is equivalent to £4 billion; 
RM4.4 billion is equivalent to £0.6 billion; RM 19 billion is equivalent to £3 billion (as measured in 
2003). 
2 RM30,000.00 is equivalent to £4286. 
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not largely felt, such as in a number of developing countries, for example Cambodia, 
India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, where co-
operatives have earned the distinction of offering productive employment for the 
enterprising poor (Tulus, 2004). Due to the shortage of data, policy makers in 
Malaysia are not able to gauge the size and the impact of the co-operative sector to 
the nation, which has resulted in co-operatives not being particularly emphasized in 
any of the country's three national policies from 1970 to 2020. In India, in contrast, 
co-operatives are an important part of the national development strategy embedded 
in India's five-year development plans, where considerable attention has been paid 
to the co-operative movement as an agent for stimulating economic growth. 
A co-operative, as defined by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) 
Statement, is "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-
owned and democratically-controlled enterprise". According to the ICA, in May 
2007, more than 800 million individuals worldwide are co-operative members 
representing co-operative movements from 84 countries. The co-operative 
movement has spread gradually and flourished in certain countries, and has become 
a significant economic actor in some national economies, for example, in the UK, 
Scandinavia, Germany and Spain. 
There appears to be a need, however, to stimulate the development of co-operatives 
in Malaysia in order to give the co-operative movement some economic relevance. 
The Government's aspiration to have a co-operative movement that can contribute 
directly to economic development has been documented in the National Co-
operative Policy (NCP), which was formulated in 2002. This thesis, therefore, aims 
to identify possible weaknesses in the Malaysian co-operative movement that may 
2 
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have hampered the long standing efforts of the DCD to develop the co-operative 
movement to be as effective and successful as the co-operative movement in 
countries such as the UK and Japan. Knowing more about co-operatives in 
Malaysia may help to form policy to create a co-operative movement, which can 
contribute significantly to the economy. As such, this study will: review the 
significant contribution of co-operative movements in countries, where co-
operatives have been successful; ascertain the factors behind the success and the 
strengths of those successful co-operative movements; identify any weaknesses in 
the co-operative movement in Malaysia; explore avenues, which could possibly 
enhance the impact of the co-operative sector in Malaysia; and finally, suggest 
policy recommendations. 
In countries where co-operatives have been acknowledged as making an impact on 
the economy, especially in the Western European countries, they have either 
contributed to a significant percentage of GDP, GNP or national savings and 
deposits, or they have a significant market share in sectors of the economy such as 
food, agricultural production, marketing and export, retail and consumer markets, 
travel agencies or health care services. For example, the Mondragon Co-operatives 
in Spain contributed 3.7% towards total GDP in 2002, co-operatives in Sweden 
accounted for 8% of Swedish GNP in 2000 and the consumer co-operative 
movement in the UK had sales of over £7 billion, profits of £231 million and over 
70,000 employees in 2002. The co-operatives that tend to be responsible for the 
significant economic contributions are secondary co-operatives, i.e. co-operatives 
that comprise primary co-operatives as members. Primary co-operatives are co-
operatives, whose members comprise of individuals. Secondary co-operatives have 
played an important role in creating strong co-operative movements in many of the 
3 
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Western European countries such as in the UK, Germany, Spain and Scandinavia. It 
is the secondary co-operatives that exist alongside their private business counterparts 
and compete with them. 
Secondary co-operatives also exist in the Malaysian co-operative system. 
Nevertheless, not one of the 35 secondary co-operatives in Malaysia has been noted 
for making a significant contribution to the economy. This thesis, therefore, seeks to 
explore the relationship between primary and secondary co-operatives in Malaysia, 
which is a neglected area of research especially in Malaysia, where in general, the 
focus has been on issues pertaining to weaknesses of co-operatives such as 
members' participation, capital adequacy, poor management, poor Board 
performance and co-operative's governance (Anderson and Henehan, 2003). 
In countries where secondary co-operatives have been making a significant 
economic contribution, it appears to be a consequence of the effective functioning of 
the secondary co-operatives towards their primary members, i.e. the primary co-
operatives (Oustapassidis, 1992; Singh et aI., 2000; Rebelo et aI., 2002; Arcas-Lario 
and Hernandez-Espallardo, 2003). The successful secondary co-operatives have 
been identified as having the following characteristics: 1) they constitute small size 
primary co-operatives operating in the same kind of economic activity; and 2) they 
constitute primary co-operatives where members' businesses are related to the 
activity of the primary co-operative (Oustapassidis, 1992; Singh et al., 2000; Rebelo 
et al., 2002; Arcas-Lario and Hernandez-Espallardo, 2003; Romero and Perez, 
2003). Having these characteristics allows secondary co-operatives to act as an 
integrated unit with primary co-operatives to achieve economies of scale, greater 
negotiating power in the market and higher efficiency for the primary co-operatives 
(Soegaard, 1994). This effect can be seen in the relationship between primary and 
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secondary co-operatives, in which the secondary co-operatives create economic 
value for the primary co-operatives, in that the secondary co-operatives offers 
primary co-operatives a pathway to resources that are critical to the primary co-
operatives' economic success such as access to market information, development of 
new products, advertising, marketing and members/employees training, with 
benefits of the integration attained for the primary co-operative members such as 
increased members' income and improvements in their welfare. 
With respect to the size of the primary co-operatives that make up the members of 
secondary co-operatives, de Drimer (1997) argues that allowing a small number of 
individuals to form a co-operative group at the primary level is important for the 
organisation and functioning of secondary co-operatives. By 'small size', we mean 
primary co-operatives with a small membership size. However, there is no one 
specific number indicated in the literature for the membership size of small co-
operative groups. In Germany and Switzerland, the minimum number of members 
required to form a co-operative is 7 individuals, while de Drimer (1997) noted a 
minimum of five, four and even three members in some legislatures. 
An issue, which is related to the size of the co-operative concerns the degree of trust 
amongst members. For example, Casson (1995) argues that voluntary associations 
of individuals in economic activity presume a higher degree of trust. Similarly, 
Romero and Perez (2003) argue that high trust is necessary in setting up a co-
operative enterprise because it is an adventure with great risks and sacrifices. 
Finally, Haddad and Mallucio (2003) argue, from the perspective of a financial 
group, that a financial group requires a conscious decision to participate that is often 
conditioned on trust in family members and friends. The importance of trust in the 
formation of a co-operative may influence the kind of primary co-operative 
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established: essentially, primary co-operatives, whose members strongly identify 
with the co-operative, with the presence of the strong identification being a 
mechanism for generating trust in the co-operative (Ole Borgen, 2001). 
Hence, this thesis aIms to review three important aspects of co-operatives in 
Malaysia: the relationship between primary and secondary co-operatives; the level 
of trust among co-operators; and the relationship between co-operative size and trust 
in co-operatives in Malaysia. In order to conduct empirical and econometric 
analysis of these three areas, it was necessary to collect primary data at the co-
operative level as this does not exist in Malaysia, especially data pertaining to the 
relationship between primary and secondary co-operatives and data on trust among 
co-operators in Malaysia. Hence, to our knowledge, this is the first study of these 
three aspects of co-operatives in Malaysia. Thus, the collection of such important 
co-operative level data for Malaysia represents a significant original contribution to 
this area of research. However, the nature of co-operatives in Malaysia has 
contributed to problems in collecting such data. For example, it was not possible for 
us to confine the study of the primary-secondary co-operative relationship among 
co-operatives in a particular sector as in Zeuli et al. (2003b), where they study the 
agricultural primary co-operatives' relationship with their secondary co-operatives. 
This is because, in general, secondary co-operatives in Malaysia have all kinds of 
primary co-operatives, regardless of their activities, as members and the primary co-
operatives, in most cases, are located across a wide geographical area. Also, there is 
a lack of information available as to which primary co-operative is a member of 
which secondary co-operative. In addition, a study into a specific type of secondary 
co-operative may not provide findings, which are useful in informing the progress of 
the Malaysian co-operative movement in general. 
6 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.2. Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the historical beginnings of co-operatives and the co-operative 
movement and the expansion of the co-operative institution to countries and 
continents. As described in detail in Chapter 2, throughout its history, the co-
operative movement has constantly changed. The Industrial Revolution and the 
birth of capitalism have resulted in institutional borrowing ('transplanting') of 
cooperative institutions from one continent to another. 
Chapter 3 explores the co-operative form of organisation. Although co-operatives 
are socio-economic organisations, they are often referred to as economic groups. 
However, certain aspects of the co-operative form of organisation differentiate co-
operatives from other economic organisations and these aspects affect the operation 
and functioning of co-operatives. Chapter 3 reviews six aspects of the co-operative 
form of organisation: the co-operative principles; the capital, income and assets of 
co-operatives; authority and control in co-operatives; the common interest; the 
system structure of the co-operative movement; and the co-operatives' legal 
framework. Of these six aspects, the system structure of the co-operative 
movement, in particular, the secondary co-operatives, is identified as an important 
aspect for the progress of a co-operative movement. Fredericks (1986) argues that 
strong secondary federations, especially, are important for a successful, integrated 
and well-balanced co-operative movement. Factors that constitute a united strong 
co-operative movement, such as the professional management of co-operatives, and 
networking, are more prevalent in secondary co-operatives than in primary co-
operatives. 
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Chapter 4 provides the background context to the empirical analysis. It provides 
information about the Malaysian economy and gives an insight into the growth and 
development of the co-operative movement in Malaysia. In this chapter, we analyse 
economic statistics relating to the growth of co-operatives in terms of the number of 
co-operatives, the number of co-operative members, share capital and assets from 
1990. As indicated above, there is no data available, however, to gauge the 
economic impact of the co-operative movement in Malaysia, e.g. information on 
how many employees exist in the co-operative sector relative to the other sectors of 
the economy is not available for Malaysia. Chapter 4 also discusses the 
development and performance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia to ascertain 
the importance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. In general, the findings 
suggest that the performance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia is poor. 
Chapter 5 describes the mail survey questionnaire used to collect the co-operative 
level data used in the empirical analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The collection of 
the primary data, which includes information on the relationship between primary 
and secondary co-operatives in Malaysia and information on trust, is the only data 
set of its kind for co-operatives in Malaysia. As such, the responses to the mail 
survey questionnaire form an original data source constructed for this thesis. Based 
on the responses to the mail survey questionnaire, in this chapter, we also analyse 
summary statistics relating to the responses to the survey in order to build up a 
profile of the co-operatives in the sample. 
Chapter 6 presents econometric analysis of the relationship between primary and 
secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. We analyse the relationship between 
secondary co-operative membership and the number of members, the share capital 
and the assets of the primary co-operatives. The findings suggest that membership 
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ill secondary co-operatives is positively associated with only the number of 
members of the primary co-operatives. We also analyse the relevance of secondary 
co-operatives from the perspective of the primary co-operatives. We find some 
evidence of the relevance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. 
Chapter 7 analyses the determinants of the level of co-operators' trust in co-
operatives as it has been argued that if the co-operative activity is related to the 
business of members, trust in the co-operative will be high (Ole Borgen, 2001). It is 
the former that is necessary for the effective functioning of secondary co-operatives. 
The responses to the survey indicate a high level of trust in co-operatives among the 
Malaysian co-operators. We also compare the general level of and pattern of trust 
among the Malaysian co-operators with that among a more general sample of 
Malaysians. Again, this entailed further collection of primary data as data on the 
general level of and pattern of trust among the general Malaysian population does 
not exist. Our findings suggest that high levels of trust in the family are positively 
associated with trust in co-operatives. 
A related point across Chapters 6 and 7 concerns the relationship between co-
operative size and trust in the co-operative. Trust in the co-operative may be low 
where co-operatives are of large size (Ole Borgen, 2001). Chapter 8, therefore, 
analyses the relationship between trust in the co-operative and co-operative size. 
Co-operative size appears to be inversely related to trust in the co-operative as 
argued by Ole Borgen (2001) with a higher probability of having trust in the co-
operative in smaller co-operative groups. We also explore the relationship between 
trust and the financial performance of co-operatives by supplementing the primary 
data with secondary data on co-operatives' income and profits. The findings 
indicate that there is no positive relationship between trust in the co-operative and 
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the financial perfonnance of the co-operative. One possible explanation for this may 
be related to the finding that co-operative activity is not likely to reflect the 
member's business. As a result of which, members may not be encouraged to invest 
more in share capital or to patronise the co-operative activity. 
Finally, Chapter 9 presents concluding comments, discusses policy implications and 
highlights avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE AND EXPANSION 
OF CO-OPERATIVES 
2.1. Introduction 
A co-operative is a form of organisation that has been accepted worldwide. Co-
operative institutions do not automatically arise. They have been developed and 
they evolved within a rich array of belief systems, across religions and ideologies. 
Co-operative institutions in different countries have their own history of formation 
and development. Although co-operatives have originated and evolved differently 
from one country to another, it has been argued that they have their roots in the 
economic ideas of Robert Owen, which came about during the Industrial Revolution 
(Webb, 1987). From here, the co-operative institution spread across countries and 
continents. Co-operatives have flourished in certain countries with varying degrees 
of success. In some countries, they have become significant economic actors in 
national economies. The modem co-operative institution in Malaysia is the outcome 
of the transplant of the co-operative institution by the colonial authority.3 
This chapter presents a review of the worldwide emergence and the expansion of co-
operative institutions. In this study of co-operatives in Malaysia, we consider it 
necessary to look at the processes that brought about the formation of co-operatives 
to understand the original concept of the co-operative. The significance of this 
modem form of co-operation, which has been internationally recognised and the 
spread of the co-operative institution, are among the areas that need to be clarified in 
order to aid our understanding of the varying degrees of success of co-operatives 
3 What made the colonial authority decide to introduce co-operatives in Malaysia will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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from one country to another. This chapter therefore reviews the emergence of co-
operatives from a historical perspective. The chapter begins in Section 2.2 with a 
review of how the co-operative thought developed and how the co-operative 
institution gained its foundations. This is followed in Section 2.3 by a review of the 
expansion of the co-operative institution across countries and continents with 
different models of co-operatives and with different degrees of acceptance for the 
modem co-operative institution and its adaptations in new environments. This 
chapter concludes in Section 2.4 with specific case studies on: firstly, the two most 
common forms of co-operatives: the consumer co-operatives and the credit co-
operatives, which have their origins in the UK and in Germany respectively; and 
secondly, the introduction and development of co-operatives in India, which was the 
door to the expansion of co-operative institutions in South Asia and South-East Asia 
with a common model for co-operative development for the region. 
2.2. The Origins and Foundations of Co-operatives 
2.2.1. The Development o/Co-operative Thought 
Co-operatives were said to originate from the word 'co-operation' and they have 
evolved differently from one country to another. Nevertheless, the expansion of the 
co-operative movement has its roots in the economic ideas of Robert Owen, which 
came about during the Industrial Revolution: "There cannot be an adequate record 
of the co-operative movement without taking into account the influence of Mr 
Owen's proceeding upon its fortunes" (Holyoake, 1906a:43). His idea of co-
operation for economic purposes earned him recognition as the founder of the co-
operative movement. It was Owen's economic ideas that had served as a foundation 
of the co-operative idea, ideas that were described as 'broken ends', scattered 
throughout his voluminous writings (Potter, 1987). Co-operation can be applied to 
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different situations, including economic: the basic idea being that more can be 
accomplished by working together. A co-operative business is the application of co-
operation to an economic situation. It is the only type of business that is accepted by 
so many different types of government (Groves, 1985). 
2.2.2. The Meaning o/Co-operation 
Co-operation is a Greek term said to originate from "co- and operari", which means 
"to work - to labour together, to endeavour for some common purpose" (Holyoake, 
1906a:3). Co-operation, from the Webster's dictionary (1961:501) means ''the 
association of a number of persons for their common benefit, collective action in the 
pursuit of common well being, especially in some industrial or business process". It 
is an old term, which has existed from the very beginning of human society when 
"two or more persons uniting to attain an end which each was unable to affect 
singly" (Holyoake, 1906a:4). Co-operation and the pursuit of the common good 
have been given distinctive socio-economic and political connotations. Besides 
being preached in religions, co-operation has been advocated for the attainment of 
ideal states. In 400 B.C, the Greek philosopher Plato advocated philosophies of 
equality, social justice, peace, brotherly love, distributive justice and many more, 
while the French Utopian, Charles Fourier, advocated the contribution of one 
according to hislher means and recompensation according to hislher contribution, 
and Louis Blanc advocated co-operation instead of competition (Enriquez, 1986). 
In the field of co-operative studies, DUlfer (1994) distinguishes between co-
operation and cooperation to facilitate references to the co-operative type of 
organisations, in that the former (spelled with a hyphen) refers to the form of co-
operative societies or related institutions, and the latter (spelled without hyphen) to 
the form of cooperation in games and sports, co-operation in business such as 
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syndicates, cartels, joint ventures and information networks. In short, however, co-
operation/cooperation is the act of voluntarily working together to achieve mutual 
benefits. Co-operation could come in the form of voluntary co-operation or from 
coercion. Where co-operation is an act of coercion, it loses its meaning in the 
industrial sense, which is "the equitable distribution of profits with worker, 
capitalist, and the consumer, concerned in the undertaking" (Holyoake, 1906a:4). 
With regards to a co-operative society, Holyoake's view on co-operation is that it 
"begins with mutual help, with a view to end in a common competence" (ibidem 
p.4). However, it is the idea of co-operation for economic purpose that became the 
foundation for co-operative societies. 
2.2.3. The Idea oleo-operation 
The Industrial Revolution gave rise to capitalism, as a result of which wealth and 
power were concentrated in the hands of a few and society was sharply divided into 
two class: the "haves" and the "have nots" (Sojakhani, 1994). It also led to 
depreciation in the value of human labour bringing pauperism and distress to the 
working class. The poor were taken advantage of by the rich in an era where 
competition was intense with belief in the survival of the fittest and that each man 
should suffer the full consequence of his own actions (ibid., 1994). Competition had 
bred inequality - inequality in the sense that the labourer was not given the full value 
of the product of his labour (Garnett, 1972). The profiteering of the capitalist at the 
expense of the poor had led to widespread industrial unrest and to the search of a 
remedy through which the poor could become owners of the fruit of their labour and 
efforts (ibid., 1972). 
Robert Owen, a social reformer who had lived in the most impoverished industrial 
conditions prevailing amongst workers in English and Scottish factories and mills 
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(Enriquez, 1986), conducted his experiment in the cotton industry in New Lanark 
where he planned "an institution for the formation of character" (Holyoake, 
1906:33). Owen pointed out the harmful consequences which followed from the 
organisation of society according to the principles of the profit motive which would 
lead to a destruction of human character, on one hand, and, on the other, to the 
degrading of and causing misery to others. He increased wages, reduced working 
hours, prohibited child labour, and improved the living conditions of his workers, 
much to the discontent of his fellow manufacturers. He tried to eliminate profit but 
instead showed a profit of £160,000 in four years (Potter, 1987). 
He argued that his approach was applicable to the nation as a whole. The 
establishment of his "New System of Society" - the Orbitson community in 1825, 
Ralahine in 1831, and Queenwood in 1839 - was based on equality in that the 
labourer had a right to the full value of the product of his labour. It was also seen to 
mean 'profit-sharing' as an efficient form of production (Tsuzuki, 1992). Co-
operation as intended by Owen would "ensure the just exchange of equal amount of 
labour (adjusted for costs of production) ... and the balancing of supply and 
demand .... " (ibid., 1992:8), thus avoiding overproduction. " ... it was co-operation 
in place of competitions because competition bred inequality" (Garnett, 1972:26). 
Co-operation to Robert Owen means 'joint-work' not only in both production and 
consumption, but also in the formation of society (ibid., 1992:65). 
2.2.4. From Co-operation to Co-operatives 
The community ideal of Robert Owen is one form of reaction to industrialism which 
involved resettlement and job provision (Garnett, 1972). 'Co-operation' then was 
seen to emerge as an 'arrangement' for poor relief, in Robert Owen's scheme of the 
"Village of Unity and Mutual Co-operation". His view that labour is the source of 
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wealth pushed him into experimenting with a remedy for the relief of the poor 
through a scheme of self-supporting communities (Harrison, 1969). 
The significance of Owen was reduced when the last Owenite settlement at 
Queenwood broke up in 1845. "Co-operation, after thirty years of valorous 
vicissitude, died, or seemed to die, in 1844-5" (Holyoake, 1906:259). It 
recommenced in Rochdale with the opening of a co-operative store in Toad Lane in 
1844, which made a great impact on the history of co-operation and the co-operative 
movement. Holyoake even said, "To me Rochdale was in one sense the Big Ben of 
Co-operation, whose sound will long be heard in history over that of many other 
stores" (Holyoake, 1906:259). 
Holyoake (1906) recognized Robert Owen as the originator of co-operation, but to 
him, the community co-operation of Owen was more like a communist scheme, 
where all must co-operate towards a common goal and the wealth created was to be 
shared equitably by all whose labour produced it. Holyoake described this sort of 
fairness as "mad equality" of "equal divisions of unequal earnings" (Holyoake, 
1906:4). But Owen's tolerance for religion had led him away from the orthodox 
communist idea (Claey, 1992). Holyoake argued that fairness that should be 
promoted in a co-operative society is fairness in which "the right of every worker, 
shareholder, or purchaser is recognized to a share of the common profit, in the 
proportion to which he contributes to it, in capital, or labour, or trade - by hand or 
head" (Holyoake, 1906:5). 
The opening of the Toad Street Store in 1844 in Rochdale was agreed by many as 
the birth of the first successful co-operative model in Britain, from where the co-
operative movement traces an unbroken lineage (Lancaster and Maguire, 1996). It 
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marks the transition from the earlier to the later co-operative movement. The early 
Owenite communitarian theory was based on a loosely defined co-operative 
movement (Garnett, 1972), and was hardly concerned with 'self-help' in the 
commonly understood sense (Gosden, 1973). Garnett (1972) noted that Owenism 
could not have survived beyond 1850 because of its collectivist implications and that 
industrialism had matured by the mid of 19th century to the extent that the economic 
reality of capitalism was gradually accepted by the working class. It is in Rochdale 
that the very first formal co-operative in the legal-commercial sense had their origins 
(Enriquez, 1986). Holyoake argued that the co-operative idea had actually "touched 
the earth, took root and grew" in Toad Lane (Holyoake, 1906:285). 
2.2.5. The Foundation a/Co-operatives 
Much of the ideals, doctrines, myths and inspiration associated with the co-operative 
movement were said to come from Robert Owen. His idea of co-operation for 
economic purpose earned him the recognition as the founder of the co-operative 
movement. His moral and ethical working of society formed the basis of the co-
operative foundation. The elimination of profit, the keystone for Robert Owen's co-
operative system of industry proved that his idea can help overcome poverty and 
misery and, at the same time, create wealth for capital growth. Robert Owen's 
principle that intelligence would prove a good investment had seen him stressing 
education as a cure of society's ills, and when this investment proved his contention, 
it came to pass that the education of members has always been deemed a part of the 
co-operative scheme (Holyoake, 1906). 
Even though the co-operative system of Robert Owen, sometimes referred to as the 
pre-Rochdale co-operations, was said to be lacking in self-help, Garnett (1972) 
viewed it differently. To him, Robert Owen's attempt to change the institution of 
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society was seen as an act of self-help. Garnett argued that Owen neither could 
"contemplate calling on the state for resources" nor could he rely on the workers 
themselves "because they had suffered too severely from adverse circumstances .... " 
(Garnett, 1972:4-6). As Owen's scheme of society was perceived by many to be 
paternalistic, Garnett pointed to the fact that the workers then were neither 
sufficiently articulate to generate their own reform, nor were they powerful enough 
to insist on the implementation of any measures, hence the need for an 'invisible 
hand' as advocated by Adam Smith. 
2.2.6. The Spirit o/Self-Help 
It was only during the second half of the 19th century that the development of the co-
operative movement was concerned with self-help. The word 'self-help' was first 
used by Samuel Smiles in 1876 (Gosden 1973). Smile (1876) had observed what he 
called the spirit of self-help displayed by a few young men who were weekly-wage 
earners. These young men of the humblest rank as he noted, taught themselves and 
each other reading and writing, arithmetic and geography; and even mathematics, 
chemistry and some of the modern languages, in classes modestly set up out of their 
small weekly wages. "Those who knew little taught those who knew less -
improving themselves while they improved the others .... " (Smile, 1876:viii). 
According to him, it is not the law that could help and stimulate men to elevate and 
improve themselves but their own free and independent individual actions. 
Self-help is the instinct of co-operation (Gosden 1973; Holyoake, 1906). Co-
operation among people based on self-help can be for the purposes of the betterment 
of the economic and/or social situation. Now these forms of co-operation are 
formalized into organisations comprising people of the same interests, joining as 
members of the organisation. These organisations can either be economic, social, 
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political or religious organisations that come under the term Self-Help Organizations 
(SHOs). The International Labour Organization (lLO) defines SHOs as 
"associations that share a number of characteristics: they all have an economic 
purpose ... and they are owned and controlled by the people who primarily benefit 
from their activities" (Parnell, 2001 :ix). Thus, co-operatives are organized SHOs for 
economic purposes, but not all SHOs are co-operatives. 
2.3. The Expansion of the Co-operative Movement 
The Industrial Revolution and the birth of capitalism resulted in institutional 
borrowing (retransplanting) of co-operative institutions from one continent to 
another. From its beginning in England, the Co-operative Movement spread to, and 
grew in other industrialized capitalist countries as well as to countries with planned 
economies such as the Soviet Union and China. Co-operatives spread to various 
parts of Western Europe with a different emphasis in different areas. In the rural 
areas, agricultural supply and marketing co-operatives became popular, whilst co-
operative retail stores, bakeries, creameries and credit banks became popular in 
urban centres (Enriquez, 1986). 
The co-operative movement in Ireland, for example, started in 1890 and was said to 
have originated from the British nineteenth century co-operation of artisans and 
thrifty middle class workers. But unlike the British co-operatives, there was little 
progress in the Irish co-operatives except in the agricultural sector of which its 
success was referred by Bolger (1977) as fortuitous, who remarked that co-operation 
in Ireland by its very nature was something of a hidden phenomenon, that the co-
operative realities were so closely entwined and accepted in daily life that their true 
significance could not be appreciated. The need for co-operation in Ireland was not 
urgent, the population was scattered and majority of the people lived off agriculture. 
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The Irish attribute all their industrial shortcomings and their commercial 
disadvantages to the actions of their government (ibid., 1977). 
In North America and Latin America, growth of the co-operative movement started 
slowly in the 1930s and spread in towns and rural areas in 1940s. In Israel, the co-
operative land settlement experience, the 'Kibbutz' became well known for its co-
operative way of living. In ex-colonial states like in India and in Africa, co-
operatives were officially encouraged and assisted. Co-operatives have been used as 
a tool for economic development by many governments in Africa and Asia after 
World War II, with varying success. Co-operatives in China and Japan were also 
given government assistance. In Canada, the co-operative movement became strong 
in the rural areas with wheat marketing, whilst credit unions spread in the urban 
areas. In Australia and in New Zealand, the spread was gradual among rural and 
urban communities; agricultural activities run along co-operative lines are still a 
stable feature of the rural economy (Enriquez, 1986). 
The German model of credit co-operatives has perhaps been the most popular model 
for co-operative institutional transplants, but with varying degrees of success. The 
promotion of the credit co-operatives based on the German Schulze-Delitzsch model 
took place in Ireland in 1894 (Guinnane, 1994) and in Italy in 1863 .(A'Hearn, 
1997). Though the attempt to introduce credit co-operatives in Ireland was seen as a 
potential solution to the credit problem of smallholders, it was a failure due to the 
Irish economic features and social environment (Guinnane, 1994). Credit co-
operatives in Ireland were undermined by the agricultural co-operatives, which also 
extended credit to their members (McCarthy et aI., 1998). However, the 'transplant' 
in Italy has been considered successful after the institution was adapted according to 
the local conditions. Fortuitous timing and favourable conditions also contributed to 
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the success; the bancha populari at that time lacked competition from other deposit-
taking institutions, and the lack of any clear legislation on co-operatives had left 
them relatively free to evolve along whatever path they chose (A'Hearn, 1997). 
Important modifications took the banche populari in Northern Italy in the direction 
of being more like ordinary commercial banks, but they retained the elements of the 
German co-operative model such as limits on maximum shareholding and a 'one 
man - one vote' rule in the general assembly (ibid., 1997). With these adaptations, 
the institution flourished in a new environment - what emerged was a sort of hybrid 
bank (ibid., 1997). 
Timing has also been noted as an important factor leading to the unsuccessful 
introduction of credit co-operatives in Denmark. Guinnane and Henriksen 
(1998:34) argue that credit co-operatives did not succeed there because the potential 
market for such institutions was already saturated by that time. The need for credit 
co-operatives had been satisfied by another institution, the parish savings banks, that 
performed many of the functions of credit co-operatives. In Russia, credit co-
operatives have been adopted by the Ministry of Finance to institute reforms for 
economic change by manipulating the collective habits of people especially in the 
context of agricultural development (Baker, 1977). Baker argues that since the co-
operative institution in Russia appeared to be only slightly different from the 
indigenous peasant institution, co-operation remained an ideological symbol that 
enabled government officials to support it rather than going for radical land reform, 
which might lead to social unrest. Thus, credit co-operatives were used "to 
mobilize people to carry out the policy of the Ministry of Finance to develop an 
independent and conservative peasantry" (Baker, 1977:144). 
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Co-operatives as legal and institutional organisations in South and South-East Asia 
(SEA) are the outcome of the specific intervention of the colonial process. "Since 
Western Europe had successfully solved the problem of peasant indebtedness 
through a co-operative system, the colonial authorities preferred to apply the same 
approach to the same problem in their respective colonies" (Ali Khan and Bhatti, 
1994:242). Co-operatives seem to be the answer to free the poor from the 
stranglehold of moneylenders, especially those in the agricultural sector. The co-
operative movement in South Asia started in India, as the term "British Indian 
Pattern" was used to describe the type of co-operatives formed in all other countries 
in South Asia and SEA that constituted part of the British empire. This pattern was 
moulded in co-operative legislation: the first legislation passed was in 1904 
followed by other subsequent amendments to the law to broaden the scope for co-
operative development. The first co-operative legislation enacted in South Asia 
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) was for the organisation and regulation 
of agricultural credit (Vyas, 1994). The Indian model of the state sponsored co-
operative development was also introduced to other parts of the British colonial 
territory and became known as the Classical British Indian Pattern of co-operation. 
And for many decades, credit co-operatives dominated the co-operative movement 
in South Asia and SEA. 
Over the years, co-operatives have gained popularity in many developing 
economies. They spread gradually and flourished in certain countries, be it in the 
rural or urban sector (Muenkner, 1994; Vyas, 1994). The expansion of co-
operatives is seen "in terms of numbers, forms and types of activities to reach out to 
a large number of people and bring them into the mainstream of development" (Ali 
Khan and Bhatti, 1994:242). Although co-operatives have been operating in South 
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Asia and SEA since the beginning of the 20th century, in general, ordinary citizens 
are still not aware of their concept. Since co-operatives are said to 'be born 
overnight' under government policies and programmes, no proper education is given 
to the people as to why a co-operative should be organized. The establishment of 
co-operative education centres and colleges can be seen as part of the legacy of the 
colonial government in accordance with the government's role in co-operative 
training and education (Muenkner, 1994). 
Transplanting of institutions from one country to another was not always successful, 
especially from one continent to another, thus special measures were needed to 
ensure its success. The British colonial government, through legislation, initiated 
the establislunent and development of co-operatives in their colony, nurturing it 
from the very beginning (Muenkner, 1994). This was done through the creation of 
government machinery for propagating the new model of organisation and 
implementing the co-operative legislation (ibid., 1994). The Indian Co-operative 
Societies Acts of 1904 and 19124 were developed by combining elements of the 
German Co-operative Societies Act of 1889 with elements of the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act of 1852 without consulting the population (ibid., 1994). 
The result is state-sponsored co-operative development known as the 'British-Indian 
Pattern of Co-operation', which the British government implemented in their other 
colonies. The salient feature of this pattern of cooperation is the creation of 
government machinery for propagating and supervising the new model of 
organisation, through the powers conferred by the Act to the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies (Muenkner, 1994; Vyas, 1994). 
4 The Act of 1904 was said to contain "no legislative protection to societies for purposes other than 
credit, or to the central agencies, banks and unions, which were gradually coming into existence to 
finance and supervise the primary credit societies" [Hough, 1959, pAS]. Whilst the 1904 Act gave 
priority to starting rural banks, the 1912 Act widened the scope of the movement. 
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The alternative economic system for the existence of co-operatives has been the 
Soviet-style centrally planned economy. Co-operatives were of secondary 
importance in this economic system and their existence was considered a 
socialization of the 'lower level' as compared to the state owned enterprises, the 
'higher level of socialization' (Kleer, 1994; Kowalak, 1994). "Co-operatives were 
valued only to the extent that they were fully integrated into a Communist economic 
system; they obtained their socialist legiti~acy not from within, not from their own 
co-operative character, but only from obedience to the system surrounding them; 
and they were associated not with the end goal of socialist transformation, but at 
best with a transition period" (Fairbairn, 2000:653). Co-operatives were a transitory 
form of organisation, transforming small-scale undertakings into collective business 
organisations and thus changing private ownership to collective ownership so as to 
transform the interests of the individual to the interests of the group (Kleer, 1994; 
Kowalak, 1994). But with the existence of two forms of property or ownership 
structure, the existence of co-operatives was seen as a threat to the development of a 
truly socialist economy. Co-operatives were therefore eliminated under the concept 
of real socialism over the period 1930 to 1940. It was not until the late 1950s that 
the co-operative was accepted, and used in socialist construction, mainly due to its 
democratic management features and the incentives in co-operatives that motivate 
economic agents (ibid., 1994). 
2.4. Specific Case Studies: UK, Germany and India 
Two types of co-operatives are the most common type of co-operatives worldwide 
and, in particular, in Malaysia: the consumer co-operatives and the credit co-
operatives. The following subsections review the development of these two specific 
types of co-operatives in their country of origin, i.e. the consumer co-operative 
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movement in the U.K. and the credit co-operative movement in Germany. The co-
operative model in Malaysia originated from the model developed in India. The co-
operative movement in India has been viewed as the most successful in South Asia 
and South-East Asia. A review of the development of co-operatives in India 
therefore gives an insight into the factors that contributed to the success of the 
Indian co-operative movement. 
2.4.1. The Development o/Consumer Co-operatives in the u.K. 
When 28 men of Rochdale co-operated they named themselves the Rochdale 
Equitable Pioneers, which was supposed to reflect the objective of the group to 
establish equity; " ... it implies an equitable share of work and profit, which the word 
Co-operation does not connote." (Holyoake, 1906:277). The opening of the store in 
Toad Lane was seen as an attempt to protect consumers at the time when there was 
widespread profiteering by private traders. Consumers were being exploited by the 
sheer greed of private retailers tampering with food to increase its weight. Floor 
sweepings were said to be added to tea and chalk dust was added to flour (Potter, 
1987). The Rochdale Pioneers insisted on the genuine quality of goods they sold but 
could not however sell them at cost price due to economic considerations (ibid., 
1987). 
Potter (1987) pointed out that in the conduct of retail trade, methods of price fixing 
according to Owen's ideal were impossible because in retailing, the goods bought in 
bulk would be sold in small quantities, hence involving the problem of dividing the 
cost price among the smaller units, which at that time involved the use of fractions. 
Surplus is therefore unavoidable and a system of dividing the profits was introduced 
by a member of the Pioneers, Charles Howarth. Profits were divided as a percentage 
of the purchase price, where initially it would not be distributed but kept by the 
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society as accumulated capital. Once it amounted to £5, members would then be 
registered as shareholders at no apparent cost. They could not withdraw this 
amount, but any subsequent savings from profit after this could be withdrawn as 
they wished. So as the members increased their purchases with the store, the greater 
the proportion of profit they received and the more they could save (Potter, 1987). 
Holyoake noted the merit of the scheme in that "it created capital among men who 
had none .... " (Holyoake, 1906:278). 
This method of profit sharing according to Potter (1987) is an indirect method of 
realizing the Owenite ideal of eliminating profit on price, for the surplus over cost 
price was returned to the purchaser in the form of a bonus. It was said to be the 
most equitable way of remunerating the organized consumers since those members 
who contributed the most to the store by buying the most from it had the right to 
reap the largest share of its profit. Though it would have been denounced by Robert 
Owen "as an attempt to spread the contagion of profit-seeking to the working class" 
(Potter, 1987:21), it was argued that the strong appeal of the trade dividend helped 
secure the permanent interest of the members as a way of keeping them loyal to their 
store. The introduction of the system of dividing profits on purchase was seen to 
result in the establishment of the co-operative movement on the firm foundation of 
pure democracy. Members were drawn to have an interest in their society and to 
participate in the government of it. Thus the democratic way of running the 
business, the sharing of profits and consumer protection were regarded as factors of 
innovation introduced by the Rochdale Pioneers in the co-operative system. 
Democracy is the essential condition, and the indispensable instrument for the 
progressive and abiding co-operative organisation of society and Robert Owen had 
not grasped its significance (Holyoake, 1906). 
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In the early days of co-operative expansion in the UK, mainly consumer co-
operatives were established. It was the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 
(IPSA) of 1852, which gave co-operative enterprises a measure of security, 
recognition and protection (Lancaster and Maguire, 1996). In 1863, i.e. 20 years 
after the opening of the Rochdale store, a group of retail societies formed the North 
of England Co-operative Society with the aim of supporting the growing retail 
consumer co-operative, which then became the Co-operative Wholesale Society 
(CWS) in 1872 (ibid., 1996). What has now become the national identity of the co-
operative movement in the UK, was already in place 30 years after the first 
successful retail co-operative in Rochdale. Besides the CWS, the Co-operative 
Insurance Society (CIS) was established in 1867, the Co-operative Congress in 
1869, the Co-operative Bank in 1872, the Co-operative Union in 1873 and the 
Women's Co-operative Guild in 1883 (ibid., 1996). 
Co-operatives in Britain are known for their retailing activities. Local societies, 
from time to time, encountered a commercial crisis and found incorporation into 
wholesale societies a welcome option. In the 1960s, many retail co-operative 
societies formed regional societies (Lancaster and Maguire, 1996). The local retail 
societies in Scotland, for example, acted jointly in sourcing and purchasing their 
merchandise by forming a co-operative wholesale trading society that rapidly 
expanded and diversified into a range of fields including manufacturing, transport, 
banking and insurance that employed thousands of people in different trades and 
occupations and made million pounds of business a year. The CWS which was set 
up by 300 co-operatives trading in Lancashire and Yorkshire for the bulk purchasing 
of goods for its members, opened factories to provide the co-operatives with goods 
and developed services such as banking and insurance to support their operations 
27 
Chapter 2 Overview of the Emergence and Expansion of Co-operatives 
(ibid., 1996). Co-operatives flourished, and entered more and more sectors of the 
economy. 
The CWS changed its name to the Co-operative Group in 2001 after merging with 
Co-operative Retail Services (CRS) in 2000. It brings the Co-operative Bank and 
the CIS together under a common leadership when it created the Co-operative 
Financial Services (CFS) in 2002. With more than 3,000 retail outlets, employing 
over 70,000 people and sales topping £7 billion and £231 million in profits in 2002, 
it claimed to be the UK's largest consumer co-operatives. Retail contributed the 
largest share in its family of businesses (£2.6 billion sales in 2002). Other activities 
are travelcare, funeralcare, banking and insurance, commercial farming, milk 
processing, manufacturing and distribution, property development, engineering and 
building services, car dealership and healthcare. The co-operative movement in the 
UK is now made up of many disparate forms of co-operative businesses and 
services: agriculture; banking; housing; retailing; worker co-operatives; insurance 
and credit unions, which were often described as a 'cradle to the grave' service of 
the co-operatives. 
The Co-operative Union, a non-trading organisation, serves to unite all co-operatives 
and other democratically owned businesses alike, basically in the task of promoting 
co-operatives, protecting the interests of members and representing the movement in 
national policy. Issues common to co-operatives are dealt with by a discussion 
group created in 1991 known as the United Kingdom Co-operative Council 
(UKCC), which represents the interests of the members to the Government, the 
public and other interested groups. The UKCC was created by the co-operatives. 
Members of the UKCC constitute the National Federation of each type of co-
5 All figures pertaining to the Co-operative Group are from the Fact sheet published by the Co-
operative Group on its website: www.co-op.co.uk (16/12/2003). 
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operatives. From the consumer co-operative movement in the UK, we will now 
review the development of the co-operative movement in Germany, where the credit 
co-operative movement originates. 
2.4.2. The Development olCo-operatives in Germany 
In Germany in 1840, the co-operative movement "did not even exist in embryo" 
(Hasselmann, 1971 :285). Factory labour was not yet the mass phenomenon in 
Germany, which was still predominantly an agrarian country. It was only towards 
the end of the 1840s and in the 1850s that capitalist firms appeared in large numbers, 
a period in which a dynamic spirit of enterprise prevailed. This was the period 
which also saw the first deliberate defensive action of the labouring class (strikes) -
when co-operative ideas made their first appearance in Germany with the foundation 
of the Arbeiter-Verbriiderung (Labour Brotherhood) in 1848: that is the joining 
together in association to produce, to exchange and to purchase goods collectively 
(ibid., 1971). 
There were not many consumer co-operatives in the 1850s, most of the co-operative 
societies at that time were handicraft producers' co-operatives. The German 
consumer movement reached its peak in the 1920s with over 3 million members, 
representing approximately one-fifth of all households in Germany (Fairbairn, 
2000). They became the largest arm of the German co-operative movement and one 
of the largest social movements in German history despite numerous measures to 
hamper consumer co-operatives (ibid., 2000). Because of their historical association 
with the working class and Social-Democratic movements, they were repressed 
during the Nazi era and co-operatives were liquidated in stages through to 1941 
(ibid., 2000). It was in 1946 that consumer co-operatives were allowed to be re-
established in West Germany by the Allied military authorities, who had previously 
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been against its establishment (ibid., 2000). Small local societies were re-
established. As West Germany became more western oriented and more 
aggressively capitalist, the consumer co-operatives faced tough and increasingly 
integrated competitors (Hasselmann, 1971). Without the benefits either of solid 
member involvement or adequate capitalization, the consumer co-operative 
movement worsened. "The consumer co-operatives had no wider co-operative ideas 
and aims beyond the cheapening of their cost of living and for that reason they did 
not become a movement and did not grow into a community" (ibid., 1971 :291). The 
Soviet military administration in East Germany however was quick to rebuild 
consumer co-operatives as a means of dealing with massive food distribution and 
rationing problems after the war. Consumer co-operatives were created top down as 
state supporting socialist organisations that rapidly took over properties and became 
large retail-distribution organisations (Fairbairn, 2000). 
The system of credit co-operatives was first introduced in Germany, during the 
1850s as a response to the perceived failure of formal financial institutions 
(Guinnane, 2001). The urban Schulze-Delitzsch and the rural Raifesissen co-
operatives are two famous types of co-operatives. Friedrich Wilhelm Raifessen 
established agricultural co-operative banks because the farmers of his day were not 
considered creditworthy for the commercial banks and remained primarily rural 
(ibid., 2001). In the urban areas, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch started the limited 
liability credit co-operative. The Haas group of credit co-operatives made up most 
of the rural credit co-operatives by the end of the nineteenth century (ibid., 2001). 
Credit co-operatives grew at the time when savings banks (Sparkassen) and other 
lending institutions were already established but they were not prepared to offer 
reasonable loan terms to small farmers and labourers, leading to the astonishing 
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growth in the number of German credit co-operatives from 245 co-operatives in 
1885 to over 14,500 twenty-five years later (ibid., 2001). Neither the Schulze-
Delitzsch nor the Raifeissen ideas were based on Robert Owen or the Owenite 
thought - "They did not even trouble to study him" (Hasselmann, 1971 :293). Today 
the co-operative banks constitute an integral part of the German banking system. 
They are important players in the market besides the savings banks and other 
commercial banks and credit institutions in a country with fragmented banking 
systems. Savings deposits in credit co-operatives (including co-operative central 
banks and the Deutcshe Genossenshaftsbank) totalled €183,824 million, which is 
30% of the total savings deposits of€613,015 million in 2004.6 They came second 
in rank after saving banks, but in terms of distribution, there are 1,338 of them in 
2002 as compared to only 498 savings banks (Porath, 2004). 
So consumer co-operatives were not really successful in West Germany whilst credit 
co-operatives consolidated into huge co-operative banks, making a significant 
contribution to the German financial economy. Although Britain is well known for 
its consumer co-operative movement, the British colonial government introduced the 
German co-operative credit system to its colony in Asia. The attempt to introduce 
co-operatives in Asia and South East Asia starts in India. The following subsection 
reviews the 'transplant' of the co-operative institution and its development in India. 
2.4.3. The Development olCo-operatives in India 
The Indian co-operative movement was never a spontaneous development as in 
advanced economies such as in Western Europe, but was government initiated. It 
started from the top, not as a movement from the masses, which influenced the form, 
progress and achievement of the co-operative movement in India. The British 
6 Federal Statistics Office, Germany, 2005. 
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colonial government of India faced serious economic problems and social unrest 
caused by the indebtedness of the Indian farmers and by permanent famine. Lands 
were transferred from actual owners to landlords and traders (Muenkner, 1994; 
Shojakhani, 1994). There were attempts to find solutions to these problems by 
setting up agricultural credit schemes and by taking legal measures against usurers, 
but which failed. The introduction of co-operatives in India carne with a 
recommendation by Nicholson, in his report regarding the possibility of introducing 
land and agriculture banks in Madras. 7 In 1900, the government considered the 
introduction of the Raifeissen model of credit co-operatives in rural India 
(Muenkner, 1994, Hough, 1959). A co-operative society was started in Punjab as 
early as 1891 for controlling the common land of the village for the benefit of the 
co-sharers, and functioned until 1922, when the land was partitioned. Credit was the 
chief concern of the co-operative movement in India then, and until now the 
agricultural credit societies formed the basic structure of the co-operative movement 
in India (Muenkner, 1994). 
The targets of co-operative development were based on credit development, and co-
operatives were nurtured and guided, with the provision of funds and management 
personnel by the government. Co-operative legislation provided the basis not only 
for promoting and organizing co-operatives, but also for the excessive government 
intervention; the role of the government in providing the policy framework, financial 
support, training and member education. The co-operatives became an instrument 
for raising the level of the agriculturist: as an agency for the supply of cheap and 
productive credit as a means of improving the lot of the agriculturist and of checking 
the trend to industrialization (Hough, 1959). 
7 The report is published in two volumes in 1895 and 1897 (Muenkner, 1994; Hough, 1959). 
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During the British period, co-operatives were confined mainly to the area of 
agricultural credit. After independence, especially after 1954, co-operatives were 
regarded as the instrument of socio-economic transformation with the most 
potential: to solve the problems of economically displaced persons; to raise moral as 
well as economic standards, to teach democratic procedures; and to lay the 
foundations of a new social order based on co-operative welfare as a contrast to 
individual competition (Shojakhani, 1994). The co-operative movement has become 
an important sector of the Indian economy with the setting up of national federations 
of co-operatives in areas such as agricultural marketing, land development, housing, 
dairy produce, labour, fishing and spinning, as an instrument for helping village and 
city workers to improve their state. Co-operatives are numerous in India and are an 
important part of the national development strategy embedded in India's five-year 
development plan (Vyas, 1994). Co-operatives have been instruments of economic 
planning underlined in the development plan by the state. They were important for 
the removal of poverty. Considerable attention was paid to the co-operative 
movement and the incentives to promote it by the government because it was 
considered the basis for planned growth and social development. As a result of this 
effort, co-operative structures can be noted from the village to the national level, 
with 200 million individual members in 1994, contributing substantially in the fields 
of agriculture and agro-processing (Shojakhani, 1994). In 1997, 32.9% of 
employment in the organized sector was in the co-operative sector, whereas the 
public sector employed 46.5% and the private sector only 20.6% (Haan et aI., 2003). 
From India, co-operative institutions spread to other parts of South Asia and South 
East Asia, mostly through colonization as in the case of Malaysia. In Malaysia, 
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however, the agricultural co-operative movement is not as significant as the non-
agricultural co-operative movement. 8 
2.5. Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the historical emergence of co-operatives and the spread 
of co-operatives across countries and continents. The historical perspective of the 
emergence of co-operatives provides information on the formation of co-operative 
institutions, why they exist and how they are formed. The co-operative is a form of 
economic organisation, which is widespread and its development in different 
countries has an interesting history, be it in the socialist economy or in the 
market/capitalist economy. Basically, a co-operative, which originates from the 
word co-operation, unites two or more persons for economic purposes. The ways 
co-operatives are formed vary from one country to another. In the West, for 
example in the UK, co-operative societies were obviously the creations of their 
members and did not owe their existence to governmental initiative. Meanwhile in 
Asia and South-East Asia, for example, co-operatives have been used as a tool for 
economic development with a government agency overseeing the development of 
the co-operative movement. Even though a certain type of co-operative may be 
successful in one country, for example the credit co-operatives in Germany, it may 
not be so in another country, for example with credit co-operatives in Ireland. Their 
degree of success, which varies from one country to another, more so from one 
continent to another, depends on the social and economic environment where the co-
operative existed. The next chapter presents a detailed review of the characteristics 
of co-operatives that differentiate them from other forms of economic organisation. 
8 A review of the development ofthe co-operative movement in Malaysia is given in Chapter 4. 
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THE OPERATION OF CO-OPERATIVES 
3.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we have reviewed the historical beginnings of co-
operatives and their expansion across countries and continents. Irrespective of 
where and in what area of activity co-operatives exist, as a co-operative 
organisation, they share some basic operational and organisational characteristics, 
which differentiate them from other forms of organisations and which determine 
how co-operatives work. In this chapter, we specifically discuss six aspects relating 
to the working of co-operative societies that can be used to explain how co-
operatives work: the co-operative principles; the capital, income and assets of co-
operatives; authority and control in co-operatives; the common interest; the structure 
of the co-operative system; and the co-operative legal framework. We present a 
discussion of these aspects in this chapter not only to highlight the kind of 
organisations that co-operatives are, but also to bring attention to which of these 
aspects that could have possibly lead to the co-operative sector in some countries 
having a significant economic impact. This chapter however begins in Section 3.2 
with a review of the definition and the concept of co-operatives and the difference 
between co-operatives and other forms of economic organisations. Then, in Section 
3.3, we review the aspects relating to the working of co-operatives, which 
differentiate them from other forms of economic organisations. After having 
discussed these aspects of co-operatives, in Section 3.4, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the assessment of co-operative performance from a variety of 
approaches. 
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3.2. The Definition and the Concept of Co-operatives 
A co-operative is a form of economic organisation, which is widespread and its 
development in different countries has an interesting history with varying degree of 
success as discussed in Chapter 2. After more than 150 years of existence, co-
operatives have been formed according to five different traditions: 1) the consumer 
co-operatives, which started in Rochdale in 1844; 2) the workers' production co-
operatives that started in France by the French labourers in the 1840s to substitute 
for the hierarchical management system with workers' initiative and accountability; 
3) the co-operative banking that started in Germany, also in the 1840s. formed 
among artisans and small merchants and later among the rural peasants; 4) the 
agricultural co-operatives that started in Europe in the 1880s among the primary 
producers and farmers to improve the quality of production, to stabilize supply of 
farm commodities, and to help secure better income for farmers; and 5) the service 
co-operatives which consist of people joining together to provide themselves with 
different kinds of services such as housing, transport, child care and health care. It 
is therefore not surprising that there are many definitions of a co-operative. 
North (1990) classifies co-operatives as organisations of economic bodies. He 
defines them as "groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
objectives" (ibid.,:5) and the distinguishing characteristics are a complex of norms 
and behaviours that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes. 
Nilsson (1996) defines a co-operative as an economic activity owned and managed 
by the members to promote members' common needs. Monzon Campos (1997) 
states that co-operatives are created from below by individuals, i.e. the members, to 
satisfy their common needs. To Fregidou (2000), a co-operative is an association of 
persons who work together to achieve certain commercial objectives. A more 
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elaborate definition of a co-operative is given by Chaves and Monzon Campos 
(2000, quoted in Julia and Server, 2003:466) who state that a co-operative is 'a 
group of private companies created to meet their members' needs through the 
market by producing goods and providing services ... where profit distribution and 
decision making are not directly linked to the capital contributed by each member, 
each of whom has one vote". The German co-operative law defines a co-operative 
as a community with open membership that has the purpose of promoting the 
members' economy by means of a common enterprise (Hanel, 1992).9 
The various definitions given above reveal the different expectations regarding the 
roles and functions of a co-operative, i.e. the social and the economic functions. In 
developing countries, for example, co-operatives are intended to serve as 
instruments of development policy, such as their roles in the reduction of disparities, 
combating exploitation, the improvement of social conditions and gender sensitivity. 
Although the social and the economic components are both present in co-operatives, 
the economic objective is the main objective of a co-operative and is stressed in 
many of the definitions of co-operatives. But it has been argued that what gives co-
operatives its essence is the social component. With socio-economic institutions 
like co-operatives, the subordination ofthe economic to the social is inherent in their 
constitution (Levi and Pellegrin-Rescia, 1997). Levi and Pellegrin-Rescia argue that 
the social component is the prerequisite for the establishment and functioning of co-
operatives. The social component is considered as an old ingredient while the share, 
the interest on it, the reserves, the balance sheets and other similar elements from the 
world of business are the new ingredients. The principles are the operational 
practices. The normative and operational devices make co-operatives an association 
9 This definition is stated in Section I of the Gennan Co-operative Law. 
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and an enterprise at the same time, that have distinguished co-operatives from the 
common profit-oriented firm (ibid., 1997). 
Co-operators from the worldwide co-operative movement, however, have agreed on 
a common definition of a co-operative, as defined by the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA). The leA defines a co-operative as "an autonomous association of 
persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs 
and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise"JO. 
Three factors, however, remain, that can be found in practically all theoretically 
based definitions (Nilsson, 1996): 
a. The user-owner principle: the individuals who own and finance the co-
operative are those that use it; 
b. The user-control principle: the control of the co-operative is by those who 
use the co-operative; and 
c. The user benefits principle: the benefits of the co-operatives are distributed 
to its users on the basis of their use. 
All organisations that fulfil these three criteria are co-operatives and organisations 
that do not meet all three criteria are not co-operatives (Nilsson, 1996). These 
criteria are thus both necessary and sufficient to establish the co-operative concept. 
Generally, a co-operative concept is linked with two aspects of a co-operative: the 
role as an interest organisation and as an enterprise (Fregidou-Malama, 2000). As 
an interest organization, it is a bottom-up alliance based on voluntary co-operation 
between independent users to pursue their needs or interests, which they have in 
common, and as an enterprise it is an economic entity and only has the purpose of 
promoting members' economic activity (ibid., 2000). The dual nature of a co-
10 International Co-operative Alliance, "Statement on the Co-operative Identity". 
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operative distinguishes a co-operative from an ordinary business. A co-operative 
therefore has different goals (Nilsson, 1996): 
a. The business objective of the co-operative requires the co-operative to be 
efficient in its business operation with sound management techniques; 
b. The social objectives require the joint responsibility of members who are 
equal irrespective of their capital contribution. Ownership and control are in 
the hands of members and the co-operative surplus is to be shared 
proportionately on the basis of patronage. Involvement in community affairs 
and members' education also becomes part of the social goals of co-
operatives. 
The dual objective of co-operatives is manifested in the practices of co-operative 
societies and is laid down in the principles for co-operatives (Nilsson, 1996). 
Co-operatives are different from other economic organisations such as: investors-
owned firms (lOFs); cartels or clubs. The dissimilarity stems in the ownership 
structure, goals/objectives, capital structure, profitability and operating efficiency. 
The goal of co-operatives is to eliminate monopolistic excesses of profit-oriented 
firms. According to the theory of co-operatives, co-operatives are user-owned firms, 
where the clients are the investors, who expect to receive direct benefit through 
doing business with the co-operatives. In IOFs, clients are separated from investors, 
who received return proportional to their investments and who are driven to 
maximize earnings. 
A cartel is a group of companies, countries or other entities having a formal 
(explicit) agreement to work together to influence market prices by controlling the 
production and sale of a particular product. Cartels usually occur in an oligopolistic 
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industry, where there are a small number of sellers and usually involve 
homogeneous products. Cartel members may agree on such matters as price fixing, 
total industry output, market shares, allocation of customers, allocation of territories, 
bid rigging, establishment of common sales agencies, and the division of profits or 
combination of these. The aim of such collusion is to increase individual member's 
profits by reducing competition. Meanwhile, clubs are voluntary groups deriving 
mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the 
members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits (Sandler, 
1992). Also, secondary co-operatives with their primary co-operatives are not like 
multi-plant firms, where a plant can be closed due to manpower problems. 
There has been a rapid growth of an alternative mode of production in the UK 
known as the labour-managed (LM) firms in the attempt to save bankrupt capitalist 
firms (Podivinsky and Stewart, 2003). LM firms are co-operatives - also known as 
worker co-operatives or producer co-operatives. LM firms are formed by 
entrepreneurs, who supply not only capital but also effort to the activity of the firm. 
In LM firms, therefore, workers own and control firms, income is shared equally 
amongst workers and LM firms have the objective of maximising income per 
worker. LM firms work on a collective decision-taking basis, majority voting and 
appropriating a share of the profit, thus upholding the co-operative principles. 
The following section discusses the organisational and the operational aspects 
related to the working of co-operative societies. 
3.3. The Organisational and Operational Aspects of Co-operatives 
In general, the four common types of co-operatives are credit co-operatives, 
consumer co-operatives, marketing and/or supply co-operatives and workers' co-
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operatives. Co-operatives, which are set up for credit purposes, are called credit co-
operatives, credit unions or loan and thrift co-operatives. Credit co-operatives 
require a small amount of fixed capital but a large amount of operating capital 
(Enriquez, 1986). This type of co-operative acquires capital from members from 
entrance fees, shares, deposits, reserves and borrowing. Consumer co-operatives 
serve consumers by way of retailing at co-operative stores. They require a large 
number of members to boost sales so as to cover costs and leave enough margins. 
Marketing or supply co-operatives are common in the agricultural sector. They 
require large amounts of fixed capital for buildings, premises, factories, machinery, 
plant or rolling stock. The worker co-operatives are co-operatives where the owners 
are also workers. Basically worker co-operatives started off with a small number of 
individuals. The individual's financial investment is particularly important. The 
workers/owners govern the business according to the one member one vote 
principle. Irrespective of the type of co-operative, the following six aspects can be 
used to explain how co-operatives work and to differentiate them from other forms 
of economic organisation. 
3.3.1. The Co-operative Principles 
The 'Co-operative Principles' form a clear set of guidelines that put into practice the 
values upheld in co-operatives. The values underlying co-operation, including self-
help, equality, equity, democracy, and social responsibility expressed in co-
operatives can be linked to a lengthy history. The statement of co-operative identity 
adopted at the 1995 Congress and the General Assembly of the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA) in Manchester listed 7 principles: (1) voluntary and open 
membership; (2) democratic member control; (3) member economic participation; 
(4) autonomy and independence; (5) education, training and information; (6) co-
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operation among co-operatives; and (7) concern for community. The principles 
were officially declared and accepted worldwide first in 1937 and were reformulated 
in 1966 and 1995, to meet new the challenges in the contemporary world. The co-
operative values and principles stand for the particular character of co-operatives 
and set apart co-operatives from investor-owned firms (IOFs). They are used "as the 
basis for the make up of legislation, by-laws or statutes and for defining practices 
applied to local problems and conditions" (Fregidou-Malama, 2000:83). These 
principles serve as the norms for all co-operative organisations all over the world, 
and these shared norms are a sign of the legitimacy of the institution (Sjoestrand, 
1992). 
3.3.2. Co-operatives' Capital, Income and Assets 
Co-operatives, like any other business organisation need considerable capital 
resources to function properly. The sources of the co-operative capital come from 
owned capital, contributions and loan capital. Benham and Keefer (1991), however, 
argue that much of the capital must come from members and members' 
contributions must be forthcoming for the co-operative to survive as co-operatives 
may collapse when contributions and loans are withdrawn. Owned capital is money 
contributed by members of the co-operatives and the sources come from shares and 
reserves. Shares in co-operatives have to be bought by members on entry as 
members of the co-operatives. Reserves are essential to enable co-operatives to 
build capital resources. Reserves provide the co-operative with an interest free 
source of capital. They accrue over time on a fixed percentage basis annually from 
the operating surplus. Loan capital is money borrowed from members and non-
members and the sources come from deposits, revolving funds, bank loans, and 
government advances. Nilsson (2001) noted that co-operatives tend to have 
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difficulty in raising capital due to the inadequate contributions of members to the 
collective capital. Capital growth is slow as members, old and new, generally pay 
only a small contribution towards the capital to join the co-operative. Thus, co-
operatives have to borrow capital, the burden of which is carried by future members 
(Jensen and Meckeling, 1976). 
With the financing of co-operatives through members' contributions, there are two 
possibilities: limited or unlimited liability. The former is the prevailing form in 
most co-operatives nowadays; the latter was adopted by co-operatives in the early 
days. With unlimited liability, all members are jointly responsible for all losses and 
debts contracted. This system is prevalent in rural areas and with small businesses. 
Enriquez (1986) noted that security in unlimited liability is not by share capital, but 
by pledging the real land titles, and by moral obligation and responsibility which 
members have for each other's welfare. He argued that this kind of arrangement is 
suitable for co-operatives where members are usually known to each other 
personally, and have mutual trust in the honour and integrity of each other. Co-
operatives based on limited liability have a large number of people as members, who 
do not know each other on personal terms. The limited liability form makes 
members accountable for only the amount of their shares, thus each member is 
allowed by co-operative law to hold a limited percent of the co-operative, normally 
not exceeding 20 percent of the total share capital (ibid., 1986). 
The source of income of co-operatives and the way in which they are controlled 
differentiate co-operatives from non-profit organisations. The source of income for 
a non-profit organization would be differentiated as being from donors (i.e. the 
patrons of the organisation) or from its customers for commercial purposes, while 
the control would either be mutual (that is by the patrons) or the entrepreneur (i.e. by 
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self-perpetuating bodies) (Spear, 2000). A non-profit organisation is, in essence, an 
organisation that is barred from distributing its profits, if any, to the individuals who 
exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors or trustees. A non-
profit organisation is however not barred from making profit: "Net earning, if any, 
must be retained and devoted in their entirety to financing further production of the 
services that the organisation was formed to provide" (Hansmann, 1980:838). Co-
operatives, on the other hand, may be profit distributing. But the distribution of 
profit in co-operatives is constrained in a number of ways and, furthermore, the fact 
that co-operatives do not primarily strive for profit, that profit is secondary, rendered 
co-operatives 'not-for-profit organisations' (NiP). This puts co-operatives closest to 
the mutual commercial typology, which could have resulted in the 
acknowledgement of co-operatives as economic organizations (Spear, 2000). 
Co-operatives' assets are collectively owned. Owners of co-operatives are 
prevented from exercising all the rights associated with ownership of the co-
operative asset by legal constraints regarding the assets' use. Some co-operative 
statutes contain a clause stipulating that in the event of liquidation, remaining assets 
should be transferred to common funds (Nilsson, 2001). When a member leaves a 
co-operative organisation, he/she does not have access to the assets to which he/she 
contributed; when a new member joins the co-operative he/she immediately has 
access to all assets that earlier generations of members have accumulated (ibid:336). 
Nilsson argues that this static nature of co-operatives' assets may be why a co-
operative firm never has to shut down even if the members' need for the firm 
disappears. Milgrom and Roberts (1992:294) argue that if no one clearly owns a 
valuable asset, then no one has an incentive to guard its value properly. This is a 
problem of vaguely defined property rights. "Property rights are defined as a 
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socially and legally enforced right to select uses of an economic good ... it gives 
owners claim to the residual returns of the firm and a part in the decision process" 
(Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999:528). Co-operatives, however, do not determine who 
receives the residual property rights and Rebelo et al. (2002) argue that this has 
resulted in members of co-operatives favouring decisions that give short-run benefits 
(i.e. the horizon problem), which affects the viability and growth of co-operatives. 
The lack of property rights has a negative impact on co-operatives such as obstacles 
to capital acquisition, inability to diversify or concentrate their asset portfolio and 
inefficiency of resource allocation (Oustapassidis and Vlachvei, 1998). The 
problems related to property rights were seen to have given rise to the new type of 
co-operatives known as the 'new generation' co-operatives. The 'new generation' 
co-operatives "require closed membership that requires significant up-front 
investment and a pooling arrangement in which members share equitably on a per-
unit basis in the revenue stream that has been created" (Cook and Iliopoulos, 
1999:526 quoting a senior officer with the St. Paul Bank for Co-operatives). Cook 
and Iliopoulos noted that the 'new generation' co-operatives offer stocks to 
members and once the stock offering is over, someone new cannot come in without 
purchasing a member's stock. 
3.3.3. Authority and Control in Co-operatives 
In this section, we will discuss on the organisation of co-operatives, which touches 
basically on the form of authority and control in co-operatives. Theoretically 
speaking co-operatives are similar to IOFs. They differ, however, in the sense that 
in co-operatives, the decision and control of the firm rest solely on members who are 
the owners and users of the co-operatives. Whereas in the IOFs, the decision control 
is based on the share capital invested by individuals and the rights to residual claims 
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ultimately rest in the hands of the owners. Decision control in co-operatives is 
based on 'one member one vote' and the rights to residuals expire when an 
individual ceases to become a member of the co-operative. In co-operatives, owners 
assume an ownership role through voluntary action or election. Control and policy 
are carried out in a democratic manner in line with the co-operative principles. The 
principle of one-member one-vote is essential in co-operatives at the primary level. I 1 
We will discuss the different levels of co-operatives in the next section, which 
focuses on the organisational structure of the co-operative system. 
The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is the highest authority in a co-operative. To 
control a co-operative, co-operative members elect the leaders among themselves, 
decide on the aims ofthe co-operative's activities, and contribute to the co-operative 
development through work, buying or deliveries (Fregidou-Malama, 2000:84). A 
co-operative's Board of Directors (BoD) is elected in the AGM following an 
election procedure, which is clearly explained in legislature pertaining to co-
operative societies. By the power vested in them, the co-operative BoD directs the 
co-operative and sets the policies for achieving the co-operative objectives. All 
policies are decided upon democratically by majority decisions at the Board 
meetings. The co-operative BoD is also responsible for the hiring of the managerial 
staff. Very often, however, small co-operatives do not have the means to hire 
professional managers. Therefore, in a small co-operative, the BoD acts as the 
managers, whereas in large co-operatives, managers are hired (ibid., 2000). 
Co-operatives are said to resemble mutual nonprofit organisations, such as clubs, in 
which the board of directors of the organisation is selected by the membership, 
11 The 'one man one vote' principle in co-operatives means that irrespective of the amount of share 
capital a member has in a co-operative, he/she has only one vote in the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) of the co-operative. 
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which consists of all individuals who make monetary contributions to the 
organisation. But they are, however, by no means the same concept: co-operatives 
are generally formed under a corporation statute that is quite distinct from both the 
nonprofit corporation statutes and the business corporation statutes (Hansmann, 
1980). Co-operative statutes typically permit a co-operative's net earnings to be 
distributed to its patrons or investors, who may in tum exercise control over the 
organisation. Thus, co-operatives are not subject to the nondistribution constraint 
that is the defining characteristic of nonprofit organisations (ibid., 1980). 
3.3.4. The Common Interest 
In general, a co-operative is a voluntary association of individuals with a common 
interest. A common need or common interest has been made a requirement for the 
formation of a co-operative group as can be seen in the definitions of a co-operative 
discussed in Section 3.2. Some countries, such as Malaysia, have made this a legal 
requirement in that unless a common interest is deemed to exist in a group, the 
group cannot be registered as a co-operative under co-operative law. Common 
interest is a general term. We take the term common interest to mean an interest that 
is commonly shared among a group of people, which can qualify them as belonging 
to the group. Common interest is thus regarded as a homogeneous factor for a co-
operative group. Nevertheless, homogeneity in terms of belonging to a group and to 
the values upheld by the group are not sufficient to "generate benefits of 
homogeneity" and also to "extend the horizons of current members, increasing their 
willingness to invest in the enterprise" (Benham and Keefer, 1991 :709-710). 
Common interest that is not based on the individual's need to survive can result in 
the existence of co-operatives, which serve the common needs of the members. The 
fact that members want something and the co-operative exists to serve their needs 
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makes other factors secondary, such as the costs of the service, how it fits in with the 
other services offered by the co-operative, whether the service is already offered by 
competitors, and so on (Hogeland, 2003). Hogeland argues that the economic 
consequence is that the co-operative can become a multipurpose business lacking a 
clear customer definition. It leads to the fundamental loss of purpose created by the 
'add-on' mentality. With this, the co-operative defines itself as it goes along, by 
accumulating a wide number of product lines, typically not clearly related. 
Ultimately, it becomes very difficult for such co-operatives to achieve the critical 
mass and scale economies that would enable them to compete with more efficient 
and focused suppliers (ibid., 2003). 
3.3.5. The System Structure o/the Co-operative Movement 
The tier system is inherent in the co-operative movement. It varies from one 
country to another, with two, three or even four tiers. The first-tier or the first-level 
co-operatives are the primary co-operatives, also known as the local co-operatives. 
The way a primary co-operative is organized differs from one place to another or 
from a country to another. There are primary co-operatives in which individuals 
with or without their own business organize themselves voluntarily to form a co-
operative group to enable them to enter into, or accomplish some activities, which 
otherwise could not possibly be undertaken by individuals. The poor may also be 
asked to get themselves organized into co-operative groups, to serve as a conduit for 
receiving development aid from the government. The recognition of a group as 
being a co-operative differs between countries. In Malaysia, for example, a group 
can only be legally recognized as a co-operative under the Co-operative Act after it 
has been registered with the Registrar of Co-operatives, i.e. after the prerequisite for 
the registration of a primary co-operative group has been met, basically common 
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economic interest must be deemed to exist in the group and the group consists of at 
least one hundred individual persons. 12 However, in the UK, an individual business 
or society can be a co-operative and will be treated as a co-operative under the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act if they are able to prove themselves a bona 
fide co-operative, i.e. if they put into practice the principles of a co-operative. 
Primary co-operatives usually operate in local areas, with a small number of 
members, limited operations, and little chance of expansion (Enriquez, 1986). 
Enriquez argues that primary co-operatives are very strong in mutual support, trust 
and confidence because members usually know each other well. 
Where a two-tier system exists, co-operatives at the second tier function as the apex 
organisation to the primary co-operative. The three-tier co-operative system would 
constitute the primary co-operatives at the first level, the secondary co-operatives or 
the regionals/federations at the second level, and the co-operative apex organisation 
at the third tier. A secondary co-operative is a voluntary association of primary co-
operatives or the first-level co-operative organisations. The Co-operative 
Development Agency (CDA) in the UK defines a secondary co-operative as "a 
corporate trading organisation set up by a group of individuals or businesses to 
provide themselves with services on a co-operative basis. The business will recruit 
member businesses or individuals that have an interest in the service it aims to offer" 
(CDA,2000). Thus, in the UK, when businesses or societies that have been treated 
as primary co-operatives set up a co-operative, the co-operative is a secondary co-
operative. In Malaysia, under Subsection 4(2) of the Co-operative Societies Act 
1993, secondary co-operatives have to consist of registered primary co-operatives 
only. In general, secondary co-operatives are formed to serve the local primary co-
12 These prerequisite for registration is contained in Subsection 4{ 1) and Subsection 5{ 1) of the Co-
operative Societies Act 1993. 
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operatives. Thus, secondary co-operatives are also known as service providers 
(Lambert and Bliss, 2001). The association of autonomous first-level co-operatives 
in autonomous federations or secondary co-operatives is one of the most valuable 
contributions of co-operators to the art and science of democratic organisation; it is 
"more in the nature of an organic growth, responding to changing needs and 
circumstances by developing new shoots" (Bonner, 1961:343). 
Secondary cooperatives are owned and run by groups of primary cooperatives. As 
owners of the secondary co-operative, the primary co-operatives determine the 
objectives of the secondary co-operative and the kind of services to be provided by 
their secondary organisation. Membership in a secondary co-operative can be either 
voluntary or is required by the law (as in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Austria) where it is obligatory for members to be affiliated with a co-operative 
auditing federation. 'Voluntary' is a relative term, if affiliation is the only chance of 
survival (Eschenburg, 1994). 
Control of the secondary society is exercised by the society members through their 
power of electing the BoD, through Annual General Meetings, and through the need 
for the Board to submit any proposal not covered by the rules to a referendum of the 
societies. Secondary co-operatives have to adhere to the same cooperative 
principles with the exception ofthe 'One Man One Vote' principle. It is normal for 
second-tier co-operatives to dispense with the traditional feature of the 'One Man 
One Vote' principle, and instead vote by size. This is because the primary co-
operatives that make up the members of the secondary co-operatives may vary in 
membership size. The uneven size of the primary member organisations and the 
democratic point of view indicates the basis of this argument - "the relative 
influence of each member organisation should somehow reflect the number of co-
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operators it represents" (Soegaard, 1994: 114). The introduction of a proportional 
representation of interests or the principle of proportionality of voting rights has 
long been adopted in co-operative banks in developed countries in order to be 
competitive with joint stock companies that represent a more developed and 
widespread form of economic activity in a post-industrial economy (ibid., 1994). 
Secondary co-operatives are the instruments of their owners, they are the "co-
operatives of co-operatives" (Soegaard, 1994) that have the roles of supporting, 
strengthening and promoting the economies of their primary members (Le. the 
primary co-operatives), while the primary co-operatives have the objective of 
maximizing income and welfare of the individual members. The relationship 
between the primary co-operatives and their secondary cooperatives often has a 
legal characteristic stipulated in the legislature relating to, e.g., the composition of 
membership, the holding of share capital, the election of the BoD and the rights of 
participation of the primary members in second-level cooperatives. In the Spanish 
cooperative's legislature, for example, a secondary cooperative must be comprised 
of at least two cooperatives at the primary level and one partner cannot own more 
than 30% of the secondary cooperative's capital (Arcas-Lario and Hemandez-
Espallardo, 2003). When the primary and secondary relationship is a business one, 
the rights of each party are also stipulated in the legislation and this serves as a 
contract between the secondary cooperatives and their members. 
It is at the secondary or federated level that joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions 
of co-operatives take place such as in advanced industrialized countries. A merger 
is the absorption of one co-operative into another. A consolidation is a union of two 
or more co-operatives to from a new organisation with a new identity for all the 
consolidated co-operatives. The advantages of such amalgamations through mergers 
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and consolidations to the large secondary co-operatives are: 1) they strengthen their 
economic efficiency; 2) they improve their bargaining market power; 3) they may 
lower operating costs; 4) they may have the opportunity to co-ordinate their research 
and development projects; and 5) they increase capital funds, membership numbers 
and support (ibid., 1986). 
Where the co-operative movement is a four tier system, the third level is the central 
co-operative organisation that has secondary co-operatives as members. The co-
operative organisations at the fourth level comprise all kinds of co-operatives, 
irrespective of co-operative types and activities (Enriquez, 1986). 
3.3.6. The Legal Framework/or Co-operatives 
A different system of co-operative law and legal frameworks has been developed 
from one country to another. An extensive legal framework of specific laws for co-
operatives exists in some countries, e.g. Germany, France and Spain. In the 
Netherlands and Belgium, the specific regulations governing co-operatives are 
placed within the framework of other general regulations, while in countries such as 
the UK, Denmark and Ireland, co-operatives are governed by ordinary company law 
(Julia and Server, 2003). Co-operatives in Britain existed under the Friendly 
Societies Act of 1834 until the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1852 was 
passed to meet the requirement for the development of co-operative societies. 
The raison d'etre of co-operative laws are to: 1) lay down that a co-operative is a 
lawful organisation; 2) show the kind of organisation a co-operative is, such as its 
objectives, its organisational matters, its funding, its operational techniques and 
procedural methods; 3) provide ways and means of possible government assistance; 
and 4) encourage the setting up and spreading of co-operatives especially in 
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developing countries (Enriquez, 1986). On the other hand, the need for co-operative 
societies to defend themselves, at least against social consequences and against fraud 
or theft, is the reason why they have to gain their legal rights. Co-operative laws are 
periodically amended and updated to suit local conditions and prevailing 
circumstances. The by-laws of co-operatives are the operating rules that guide the 
co-operative from day to day in all normal operations. 
Gosden (1973) and Anheier and Ben-Ner (1997) argue that the co-operative 
legislature may hinder or facilitate the progress of co-operatives, in that it can 
influence co-operatives' internal and external working conditions by facilitating or 
restricting different factors. Co-operative law can create a foundation for co-
operative action, provide rules for operation on a co-operative basis and promote co-
operatives as an alternative entrepreneurial method to compete in the economy (Roy, 
1981 quoted in Fregidou-Malama, 2000:86). Fregidou-Malama (2000) argues that 
as legislatures are made by the state, the state can define or change the definition of 
co-operatives in the laws for co-operatives, to use them to achieve the objectives of 
the state, thus affecting the perception of co-operatives. Therefore, it is through the 
law that the state is able to influence the development of co-operatives. Julia and 
Server (2003), however, do not agree that co-operative development in a country can 
be affected by a legislature, saying that "the degree of presence and establishment, 
measure in terms of market share, cannot be said to be related to the existence of a 
specific more or less developed regulatory framework ... nor to the greater or lesser 
number of societies in each country" (Julia and Server, 2003:476). This statement 
may be applicable to industrialized nations, but in developing countries, regulatory 
frameworks, which conferred powers to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 
were inevitable in the early stage of co-operative development. In the later stages, 
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for example in India, legislative frameworks become a necessity to safeguard the 
finance which the Indian government placed at the disposal of the co-operative 
sector (Shojakhani, 1994). 
This section has discussed six aspects related to the working of co-operatives, which 
can influence co-operative performance. The following section provides discussion 
on the performance of co-operatives from a variety of approaches. 
3.4. Co-operative Performance 
Assessments of the performance of co-operatives have been made based on different 
levels of debate such as: 1) the adaptation of the neo-classical theory of the firm that 
argues that the co-operative business form is construed so as to attain a large volume 
of business and, thereby, reap economies of scale (McCarthy et aI., 1998; Singh et 
aI., 2000); 2) the property rights and agency theories that claim that co-operatives 
are immanently inefficient (Lawless et aI., 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992); or 3) 
the transaction cost theory that argues for the rationale of vertical integration, for 
each business is too small to accomplish the task separately (Nilsson, 2001). 
Oustapassidis (1998) is of the view that it is more useful to view the differences in 
terms of property rights to see whether co-operatives perform as well as their IOFs 
counterparts. Lehmann and Parliament (1992), however, argue that a generally 
accepted performance criteria for co-operatives is absent. This is due to 
disagreement between the 'theorists' and the 'practitioners' over the roles/functions 
of co-operatives. The 'theorists' are more interested in what organisations do rather 
than with what they are. 
More often than not, co-operatives are viewed as a variant of the IOFs and, as such, 
the performance of co-operatives is judged according to their economic efficiency, 
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i.e. technical efficiency, scale efficiency and allocative efficiency (Nilsson, 2001; 
Singh et aI., 2000). But Carter (2003) argues that efficiency is the wrong standard 
by which to measure co-operative performance especially given the way in which 
they help to reduce poverty, such as in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where 
co-operatives have offered productive employment for the poor. Co-operatives 
should be looked upon as local institutions that play an important role in the local 
economy. Carter named a few co-operatives that have been successful as local 
institutions for modem societies, such as the success of India's dairy co-operatives 
in transforming the country's dairy economy and Bangladesh rural electric co-
operatives in increasing job opportunities and productivity. He argues that this 
contribution to poverty reduction is, however, very difficult to measure. 
Krahnen and Schmidt (1995) and Tairnni (1998) argue that co-operatives were 
intended to serve as instruments of development policy with the focus on the social 
outcomes of co-operatives: the reduction of disparities, combating exploitation, the 
improvement of social conditions and gender sensitivity. The strive for efficiency 
may result in co-operatives relinquishing original objectives, and in the 
transformation of co-operatives into company business, thus affecting the survival of 
a co-operative as a co-operative (Anderson and Henehan, 2003). Meanwhile, Clarke 
(1952, cited in Porter and Scully, 1987) argues that co-operatives can never (unless 
by chance) be efficient. Co-operatives are argued to have survived because they 
were given subsidies, tax exemptions and gratis services from the government to 
compensate for their inefficiencies. In some developing countries today, co-
operatives receive hefty state subsidies that render comparisons with private 
institutions meaningless. It has been argued that Government subsidies to co-
operatives are due to the requirement that co-operatives should carry out some 
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socially valuable tasks (Nilsson, 2001). The conflicting goals between members and 
management, poor management, poor Board performance, inappropriate strategies 
or poor implementation of strategies, inadequate capitalization, lack of member 
oversight, and being overly sensitive to members' concerns are among the reasons 
given for poor co-operative performance (Anderson and Henehan, 2003). 
It is argued that the inherent inefficiency of co-operatives is due to the structure of 
property rights within the co-operative (Oustapassidis and Vlachvei, 1998). The 
basic property rights governing ownership and control in co-operatives are different 
from IOFs, as discussed in Section 3.3 above. The lack of, or vaguely defined, 
property rights in co-operatives creates the horizon problem, i.e. the problem of non-
transferability of ownership and the control problem. These problems related to 
property rights are seen to have several effects on co-operative performance, and the 
problems are seen to lead to drawbacks of co-operatives as compared to IOFs in the 
same industry (ibid., 1998). 
Nilsson (2001:343) argues from the welfare theoretical perspective to reject the 
claim that co-operatives are inefficient, saying that "it is not a matter of the extent to 
which the co-operative succeeds in creating a stronger market position for its 
members, rather it is how far the members subjectively perceived their situation to 
be better as a result of the operation of the co-operatives". Nevertheless, the 
continued existence of co-operatives in the West that depend on their ability to 
compete effectively in the markets in which they operate, and, at the same time, to 
also provide benefits to members which they cannot get from conventional 
companies should be emulated. Ultimately, in the first place, the success of co-
operatives must depend on the economic competitiveness of the co-operative 
business. For this purpose, co-operatives have to make use of sound management 
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techniques to achieve competitive advantage for the co-operative in the marketplace. 
Davis (1999) argues that an essential management tool for co-operatives is to 
develop strategies for the survival of the co-operative and for the strategies to 
provide the framework for evaluating successes and failures within the co-operative. 
Studies that analyse the performance of secondary co-operatives have, almost 
always, analysed the efficiency of secondary co-operatives: for example, the 
efficiency of the Greek co-operatives' marketing unions (Oustapassidis, 1992); the 
efficiency of the milk union in India (Singh et aI., 2000); the efficiency of the 
Portuguese Wine Co-operative (Rebelo et aI., 2002); and the efficiency of the 
secondary marketing co-operatives in Spain (Arcas-Lario and Hernandez-
Espallardo, 2003). The interest in secondary co-operatives is probably because of 
the generally large size of secondary co-operatives and the impact of their activities 
on the survival of their primary members. The secondary structure is essentially a 
competitive process leading to a higher level of economic efficiency, which is a 
widely accepted measure of the performance of secondary co-operatives. The 
effectiveness of secondary co-operatives, in the first instance, towards the survival 
and development of primary co-operatives, gives co-operatives their sense of 
relevance as economic organisations, leading to a higher level of economic 
performance. Secondary co-operatives are extremely influential in countries where 
the co-operative movement has been making a significant economic contribution, 
especially in the West. It is the secondary co-operatives, through the integration of 
primary co-operatives that appear to be capable of moving the co-operative sector 
forward to significantly affect the country's economy. Fredericks (1986:146) argues 
that "for a successful, integrated and well-balanced co-operative movement, strong 
secondary and tertiary federations or centralizations are important". Factors that 
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constitute a united strong co-operative movement, which include among others, 
members' participation and competency training, professional management of co-
operatives, and networking, are raised more in secondary co-operatives than in 
primary co-operatives. 
3.5. Summary 
Co-operatives are self-help organisations organised on the national and international 
level and are homogeneous in values and structures even though their existence 
worldwide both in developed and developing countries is with varying degrees of 
success. Basically, the existence of co-operatives is to achieve a purpose or interest, 
which a group of individuals have in common. In this chapter we have discussed the 
organisational and operational aspects of co-operatives that are related to the 
working of co-operative societies. From the six aspects discussed: the co-operative 
principles; co-operatives' capital, income and assets; authority and control in co-
operatives; the common interest; the system structure of the co-operative movement; 
and the legal framework for co-operatives, the aspect that would best account for the 
performance and success of the co-operative form of organisation lies in the system 
structure of the co-operative movement, perhaps most importantly the secondary 
structure. Larger co-operatives at the secondary level represent a form of collective 
strategy. The secondary co-operatives are co-operatives for the primary co-
operatives that should be formulating strategies and pushing forward the systematic 
development of the primary co-operatives. It is at the secondary level that the 
application of sound management tools would be a necessity to achieve competitive 
advantage and better position in the market. In the next chapter, we will review the 
growth and the development of the Malaysian co-operative movement before 
analysing secondary co-operatives in Malaysia in detail in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN MALAYSIA 
4.1. Introduction 
Co-operation has been the culture in Malaysian life, from cradle to grave, since time 
immemorial. Co-operation can be seen in all aspects of everyday life: for example, 
financing a wedding ceremony or undertaking funeral preparations. The co-
operative institution in Malaysia is based on the modern form of co-operation 
introduced by the colonial government that was intended mainly to overcome debt 
problems among its civil servants (Fredericks, 1986). This chapter reviews the 
growth and development of the co-operative movement in Malaysia in Section 4.3, 
which includes the co-operative movement's early days when co-operatives were 
introduced in 1922, the early impact of co-operatives, the expansion of the co-
operative movement and the co-operative legislature. This is followed by a 
discussion of the institutions, which support co-operatives' development in Section 
4.4. Economic statistics pertaining to the growth and expansion of co-operatives in 
Malaysia are analysed in this chapter in Section 4.5. As the discussion on 
performance of co-operatives in the preceding chapter suggests that secondary co-
operatives play an influential role in a co-operative movement, this chapter also 
reviews the development of secondary co-operative organisations in the Malaysian 
co-operative movement in Section 4.6. The chapter concludes with a summary 
discussion of the problems faced by the co-operative movement in Malaysia after 
almost a century of existence in Section 4.7. Initially, in the next section, Section 
4.2, we will briefly review key characteristics of Malaysia to aid understanding of 
the development of co-operatives. 
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4.2. Malaysia, The Country 
Malaysia, a country in Southeast Asia, consists of two regions - West Malaysia and 
East Malaysia. West Malaysia is a peninsular that joins Thailand on the north. At 
the southern tip of the peninsular lies Singapore. East Malaysia is located on the 
island of Borneo. The West and the East are separated by some 640 miles by the 
South China Sea. Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and one federal territory. 
The states are namely: Perlis; Kedah; Pulau Pinang; Perak; Selangor; Pahang; 
Kelantan; Terengganu; Melaka; Negeri Sembilan; Johor; Sabah; and Sarawak (see 
Appendix A4.1). The federal territory (Wilayah Persekutuan) consists of three 
components - the cities of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya in the peninsular, and the 
island of Labuan in East Malaysia. 
Malaysia occupies a total area of 320,252 sq. km. comprising Peninsular Malaysia 
(131,805 sq km), Sabah (73,997 sq km) and Sarawak (124,450 sq km), thus making 
Sarawak the largest state followed by Sabah. Sarawak makes up some 37.5% of the 
country's total area; Sabah's population is made up of at least 30 different groups of 
people with more than 50 different languages and no less than 80 dialects. The total 
population of Malaysia was 25.6 million in 200413 and is made up of 3 main ethnic 
groups: the Malays; Chinese; and the Indians. The largest ethnic group in Malaysia, 
accounting for more than half of the total population today, is the Malays. The 
Malays, along with the indigenous people form a group called Bumiputra, an official 
Malaysian language term which literally means "sons of the soil", which accords 
them special privileges as enshrined in the Constitution. There is also a host of other 
13 Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2005. 
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minorities, mostly from Malaysian Borneo. The Malaysian economy is a mixture of 
private enterprise and public sector. 
The country is one of the world's leading exporters of semiconductor devices, 
computer hard discs, audio and video products and room air-conditioners. Malaysia 
also exports petroleum and liquefied natural gas, chemicals, palm oil, wood and 
wood products, rubber and textiles. 78.4% of her total exports in 2005 consisted of 
manufactured goods, whereby manufacturing comprises 31.6% of Malaysia's GDP. 
In 2005, the GDP composition by sector shows the service sector dominating with 
59.5%, industry 33.3%, and agriculture 7.2%. The labour force is 10.67 million 
with 49.5% in services, 36% in industry and 14.5% in the agricultural sector. In 
terms of agricultural products, peninsular Malaysia produces rubber, palm oil, and 
rice, which ranks only after subsistence crops from Sabah, while rubber, pepper and 
timber represent the agricultural produce of Sarawak. The Peninsular is also home 
to industries related to rubber and oil palm processing, light manufacturing industry, 
electronics, tin mining and smelting, logging and processing timber, while Sabah 
and Sarawak are dominated by logging and petroleum production and refining 
industries. 
Malaysia, a middle-income country, transformed itself from 1971 through to the late 
1990's from a producer of raw materials into an emerging multi-sector economy. 
Between 1970 and 1990, Malaysia's economy was directed under the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), with GDP growth averaging 6.7% a year. This period also 
saw Malaysia transform itself from a resource-based economy - primarily producing 
rubber and tin - into a multi-sectoral one. Growth was driven largely by exports, 
with electronics in particular as a major revenue source. This was followed by the 
period of the National Development Policy (NDP), planned to run from 1991 
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through to 2000, with a similar economic growth-oriented approach. The NDP 
contained several new dimensions, one of which emphasized more rapid 
development of an active Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community 
(BCIC) in the modern sectors of the economy. This is followed by the National 
Vision Policy (NVP) which incorporates the key strategies of the NEP and NDP and 
again new dimensions towards an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and 
resilient by the year 2010 (EPU, 2004). 
Malaysia is a multi-racial, non-homogenous middle income country with per capita 
. income of $9,700 (in 2004). The distribution of income in 2003 shows the lowest 
10% of income being shared by 1.4% of the population, with 39.2% of the working 
population sharing the highest 10% of income. The age structure is biased towards 
the working age, i.e. 15 - 64 years (61 %), with an almost equal proportion between 
males and females. 
4.3. Growth and Development of the Co-operative Movement 
4.3.1. The Movement's Early Days 
Much of the early development of the co-operative movement in Malaysia (then 
Malaya) can be traced from Fredericks (1986), one of the few studies in this area. 
Fredericks studied the impact of the co-operative movement from 1922 to 1968. His 
study covers the development of the co-operative movement during the British 
colonial period till 1957 and thereafter. During the British colonial period, he 
looked, in particular, at the impact of the emphasis on credit co-operatives on the 
traditional loan sources and on other co-operative activity, mainly marketing, from 
1922 to 1939. Section 4.3 draws on this study for the discussion of the development 
of the co-operative movement in Malaysia. 
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In 1911, a committee led by Sir Arthur Young was set up by the British to 
investigate the possibility of introducing co-operative societies into the small 
holding sector in Malaya in an attempt, to what Fredericks referred as, to initiate 
rural development in Malaya. It was the first colonial effort to introduce a co-
operative institution in Malaya as a form of commercial money economy. The 
committee reported that the Malays, who were largely Muslims, were unready for it; 
citing not only their rejection of the interest rates present in the activity of borrowing 
and lending, but also their self-sufficing attitude and distrust of others. It was 
concluded then that rural credit societies could not at that time be introduced, nor 
would such a system be ever successfully disseminated especially among the Malays 
(Fredericks, 1986). 
In 1919, another report was submitted by Cavendish on developing a co-operative 
movement in Malaya based on his study of the co-operative movement in India. 
Cavendish proposed a bureaucratic structure for the implementation of policy and 
supervision of co-operatives, a co-operative movement that is financially 
independent of the state, and he also recommended the establishment of a central 
form of co-operative organisation,14 which would give loans to members and other 
co-operative societies against a collective mortgage of properties of its members. 
The last two were never implemented as the third was seen as "antithetical to the 
method proposed for financing the co-operative bank" (Fredericks, 1986:3), 
especially in the prevailing state of economic depression and the fact that the 
development of co-operatives had to be nurtured from the very beginning. 
When the Co-operative Societies Enactment was passed in 1922, co-operation of the 
western form was introduced, eventually with the registration of co-operative 
14 The recommended Co-operative Bank of Malaya "would assume dual function: act as the apex 
society ofthe co-operative movement and be its central financial institutions" [Fredericks, 1986:3]. 
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societies of the credit type in the rural and urban sectors; the rural credit co-
operatives having unlimited liability and the urban credit co-operatives having 
limited liability. Subsequently, the first government office to take charge of co-
operative development was set up on 1 st July 1922 with Mr. A. Cavendish as the 
Registrar. Early in the year of the introduction of co-operatives only 3 types of co-
operatives were widespread: the rural co-operative credit societies; the labourers' 
co-operative credit societies; and the consumer societies. This is followed later by 
the marketing societies (rubber, eggs and other products) (Fredericks, 1986). 
The first stage of the development and growth of co-operatives in Malaysia was 
during the period 1922 to 1939, with thrift and credit co-operatives dominating the 
scene, both in rural and urban areas. Co-operatives were to be the solution to the 
indebtedness of Malay peasants in rural areas and government civil servants in urban 
sectors, with the expansion of Rural Co-operative Credit Societies in rural sectors, 
while the Thrift and Loan Societies and the Labourers' Co-operative Credit Societies 
were found in urban settings (Fredericks, 1986). Marketing and consumer co-
operatives were developed much later. The Federated Malay States Posts and 
Telegraphs Co-operative Thrift and Loan Society Limited was the first urban credit 
co-operative to be registered. It was registered on the 21 st July, 1922 and still 
operates today but has subsequently changed it named to Koperasi Kakitangan 
Telekom Malaysia (KOTAMAS).15 The first co-operative to be formed in the rural 
area was an unlimited form of co-operative society known as Syarikat Bekerjasama-
sama Kampung Tebuk Haji Musa, Kerian Dengan Tanggungan Tidak Berhad. Little 
is known of its history, however, except that it was registered in December 1923. 
IS Newly registered co-operative societies or those that wished to change their registered name are 
required under the Co-operative Act to include the word 'Koperasi' (the national language word for 
co-operative) to distinguish them from other forms of business organizations, with the word 'Berhad' 
(or limited liability) being the last word in the name. 
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This co-operative is no longer registered with the Co-operative Development 
Department. One can easily distinguish the older co-operatives from the new ones, 
in that the older co-operatives tend to have longer names which can be divided into 
three parts - the first part of the name, i.e. the word Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama, 
means co-operative, the last part of the name Dengan Tanggungan Tidak Berhad, 
means unlimited liability, and the middle part of the name usually denotes the place 
where the co-operative is supposed to operate. The co-operative movement in 
Sarawak started on 3rd May 1949, and in 1959 in Sabah (Fredericks, 1986). 
4.3.2. The Transplant of the Co-operative Institution in Malaysia 
The introduction of co-operatives was primarily aimed at reducing indebtedness in 
the rural and urban sectors. Credit co-operatives were introduced in rural sectors to 
consolidate rural capital resources and to put an end to exploitative indigenous credit 
resources (Fredericks, 1986). The Thrift and Loan Societies and the Labourer's Co-
operative Credit were introduced in the urban sector. The Thrift and Loan Societies 
were established among government civil servants to replace the existing 
government system of 'loans to subordinates' and as an alternative to private money 
lenders and usury. The Labourers' Co-operative Credit was introduced in urban 
areas to encourage thrift and to provide a convenient outlet for savings for 
government employed labourers. Fredericks' observation on the colonial policy on 
the co-operative movement was one of duplication in which he states that the 
"policy ... was implicitly aimed at the duplication, insofar as it was possible, of the 
conditions surrounding the grass root origins of the European movement" 
(Fredericks, 1986:5). 
The institution of co-operatives and its ideological foundations came into conflict 
with traditional Malay values and attitudes and with the feudalistic rural social 
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system itself which provides some indication of the social impact of the co-operative 
movement in the rural sector. Fredericks (1986) noted that the channeling of 
individual savings into a formal institution on a voluntary basis without social 
sanctions created a unique situation for the farmer. Also the process of borrowing 
capital for investment purposes and joint marketing that advocated Western 
economic values was unfamiliar to the rural small-holder. The co-operative 
movement operated within an established traditional social system. The social 
system of royalty had traditionally dominated, and this traditional social system was 
supported by the colonial government (ibid., 1986). Autocratic powers vested in the 
royalty were consolidated by the British under the indirect rule strategy in a 
semblance of non-intervention in the traditional political structure. Thus, the mode 
of initiating and diffusing co-operative societies in the rural areas was through the 
royals and the local chiefs where they "were persuaded to impress upon their 
subjects the value of the co-operative movement" (ibid., 1986:45). Fredericks 
(1986:27) also noted that establishing co-operatives was easier in the urban areas as 
"membership was drawn from a highly concentrated population and who received 
regular incomes from which deductions could be made at source ... (and) that the 
economic operations of these societies were less dependent on prevailing economic 
conditions". 
4.3.3. The Early Impact of Co-operatives 
The emphasis on credit co-operatives can be seen in the increasing number of this 
type of co-operative year after year. In 1922 there were 9 co-operatives, in 1925 69 
co-operatives, in 1930 240 co-operatives and in 1939 a total of 648 credit co-
operatives (figures calculated from Fredericks (1986:6-8). The 2 consumer co-
operatives established in 1922, which insisted on cash trading, went into liquidation 
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one after another, the last one managed to operate until 1927. Nevertheless, efforts 
at consumer sales were introduced within other established co-operative ventures 
with varying degrees of success. After 1971, the consumer co-operative movement 
became more rural oriented - this was largely due to the extension of the Malaysian 
Co-operative Wholesale Society's (MCWS's) operations into the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA) schemes (Fredericks, 1986:129). Marketing co-
operatives and other co-operatives of the non-economic type were introduced in the 
late 1930s. 
The impact of the co-operative movement is more keenly felt in the urban sector due 
to the existence of more complicated cultural factors in the rural areas. The rural co-
operative movement failed to attain a significant widespread hold in the rural sector 
essentially because the movement was rooted in the ideological traditions of 
Western philosophy. The group behaviour for collective benefit introduced by the 
Western co-operative ideology was very different from the Malay traditional social 
framework (Fredericks, 1986). Rural credit co-operatives decreased after 1929 not 
only due to the cultural factors but also due to financial factors. As the internal 
resources of the societies could not meet the relative massive capital inputs required, 
loans were sanctioned from the urban societies. The loans were stopped after 1928 
when repayment dragged on, thus affecting the urban societies (Fredericks, 1986). 
4.3.4. The Expansion Phase 
Starting with only a single activity such as credit or rice milling, the co-operative 
movement in Malaysia has now diversified into all kinds of business activities such 
as consumer, housing, transport, land development and production. Co-operatives 
were used as a tool to spearhead rural development and to encourage and give full 
assistance to the Malays collectively through co-operative organisations (Fredericks, 
67 
Chapter 4 The Co-operative Movement in Malaysia 
1986). This was during the development period 1956 to 1960 and was extended in 
the Second Malaya Plan, 1961 to 1965. Emphasis was on the role of rural co-
operatives in economic development to include not only farmers but also fishermen. 
The co-operative movement became part of the rural development strategies in the 
1960's as it was realized that co-operatives were the only viable institutions through 
which the Government could implement its developmental projects. It marks the 
beginning of Government financial support to co-operatives (Fredericks, 1986). 
The role of co-operatives in the agricultural sector was, however, reduced by 
institutions introduced by the Government to undertake extension work in the 
agricultural sector, playing a secondary role to co-operative societies. The Farmers' 
Associations, for example, were given the responsibility for supplying agricultural 
credit, inputs and services, and also for providing marketing services, thus reducing 
the scope of operations of the co-operative societies to the extent that the co-
operative societies were only allowed to undertake operations that were not yet 
undertaken by the farmers' association. Where farmers' associations exist, co-
operatives were allowed to operate activities that had been assigned to the 
associations but the co-operatives were not given any financial support from the 
Government (Fredericks, 1986). 
The Government's role in co-operative development was also modified. The 
supervisory and developmental role of the Department of Co-operative Development 
was facilitated through the Government's financial commitment under the First 
Malaya Plan in anticipation of the Movement's growth. The formation of co-
operative societies was to be supplemented by a broad range of government 
initiatives. The co-operative movement expanded in number in a variety of 
activities: credit, insurance, transportation, housing, consumerism, to name a few. 
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School co-operatives were also pioneered when the first school co-operative was 
registered in 1965, which lead to the introduction of school co-operatives throughout 
the country in 1966 with the aim of encouraging thrift and to develop entrepreneurial 
skills among students in secondary schools (Fredericks, 1986). 
The government support for co-operatives in rural areas extended into the 1980s16• 
The "New Co-operative Era" was announced in 1983, which brought about the 
establishment of 2 specific types of co-operatives for rural communities, the 
Koperasi Industri Kampong (KIKs or Cottage Industries) and the Koperasi 
Pembangunan Daerah (KPDs or the District Development Co-operatives). The 
KIKs were formed to enable the local community to utilize local natural resources 
like rattan, clay, metals (silver) to promote handicrafts such as pottery and 
silverware and to produce them for commercial purposes. The KPDs were set up to 
create opportunities in rural communities to participate in government development 
projects in their localities by carrying out minor infrastructure works such as 
building small bridges, roads and general maintenance in their respective districtS. 17 
Most of the KPDs were established in government development schemes such as in 
the schemes of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). 
The agro-based co-operatives and the fishery co-operatives in West Malaysia were 
handed over to the Farmers' Organization Authority and the Fisheries Development 
Authority in 1975 and 1976 respectively (Fredericks, 1986). The agro-based co-
operatives in Sabah and Sarawak, however, remained under the supervision of the 
Department of Co-operative Development (DCD) (see Section 4.5.2 below for a 
detailed review of the DCD). These two agencies are under the Ministry of 
Agriculture whilst the DCD is presently under the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Co-
16 The DCD's website at http://www.jpk.gov.my/jpk [03103/2006] 
11 The DCD's website at http://www.jpk.gov.my/jpk [03103/2006]. 
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operative Development. The handing over saw a total of 1484 agro-based co-
operatives and 76 fishery-based co-operatives in the Peninsular being placed under 
the supervision of the Farmers Organization Authority and the Fisheries 
Development Authority (Fredericks, 1986). 
Many of the agro-based co-operatives have been deregistered; some were absorbed 
into the establishment of the Organization of Regional Farmers, whilst others were 
deregistered after prolonged losses without any chance of survival, due to 
management problems and competition from several government agencies, which 
were formed to provide assistance to the agricultural sector (Fredericks, 1986). As 
at 2002, there are 549 agro-based co-operatives and 34 fishery based co-operatives 
with a total membership of 92,791 and 12,814 respectively.18 The agro-based co-
operatives have accumulated RM25.2 million in shares/subscriptions and RM158.8 
million in total assets, while the fishery-based co-operatives have accumulated 
RM3.6 million and RM21.9 million in shares and total assets respectively. 19 
4.3.5. The Movement's Structural Expansion 
Structural expansion of the co-operative movement proceeded at a modest pace. 
Discussions on creating a secondary co-operative union started as early as 1924 for 
co-operatives in the rural sector and in 1928 for the urban co-operatives with the 
creation of a secondary co-operative for the urban co-operative movement, the 
Selangor Urban Co-operative Union, in 1929 comprising 7 urban societies 
(Fredericks, 1986). Four such unions were established by 1939 with 39 societies as 
\8 Figures pertaining to the agro-based co-operatives and the fishery-based co-operatives were 
obtained from unpublished report of the Farmers' Organization Authority and the Fisheries 
Development Authority, respectively. 
19 The monetary values are specified in the Malaysian Ringgit (RM), where the exchange rate is £1 
for approximately RM7. Therefore, RM25.2 million is equivalent to £3.6 million, RM158.8 million 
is equivalent to £22.7 million, RM3.6 million is equivalent to £0.5 million and RM21.9 million is 
equivalent to £3.1 million. 
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members. Further to that, 25 Labourers' Co-operative Credit societies had formed 
six Investment Unions by 1939. The Malayan Co-operative Wholesale Society 
(MCWS) was established in 1949 through the initiative of the Government and in 
order to see it operating, the government encouraged the formation of retail co-
operatives in rural areas and provided them with initial loans with the objective that 
these co-operatives would get their supplies from MCWS. The MCWS was 
reoriented towards the rural sector to supply the essentials of life to the rural people 
especially after the Emergency period (Fredericks, 1986). In 1971 the co-operative 
Angkatan Koperasi Kebangsaan (ANGKASA) was registered whose members 
include both urban and rural co-operatives inclusive of the agro- and fishery-based 
co-operatives. 
On the impact of the secondary structure, Fredericks said that "it is doubtful that the 
scope of their activity was very great" (Fredericks, 1986:30), stressing this point of 
his again later when he said, "... it is worth repeating that the secondary co-
operative structure in the rural sector has served largely as a convenient channel for 
Government loans while parts of the urban secondary co-operative structure have 
not been performing any real function" (ibid:129). Fredericks argued that the co-
operative movement "needed only functional and sectoral developments in order to 
make it more ubiquitous" (ibid: 131). 
The ANGKASA or short for Angkatan Koperasi Kebangsaan Malaysia Berhad 
(National Co-operative Organization of Malaysia) was established in 1971 as a form 
of secondary co-operative. Members of the ANGKASA totalled 3015 co-operatives 
in 2004, induding 2725 co-operatives registered with the DCD (both adult and 
school co-operatives), 262 agro-based co-operatives and 28 fishery-based co-
operatives under the Ministry of Agriculture. 1364 or 45.2% of its members are 
71 
Chapter 4 The Co-operative Movement in Malaysia 
school co-operatives. Although the ANGKASA was initially formed as a secondary 
co-operative, in May 1996, it has been officially recognized by the Government as 
an apex body for co-operatives and it represents co-operatives nationally and 
internationally. It mainly provides general services to its members in promoting the 
co-operative movement in the country especially in the areas of co-operative 
education, information, publication and training services. 
The ANGKASA had never been involved in any form of business activity. It 
generates income from the one service it provides - the salary deduction service to 
help its member co-operatives receive payment from the members who enter into 
transactions with them. Its Service Bureau took over the co-ordination and 
collection of dues from co-operative members to their societies from the 
Government. This activity was "motivated by the desire of the Government to stop 
deducting from the salaries of its employees their loan and other obligations to co-
operative societies" (Fredericks, 1986: 157). Member co-operatives use this service 
as an assured way of receiving fee or share payment from their members or the 
repayment of loans and any other transaction. The co-operative members' salary 
deduction service is very popular with co-operatives in government organisations as 
the success of this scheme is, in particular, due to the co-operation of the paymaster, 
in this case the Government, who agreed to co-operate and to establish the necessary 
processes to help the co-operative movement. Co-operative members just have to 
give their consent to their pay being deducted on a monthly basis for whatever 
amount they have to pay, and then everything will be passed to the ANGKASA, 
which will get the payment from the paymaster and pass it to the co-operatives. For 
every RMl, co-operatives are charged 0.6%. The income generated through its 
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salary deduction service provides the ANGKASA with very stable self-generating 
income. 
The salary deduction service has also been extended to associations, clubs and 
unions that have civil servants as their members. In 2003, 434 non-eo-operative 
organisations used this service as compared to only 307 co-operative societies. 
Despite substantive earnings from the provision of this particular salary deduction 
service (roughly RM2.l million a month), the ANGKASA still has to be given funds 
to help with its other expenses. The fund channelled to the ANGKASA comes from 
the statutory payment made by co-operatives under Subsection 57(2)(b) of the Co-
operative Societies Act 1993 that requires registered societies to pay 1 % of their 
audited net profits for each financial year to the Co-operative Development Trust 
Fund to be used for any secondary or tertiary society which the Minister has 
declared to be a body representing the co-operative movement at the national and 
international level. In 2003 the amount paid to the ANGKASA from this Fund was 
20 RM3,000,000.00. 
4.3.6. The Co-operative Legislature 
Three different co-operative laws had been introduced in the Peninsular (West 
Malaysia) and in the two states in Borneo (East Malaysia - Sabah and Sarawak): 1) 
the Co-operative Societies Enactment 1922, which was enacted primarily for the 
regulation of credit co-operative societies (Fredericks, 1986) and was replaced by 
the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1948, which was used to govern different 
types of co-operatives in the Peninsular states; 2) the Sarawak Co-operative 
Ordinance 1949 for co-operatives in Sarawak; and 3) the Sabah Co-operative 
20 The DCD Audit Report on the income and expenditure pertaining to the Fund for year ending 
December 2003. RM3 million is equivalent to £0.4 million. 
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Ordinance 1958 for co-operatives in Sabah. When the Co-operative Act of 1993 
was passed, all of the above Acts were made null and void. Co-operative societies 
are now regulated under a common law for all, inclusive of the agro- and fishery-
based co-operatives even though their development and supervision are under a 
different ministry. 
When the Co-operative Act was amended in 1976, amendments involved: the 
elimination of co-operatives with unlimited liability; and the inclusion of the 
statutory requirement for a minimum number of members. 
i. The elimination of co-operatives with unlimited liability 
Co-operative societies were still registered on the basis of unlimited 
liability until the amendment to the Co-operative Act in 1976 in an effort 
to minimize the many restrictions imposed by the government on the 
business activities run by the co-operatives, which had been regarded as 
eagerness on the part of the Government to protect the members. 
Fredericks (1986) argued that the need for unlimited liability is not 
necessary where finance is generated from among the members 
themselves and not from other financial institutions. Nevertheless, he 
also noted that although the German Schulze Delitzsch endorsed limited 
liability for urban credit co-operatives, it was for co-operatives at the 
later stage. Schulze Delitzsch had suggested that it would be 
advantageous at the initial stage to accept the unlimited form ofliability. 
ii. Minimum number of members 
The minimum membership required to form a co-operative society had 
been 10 until the 1976 Amendment to the Co-operative Societies Acts, 
which increased the minimum requirement to 100, "in keeping with the 
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departmental policy to encourage the registration of viable societies" 
(Fredericks, 1986: 148)_ 
4.4. Support for Co-operative Development 
4.4.1. The Ministry 
Formulation of policies pertaining to co-operatives is conducted at the ministry 
level. The aim of the Ministry of Entrepreneur and Co-operative Development is to 
assist in the encouragement of co-operative formation in the country and to provide 
an environment conducive for the development of co-operatives. 
4.4.2. The Department o/Co-operative Development (DCD) 
The DCD was inaugurated in 1921 in the district of Taiping in Perak, one of the 
territories where the colonial government had its greatest sphere of influence. The 
function of the DCD then was more supervisory than developmental (Fredericks, 
1986). The present roles of the DCD are: to register and revoke the registration of 
co-operative societies and to ensure that co-operatives function in accordance with 
the provisions of the co-operative legislature; to advise the Minister on any matter 
relating to co-operative societies; and to encourage and promote the establishment 
and development of co-operative societies and help them increase their efficiency. 
As at the end of 2002, the number of employees in DCD is 996. 
The DCD has its head office in Kuala Lumpur and 14 state offices including one in 
Kuala Lumpur. These state offices carry out the duties of the Registrar General for 
Co-operatives. They are in charge of the local co-operatives registered and 
operating within their locality. The DCD head office does not take charge in the 
supervision of co-operatives with the exception of 2 co-operatives that is the 
ANGKASA and the Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad (Bank Rakyat) (see 
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Appendix A4.2 for a brief account of Bank Rakyat). The ANGKASA and the Bank 
Rakyat have been placed under the direct supervision of the DCD headquarters for 
two different reasons. For the ANGKASA, it is due to the massive government 
grants directed towards it and for Bank Rakyat it is because of the huge amount of 
public money involved. All other co-operatives are put under the supervision of the 
respective DCD state offices where they operate. The DCD Kuala Lumpur office 
not only supervises co-operatives operating within the Kuala Lumpur territory but 
also those that operate on a nationwide scale. These co-operatives are classified as 
'national' co-operatives. This type of co-operative can no longer be registered. 
The DCD has, throughout its existence, been placed under different Ministries, from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of National and Rural Development, then 
under the Ministry of Land and Co-operative Development, and in 2004 under the 
Ministry of Entrepreneurs and Co-operative Development. 
The DCD also manages funds for the co-operative movement. The Funds are: 
a. The Consolidated Trust Account. 
This fund was set up in 1985. The source of this fund came from the 
Treasury fund, loan repayments, processing fees and interest from fixed 
deposits in banks. The Consolidated Trust Account gives funds to co-
operatives to carry out viable projects. The types of financing offered from 
this fund are soft financing up to RM30,000.OO and collateral financing from 
RM30,OOl.OO up to RM5,OOO,000, both with a maximum repayment period 
of up to 180 months.21 Loans given out can be categorized into loans for 
working capital, for housing projects, for the acquisition of land or buildings, 
21 RM30,000.00 is equivalent to £4285.00 and RM50,000.00 is equivalent to £7142.00. 
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for plantation activities, and for purchasing vehicles and machineries. Loans 
for working capital formed the largest part of total loans given out from this 
fund. In 2002, a total of RM13.03 million was distributed to co-operatives 
with working capital taking RM6.10 million (47%).22 From 1978 to 2002, 
926 loans from this fund, in a total of RM196.39 million, were approved to 
co-operatives?3 62% of the loans were approved for working capital, 16% 
for the purchase of vehicles, 15.4% for the acquisition oflandlbuilding, 3.8% 
for plantation activity and 2.8% for housing projects. Working capital 
accounted for 39.6% of the value of loans in the same period, the acquisition 
of land or building accounted for 26.1%, housing projects 12.5%, the 
purchase of vehicles 12.1 % and 9.7% were approved for plantation activities. 
b. The Co-operative Education Trust Fund (CETF). 
The financial sources of this trust fund come from the statutory requirement 
under paragraph 57(2)(a) of the Co-operative Act 1993, which requires all 
co-operatives to contribute 2% of their net profit towards this fund and also 
from the proceeds of the investment made from the fund. The trust fund can 
be used for any or all of the following purposes: 
to meet expenditure pertaining to the running of the Co-operative 
College; 
to meet expenditure pertaining to surveying the co-operative movement; 
to meet expenditure pertaining to the holding of co-operative seminars, 
conferences, or meetings and the participation of any member of any 
registered society or any person nominated by the Committee in 
international co-operative seminars, conferences or study tours; 
22 Figures pertaining to the Consolidated Trust Fund are from the DCD's 2002 Annual Report. 
RM13.03 million is equivalent to £1.85 million and £6.10 million is equivalent to £0.9 million. 
23 RM196.39 million is equivalent to £28.1 million 
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to meet expenditure pertaining to the advancement of co-operative 
education in whatever form is considered relevant by the Committee; 
to meet expenditure pertaining to the administration of the trust fund. 
c. The Co-operative Development Trust Fund (CDTF) 
All co-operatives, except school co-operatives and co-operatives with a net 
profit of less than RM2000.00,24 are also required by the Co-operative Act to 
contribute 1 % of audited net profit towards the CDTF. Sources for the fund 
may also come from donations and grants made by third parties and proceeds 
of investments. Nevertheless, no donation from any foreign source can be 
received without the prior approval of the Fund's committee. The trust fund 
can be used for the purposes of: 1) meeting the expenditure pertaining to any 
program and activity conducted by the apex body for the promotion of the 
co-operatives' principles and the facilitation of the operations of the 
registered societies; 2) meeting the expenditure pertaining to the 
administration of the trust fund; and 3) meeting whatever expenditure as may 
be deemed necessary by the Committee for the benefit and the development 
of the co-operative movement. 
The DCD also gives out grants to co-operatives from the development budget 
allocation. In 2002 from the RM6.3 million allocation, RM2.1 million or 33.3% was 
allocated for co-operative grants.25 The grants are given out to: 1) help co-
operatives install the basic necessities in the running of their activities such as a cash 
register machine, goods display shelves, computers, or security grills; 2) provide 
incentives for newly registered co-operatives; 3) help co-operatives that encounter 
24 RM2000.00 is equivalent to £286.00. 
2S RM6.3 million is equivalent to £0.9 million and RM2.1 million is equivalent to 0.3 million. 
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problems in running their activities to get consultancy services; and 4) enable co-
operatives to update their accounts. 
The nCD also provides external auditing services with a minimal charge to co-
operatives that qualify for this service, especially co-operatives that cannot afford to 
pay for the services of private external auditors. External auditors who want to 
audit the accounts of co-operatives need to seek approval from the Registrar 
General, which is given only after the applicant has fulfilled the conditions laid 
down by the Registrar General. Among others, they must be a member of the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) or a member of the Institute of Co-
operative and Management Accountants (lCMA), and posseses an Auditors License 
issued by the MIA or ICMA. 
4.4.3. The Co-operative College of Malaysia (CCM) 
The CCM is the institution for co-operative training and education in Malaysia. 
Fredericks defined co-operative education as "the social, ideological, economic and 
business knowledge and practices required for the organisation and operation of a 
co-operative society as a voluntary, mutual benefit and democratic organisation" 
(Fredericks, 1986:91). The CCM was established in 1946 to meet both the training 
needs of the DCD and the co-operative movement. Besides conducting courses on 
the field of co-operative management, the CCM also organizes seminars both locally 
and internationally in the field of co-operatives. Other activities of the CCM include 
publications to disseminate information on co-operatives, undertaking research and 
providing consultancy services to co-operatives. The CCM operational expenses are 
financed by the co-operatives from the 2% levy on the net profits of co-operative 
societies. 
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4.5. Economic Statistics on the Co-operative Movement 
4.5.1. The Growth of Co-operatives 
Table 4.1 in Appendix A4.326 presents statistics relating to the growth of co-
operatives in Malaysia from 1990 to 2003 , in terms of the number of co-operatives, 
the share capital and the assets of co-operatives. The number of co-operatives has 
been increasing annually right through the crisis period in 1997 with only a slight 
decrease in membership. The annual average growth rate of co-operatives and 
membership from 1990 to 2003 were 3.0% and 3.58% respectively, while share 
capital and assets grew at 10.02% and 11.78% in the same period. Figure 4.1 below 
shows the growth in co-operatives' share capital and assets. 
Figure 4.1: The Growth in the Share Capital and Assets of Co-operatives 
from 1990 to 2003 
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In the DeD' s list of the 25 largest co-operatives in 2004, 19 of the 25 largest co-
operatives by number of members are credit co-operatives and 16 of the co-
operatives by share capital are credit co-operatives. The 25 co-operatives have 
members ranging from between 16,130 and 714,743 in 2004, with the Bank Rakyat 
26 All tables for this Chapter are placed in Appendix A4.3 . 
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having the largest number of members. The share capital of the 25 largest co-
operatives in 2004 ranges between RMI2,148.4 million and RMI,869.2 million?' 
The 4,469 co-operatives in Malaysia in 2003 are classified under 8 sectors of 
business activities: creditlbanking; consumer; transport; construction; 
plantation/estate; housing; services; and small/cottage industry. The creditlbanking 
co-operatives are mainly credit co-operatives providing personal loans to members. 
There are 447 credit co-operatives in 2003, of which 3 of the co-operatives run 
banking activities. The consumer co-operatives are divided into two categories: the 
adult consumer co-operatives, which operate mini markets, supermarkets, provision 
stores and petrol stations; and the school co-operatives, which run school canteens, 
bookshops, operate laundry and computer classes. The transport co-operatives 
provide transportation services for transporting people or goods. The majority of the 
transport co-operatives are based on land development schemes such as the Federal 
Land Development Authority (FELDA) and the Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), transporting agricultural products to the 
processing plants. They also include the taxi drivers' co-operatives. 
The construction co-operatives carry out minor infrastructure works such as building 
small bridges, roads and general maintenance in their respective districts or 
localities. The KPDs, which were initially set up to participate actively in 
government development projects in their localities, are all grouped under this 
activity. The plantation/estate co-operatives develop and manage agricultural land. 
Crops include coconut, rubber, oil palm, pineapple and cocoa; as at 2003 a total of 
45,588 hectares of land have been developed, 88.0% of which with oil palm. The 
housing co-operatives carry out housing projects for members. The services co-
27 RMI2,148.4 million is equivalent to £1,735 million and RMl,869.2 million is equivalent to £267 
million. 
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operatives provide services such as maintenance of housing estates, rentals of 
buildings/stalls owned by members, day care centres, computer classes and 
collection centres for settling utility bills. The small/cottage industry co-operatives 
produce handicrafts such as pottery and silverware, food-based products and 
livestock rearing. Co-operatives of this type belong to the small scale or cottage 
industries. All the KIKs come under this category. 
4.5.2. The Distribution a/Co-operatives 
Co-operatives are distributed all over the country, in the peninsular and in East 
Malaysia. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the co-operatives by state and by 
activity for 2003. 60.6% of the co-operatives are consumer co-operatives, which 
constitute adult co-operatives (24.5%) and school co-operatives (36.1 %). 10% are 
credit co-operatives, 9.8% are transport co-operatives, 9.2% are services co-
operatives, 5% are plantation co-operatives, 2.4% are construction co-operatives, 2% 
are housing co-operatives and 0.9% are small/cottage industry co-operatives. 
Although almost all types of co-operatives exist in almost every state, their uneven 
distribution among the states reflects the socio-economic factors which characterize 
the individual states. In Sabah and Sarawak, more than half of the adult co-
operatives are consumer co-operatives: 51 % in Sabah and 81.8% in Sarawak. In the 
Peninsular, 59.9% of the adult co-operatives in Kelantan and 52% in Terengganu are 
consumer co-operatives. Development is rather stagnant in Sabah and Sarawak in 
East Malaysia, with the exception of the capital cities. In Sarawak, the largest of the 
two in terms of area, even though the major cities are well connected by 
transportation, water transport is an important means of transportation for passengers 
and goods to a large proportion of the population of the state. It was reported that 
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between 300 to 500 boats and vessels ply the 55 navigable rivers in Sarawak daily.28 
This transport system is of great importance to a large section of the population 
especially as the more rural areas are inaccessible by roads. Consumer co-operatives 
would in such a situation offer a solution for daily needs. Meanwhile Kelantan and 
Terengganu are less developed than the other states in the Peninsular, which might 
also account for the larger percentage of consumer co-operatives. 
Among the urban Malaysians in more developed states, where super- and 
hypermarkets have succeeded in attracting people with better offers in terms of 
price, product range and location, more often than not, at one-stop shopping centres, 
consumer co-operatives may not be much of an attraction. Consumer co-operatives 
in urban areas are mostly convenience stores that cater for specific groups, for 
example employees in an organisation. Often, consumer activities are ran as an 
extension to credit activities by credit co-operatives that sell consumer goods such as 
electrical goods to members on cash or hire-purchase terms. 
The relatively large number of transport co-operatives in Pahang, Johore, Negeri 
Sembilan and Perak is due to the fact that many land development schemes (such as 
FELDA, and FELCRA) are in these states. The transport co-operatives in the 
schemes mainly serve settlers in transporting agricultural products such as palm oil 
and rubber to the processing plants. Co-operatives in plantation activities are 
numerous in Sarawak and Perak due to the suitability and land availability there. 
Land in Sarawak is suitable for commercial agricultural development.29 Co-
operatives involved in small industries are more highly concentrated in the states of 
Perak and Kelantan. 
28 Sarawak Online at www.sarawak.gov.my/[07/04/2006]. 
29 Sarawak Online at www.sarawak.gov.my/[07/0412006]. 
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4.5.3. The Distribution olCo-operative Members 
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of co-operative members by state and by activity of 
co-operatives. 34.9% of co-operative members are concentrated in co-operatives 
with creditlbanking business, 12.2% of the co-operative members are in services co-
operatives, 9.6% are in adult consumer co-operatives; 3.5% are in plantation co-
operatives, 3.3% are in transport co-operatives, 2% are in construction co-
operatives, 1.8% in housing co-operatives and 0.1 % are in small/cottage industry co-
operatives. School co-operatives have 32.5% of the membership population. 
69.1 % of the 1.8 million credit co-operative members are members of the 100 credit 
co-operatives in Kuala Lumpur (Le. in KL office and the HQ). The Bank Rakyat 
members alone, with its 629.9 thousand members, constitute 34.6% of all the credit 
co-operatives members and 17.9% of the total adult co-operative members in 2003. 
Although the figures in Table 4.2 indicate that a large percentage of members of 
credit co-operatives are in Kuala Lumpur (KL), it is not indicative of the real 
situation. This is because many of these co-operatives in KL are national co-
operatives that have members based nationwide. 
However, with respect to the co-operatives in consumer business, although we 
pointed out earlier that many of these co-operatives are located in Sarawak and 
Sabah in East Malaysia and Kelantan and Terengganu in West Malaysia, the 
consumer co-operatives in Sabah and Sarawak have a smaller number of members 
per co-operative than the consumer co-operatives in Kelantan and Terengganu. On 
average, there are 8.6 members per co-operative in Sarawak and 14.5 members per 
co-operative in Sabah, whilst in Kelantan there are, on average, 96.5 members per 
co-operative and 68.1 members per co-operative in Terengganu. The numerous 
government land development schemes located in the states of Johore and Pahang 
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may help to explain the large percentage of transport co-operative members in the 
two states, 51.3% and 49.5%, respectively. 
Although there are more than 5 million co-operative members, the members of adult 
co-operatives are only slightly more than 3.5 million. This figure, however, could 
be much less as we cannot rule out double counting. This is because, except for 
credit co-operatives, one can be a member of an unlimited number of co-operatives 
but one can be a member of not more than one registered society with credit as its 
primary activity. On average, there are 4,069 members per credit co-operative; if we 
were to exclude members in Bank Rakyat, the figure is 2,665 members. There are 
on average 1,558 members per service activity co-operative, 1023 members per 
housing activity co-operative, 927 members per construction activity co-operative, 
822 members per plantation activity co-operative, 459 members per consumer 
activity co-operative, 396 members per transporting activity co-operative, and 147 
members per small/cottage industry activity co-operative. 
4.5.4. Share Capital and Assets 
In 2003, the co-operative movement had total share capital of RM5.57 billion and 
RM25.14 billion in assets.30 A large percentage of the total share capital and assets 
in the co-operative movement in 2003 comes from the 447 credit co-operatives (see 
Table 4.4). Although the credit co-operatives constituted only 10% of the total 
number of co-operatives in 2003, these co-operatives contributed 78.3% to the total 
share capital and 84.7% to the total assets of the co-operative movement. Out of the 
447 credit co-operatives only 3 co-operatives run banking activity. The share capital 
of the 3 co-operatives that ran banking activity (RMl,345.6 million) constituted 
30.8% of the total share capital of the 447 co-operatives in the creditlbanking sector 
30 RM5.57 billion is equivalent to £0.8 billion; RM24.14 billion is equivalent to £3.4 billion. 
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in 2003.31 The assets of these 3 co-operatives (RM16,360.7 million) constituted 
76.8% of the total assets of the 447 co-operatives in the same year.32 One of the 
three co-operatives that run banking activity, i.e. the Bank Rakyat, with RM 1,324.5 
million in share capital and RM 16,142.1 million in assets, alone constituted 66.2% 
and 75.8% of the total share capital and the total assets of the 447 co-operatives in 
the creditlbanking sector respectively, or 98.5% and 98.7% of the total share capital 
and the total assets of the three co-operatives in the banking business.33 
The average share capital per co-operative is RM6.8 million in credit co-operatives 
(i.e. for only the 444 credit co-operatives), RMl.l million in housing co-operatives, 
RMO.2 million in adult consumer co-operatives, RMO.l million in transport co-
operatives, RMO.9 million in plantation co-operatives, RMO.02 million in 
smalVcottage industry co-operatives, RMO.2 million in construction co-operatives 
and RM1.6 million in services co-operatives.34 
4.5.5. The Composition o/Co-operative Members according to Social and 
Economic Groups 
The DeD classifies the 2,818 adult primary co-operatives in 2003 into 12 
membership groups: government servants; teachers; armed forces; employees of 
statutory bodies, government agencies; private firms; higher education institutions; 
women; schools; the KPD's; the small business co-operatives; and other individuals 
not covered by the previous 11 groups. Basically, however, we can group members 
into 2 main categories of social and economic groups: 1) employees with a fixed 
monthly income in public services (i.e. government servants, teachers, armed forces, 
31 RM1345.6 million is equivalent to £192 million. 
32 RMI6,360.7 million is equivalent to £2,337 million. 
33 RM1324.5 million is equivalent £189 million; RM16,142.1 million is equivalent to £2,306 million. 
34 RM6.8 million is equivalent to £1 million; RMl.l million is equivalent to £0.2 million; RMO.2 
million is equivalent to £29,000.00; RMO.1 million is equivalent to £14,000.00; RMO.9 million is 
equivalent to £0.1 million; RMO.02 million is equivalent to £2,900.00; RMO.2 million is equivalent to 
£29,000.00; RM1.6 million is equivalent to £0.23 million. 
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employees of statutory bodies and government agencies), in private firms and in 
higher education institutions; and 2) the other individuals not covered by the first 
category. Table 4.5 shows the composition of co-operative members according to 
the social and economic groups in 2003. 
Altogether, 1.62 million co-operative members or 46.0% of the total members of 
adult co-operatives are employees of an organisation, known to employ individuals 
on a fixed monthly income basis. The figure might be more if we were to take into 
account other individuals with fixed incomes in the 'others' category. One might 
predict that co-operative members in the 'others' category would be members of co-
operatives in banking, housing and services activity, since these types of co-
operatives bring together individuals as members irrespective of any organisations 
or institutions they represent. Thus, the 0.6 million members of the Bank Rakyat 
falls under the 'others' category of membership composition. If we were to deduct 
the 0.6 million Bank Rakyat's members from the total 1.8 million members in the 
'others' category, this category is left with only 1.2 million members or 34.3% of the 
total number of members of adult co-operatives. 
In 2003, co-operative members employed in public services made up 37.1 % of the 
total co-operative members. In the first category, most of the co-operative members 
are individuals employed in the public services35 (79.3%), followed by employees in 
private firms (15.2%) and by employees in higher learning institutions (5.4%). Co-
operatives formed by these groups of individuals are meant for employees within the 
specific organisation only. The second category of co-operative members, not 
covered by the first category, may include any individuals out of the labour market, 
35 The public services is defined in Article 132 of the Malaysian Constitution to include the anned 
forces, the general public service of the Federation, the police force, the railway service, the joint 
public services between the Federation and the states or between the states, the public service of each 
State and the education service. 
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as well as those with or without a fixed monthly income. In addition, in the second 
category of co-operatives, membership may be restricted to certain individuals, e.g. 
women only co-operatives. 
In the DCD's list of the 25 largest co-operatives mentioned in Section 4.5.1, many 
carry the names of co-operatives in public services with credit activity. The co-
operation of the paymaster, i.e. the Government, in the collection of monthly fees 
and loan repayments through the monthly salary deductions of civil servants who are 
co-operative members is an advantage for co-operatives formed by employees in the 
public services. Even the Bank Rakyat requires its borrowers to have at least 2 
guarantors, one of them must be in government service for the Bank to make 
deductions from their salary in the event of default payments by borrowers. 
4.5.6. The Business Performance of Co-operatives 
The performance of co-operatives in the different business categories for 2003, 
based on the volume of business and the profit or losses made, is presented in Table 
4.6. The 447 creditlbanking co-operatives have a total of RMI8,572.1 million in 
loans outstanding with a profit of RMI5,577.6 million.36 Credit co-operatives are 
the largest lender of personal loans. In 2003, the amount of loans given out by the 
447 co-operatives in creditlbanking activity was RM 4,964.4 million (DCD 
unpublished data, 2003).37 This far exceeded the total amount of personal loans 
given out by banking institutions (the commercial banks, finance companies and 
merchant banks) in 2004 which amounted to RM 1,857.4 million (BNM, 2005).38 In 
credit activity, the largest loan providers are the co-operatives of the armed forces, 
followed by co-operatives of civil servants, co-operatives among private sector 
36 RMI8,572.1 million is equivalent to £2653 million; RMI5,577.6 million is equivalent to £2225 
million. 
37 RM4964.4 million is equivalent to £709 million. 
38 RM 1857.4 million is equivalent to £265 million. 
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employees and co-operatives for teachers. The DCD statistical report on co-
operatives with credit activity for 2004 shows that these 4 types of co-operatives 
gave out RM448.3 million, RM324.7 million, RM228,4 million and RM126.0 
million in loans respectively.39 
The average business volume for the non-credit co-operatives is not more than 
RMO.5 million per co-operative,40 with housing co-operatives, plantation co-
operatives and services co-operatives making relatively more profits than consumer 
co-operatives, transport co-operatives, and construction co-operatives. The average 
accumulated profit for the 92 housing co-operatives, the 224 plantation co-
operatives and the 409 services co-operatives is RMO.2 million per co-operative.41 
The 38 small/cottage industry co-operatives have a accumulated losses of RM1.3 
million as at 2003.42 
4.5.7. Employment in Co-operatives 
Table 4.7 presents data on employment in co-operatives. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that the data from the DCD may, however, be unreliable 
since there is a huge difference for the 3 consecutive years, 2003, 2004, and 2005 in 
terms of employment statistics. In 2003, there is almost no data (only a mere 275 
co-operative employees); in 2004 total employment in co-operatives was recorded at 
21,706 whilst in 2005 it was recorded at 11,444. The figures indicate a huge 
difference (i.e. reduction) of 10,266, which could be because of difficulties in 
obtaining data from co-operatives. 
39 The figures are from the statistical report on co-operatives with credit activity for 2004 in the DeD 
database system, the INFOKOP. RM448.3 million is equivalent to £64 million; RM324.7 million is 
equivalent to £46 million; RM228.4 million is equivalent to £33 million; RM126.0 million is 
equivalent to £18 million. 
40 RMO.5 million is equivalent to £71,000.00. 
41 RMO.2 million is equivalent to £28,000.00. 
42 RM1.3 million is equivalent to £0.2 million. 
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The data on employment in co-operatives in Table 4.7 does however indicate the 
activity sector of co-operatives with the largest number of employees. For 2004, the 
credit and banking activities have the largest number of employees. Together, they 
had 10,437 employees, which is 48.1 % of the total number of employees in co-
operatives for that year. The banking sector activity with its 3 co-operatives had 
almost the same number of employees as the 444 co-operatives in credit activity in 
2004. One might predict that the Bank Rakyat, being the largest co-operative with 
branches all over the country, would have the largest number of employees. After 
the credit co-operatives, the consumer co-operatives had the second highest number 
of employees in 2004 with 4,781 employees followed by the services co-operatives 
with 2310 employees and 1174 employees in transport co-operatives. 
4.6. The Secondary Co-operatives 
4.6.1. Distribution and Group Size of Secondary Co-operatives 
In 2003, there were a total of 35 registered secondary co-operatives, whose members 
(the primary co-operatives) range between 3 and 344 co-operatives. All 35 
secondary co-operatives have members totalling 1001 primary co-operatives. Out of 
the total of 35 secondary co-operatives, 8 co-operatives, i.e. 22.9%, were inactive. 
The remaining 27 co-operatives were involved in 5 types of activity: credit 
(financing); consumerism; construction; plantation; and services. More than half of 
the active secondary co-operatives (85.2%) ran either service or consumer activities; 
none of the co-operatives ventured into the areas of housing, transport or small 
industry. Table 4.8 summarises the distribution of secondary co-operatives by state 
and by activity of the secondary co-operatives in 2003. 
Ten of the 35, i.e. 28.6%, of the secondary co-operatives are located in Kuala 
Lumpur. All these 10 secondary co-operatives are the national-based secondary co-
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operatives and their members consist of primary co-operatives from other states. 
Altogether, they have a total membership of 669 primary co-operatives. However, 1 
of the national-based secondary co-operatives with 344 primary members has been 
inactive. The 9 active secondary co-operatives in Kuala Lumpur are secondary co-
operatives in either consumer or services activity. 50% of the total secondary co-
operatives that run consumer activity are the national-based secondary co-operatives 
in Kuala Lumpur. The state of Penang with its 148 primary co-operatives has 6 
secondary co-operatives, 2 of which are inactive. In most of the other states, there is 
only one secondary co-operative despite the many types of primary co-operatives 
present in every state. Only 1 secondary co-operative out of 3 in the state of Pahang 
is active. The state ofNegeri Sembilan has 1, yet inactive, secondary co-operative. 
Table 4.9 shows the distribution of the secondary co-operatives by number of 
members. A large percentage of the secondary co-operatives have less than 20 
members - almost half (48.6%) of the secondary co-operatives have less than 10 
members, followed by 28.6% with between 11 and 20 members. 
4.6.2. The Active and the Inactive Secondary Co-operatives 
The 8 inactive co-operatives have a total membership of 408 primary co-operatives. 
Of the 27 active secondary co-operatives, 7 are secondary co-operatives for co-
operatives of settlers in land development schemes with a total membership of 260 
primary co-operatives. Thus, the remaining 20 secondary co-operatives encompass 
only 333 primary co-operatives. Table 4.10 shows the distribution of secondary co-
operatives by their activity status. The 593 primary co-operatives that are members 
of the 27 active secondary co-operatives encompass 21 % of the 2817 primary co-
operatives (excluding the 1615 school co-operatives and the 2 co-operatives under 
the DCD-HQ) in 2003. Of the 8 inactive secondary co-operatives, 3 are secondary 
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co-operatives for primary co-operatives formed by settlers or communities in 
government development schemes. Only one is a national based secondary co-
operative, which we have mentioned in Section 4.6.2. 
4.6.3. Secondary Co-operatives in Government Development Schemes 
10 (28.6%) of the 35 secondary co-operatives are secondary co-operatives in 
government development schemes, of which only 7 are active. There are several 
kinds of development schemes such as the Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA), the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) 
and the Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA). Individual 
states also run their own development schemes such as the Kedah Development 
Authority (KEDA), the South Kelantan Development Authority (KESEDAR) and 
the KETENGAH in Terengganu. Their objectives are all directed towards social 
and economic development in Malaysia. These development agencies came into 
operation in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. 
Land development is one of the major initiatives in planned settlement. The 
absorption of poor households into modem agriculture was achieved through the 
opening of new land for the plantation of mainly palm oil, rubber or cocoa. The 
very poor and the landless were brought in as settlers. They were provided with 
modest housing and were allocated estate lots where they were required to work on 
their plantation on the basis of group ownership as the plantations were extensive. 
The Government through the specific agencies provided them with all the basic 
amenities and necessary support required including training and financial support in 
the early years. 
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Land development agencies have encouraged the fonnation of co-operatives in land 
development projects to channel agricultural inputs and facilities to the settlers and 
to transport agricultural produce from the plantation to centres of collection. These 
co-operatives themselves can be considered as a program of agencies. The co-
operatives also run other related activities acquired through tender offered by the 
agencies concerned such as maintenance of the area under cropping, small 
construction projects in their schemes and buying agricultural produce. The co-
operatives are even run from the office of the agencies in their early stages. The 
establishment of secondary co-operatives among these primary co-operatives enable 
co-operatives to go for larger tenders that would then be distributed to their primary 
members. The secondary co-operatives were given projects by the government 
agencies. These secondary co-operatives act as conduits to channel development aid 
to development schemes' communities; they then become business partners of the 
respective agencies diversifying into other lucrative activities.43 The 260 primary 
co-operatives that are members of the 7 active secondary co-operatives in 
government development schemes (see Table 4.10) constitute 43.8% of the total 593 
members of the total active 27 secondary co-operatives. 
4.6.4. Trends in the Establishment o/Secondary Co-operatives 
Three trends in the establishment of secondary co-operatives can thus be seen in 
Malaysia. Firstly, secondary co-operatives have joined together primary co-
operatives whose members are individuals from a similar employment grouping 
43 Source of reference: websites of the secondary co-operatives and the related agencies 
(bttp://www.nitsb.com.my; http://www.risda.gov.my; http://www.felda.net.my) [15/0312003]. A 
local newspaper had also reported that the Minister for Rural Development had asked RISDA to list 
a1\ the projects given by RISDA to NARSCO (a secondary co-operative for co-operatives of rubber 
smallholders) to ensure proper use of government a1\ocations (Utusan Malaysia Online.' 24 <?gos 
2006: "RISDA diminta seneraikan projek diberi kepada NARSCO" (RISDA requested to hst projects 
given to NARSCO). 
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such as teachers or government agency staff but they differ in activity. Secondary 
co-operatives of this type operate as national-based secondary co-operatives. 
Secondly, secondary co-operatives have joined together primary co-operatives of 
settlers or communities in government development schemes. The secondary co-
operatives established either operate on a regional level or a national level. Finally, 
secondary co-operatives have joined together primary co-operatives of all kinds of 
activities. This type of secondary co-operative can be found at the regional and 
national level. 
4.6.5. Secondary Co-operatives' Performance 
Three categories of performance of secondary co-operatives have been defined by 
the DeD: satisfactory, average, and weak. The evaluation of the performance status 
of the secondary co-operatives was carried out by the specific DeD state offices 
where the secondary co-operatives were located. From the total 35 secondary co-
operatives, only 25 co-operatives have been evaluated as 2 co-operatives were newly 
formed secondary co-operatives and 8 are inactive secondary co-operatives. The 
two co-operatives formed in 2003 were less than a year old when the information 
was gathered in 2004. 11 or 31.4% of the co-operatives were classified as weak 
performers and 10 or 28.6% as average performers. Only 4 co-operatives or 11.4% 
fall into the category of satisfactory performance. 60%, of the co-operatives in 
consumer activity are classified as weak performers. In the services activity, 5 out 
of 12 (excluding the new co-operatives) or 41.7% fall into the weak performance 
category. Table 4.11 presents the distribution of the secondary co-operatives by 
performance as classified by the OeD and by activity. 
There are no fixed criteria specified for the evaluation. However, when we 
compared the oeD classifications with the 2003 income and profit figures of the 
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secondary co-operatives in Table 4.12, we can make a generalisation of the 
definition for each of the performance categories: co-operatives with satisfactory 
performance are co-operatives with a high business volume and high profit; co-
operatives with average performance are co-operatives with not so high income but 
with positive accumulated profits; and co-operatives with weak performance are co-
operatives with low income or co-operatives with high business volume but unable 
to cover accumulated losses. 
The 4 co-operatives with satisfactory performance have a total business volume of 
RM12.0 million, which is 85.5% of the total RM14.0 million business volume of all 
the secondary co-operatives and accumulated profit of RM4.2 million, which is 
86.2% of the total RM4.9 million accumulated profit of the 17 secondary co-
operatives with positive profit in 2003.44 Table 4.12 lists the 35 secondary co-
operatives by activity and business performance in 2003. 3 of the 4 co-operatives in 
the satisfactory performance category are secondary co-operatives in government 
development schemes. The business volume of these 3 secondary co-operatives is 
RM 10.8 million, which is 76.8% of the total volume of the 35 secondary co-
operatives and their RM 3.9 million profits account for 79.6% of the total profits.45 
4.7. Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the growth and development of the co-operative 
movement in Malaysia. Despite almost a decade of the co-operative movement's 
existence in Malaysia, the movement has experienced growth in terms of the number 
of co-operatives, membership, share capital and assets. No comprehensive data are 
available to accurately gauge the impact of the co-operative sector on the economy 
44 RM12.0 million is equivalent to £1.7 million; RM14.0 million is equivalent to £2 million; RM4.2 
million is equivalent to £0.6 million; RM4.9 million is equivalent to £0.7 million. 
4S RMIO.8 million is equivalent to £1.5 million; RM3.9 million is equivalent to £0.6 million. 
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and to demonstrate the sector's value to the policy makers, such as complete data on 
employment in co-operatives or an aggregate payroll. Thus, the expansion of co-
operatives has been presented in terms of the number, type and activities of co-
operatives. Out of the eight types of activities that co-operatives can be involved in, 
only credit co-operatives can be considered as outstanding with respect to their large 
number of members and their relatively high amount of assets and loans outstanding. 
Judgements on the performance of the co-operative movement have been made on 
the basis of the number of co-operatives, share capital and assets of co-operatives 
that increase each year, such as in the statement by the Director General in the 
DCD's 2001 annual report, which says, "I am quite satisfied with the annual 
performance of the Co-operative Movement nationwide. At the end of year 2001, 
there were 4,264 registered co-operatives with 4.7 million members, share capital 
exceeding RM4.3 billion and total assets amounting to RM18.9 billion".46 It would, 
however, be inaccurate to claim that the co-operative movement is a success by 
basing it solely on the growth statistics. 
Co-operatives in Malaysia seem never to have been widely acknowledged by policy 
makers, as institutions capable of assisting economic growth and social 
development. Co-operatives have never been seriously put forward in any of the 
country's national policy so far, such as the New Economic Policy that ran from 
1970 to 1990, or the National Development Plan that ran from 1991 to 2000, or the 
current National 2020 Vision. This is, in contrast, to other countries such as India. 
Nevertheless, through the DCD, the growth and the development of this institution 
has been nurtured but the co-operative movement still has not been as successful as 
the co-operative movement in other countries such as in the Western European 
46 RM4.3 billion is equivalent to £0.6 billion; RM 18.9 billion is equivalent to £2.7 billion. 
96 
Chapter 4 The Co-operative Movement in Malaysia 
countries where co-operatives have been making a significant economic 
contribution. Acknowledging the potential role of the co-operative movement in 
Malaysia, the National Co-operative Policy (NCP) was formulated in 2002, which 
can be seen as an effort to attain a more effective co-operative movement that could 
significantly contribute towards national development. The government has 
committed a lot of resources to achieve the objectives of the NCP including: 
enhancing the co-operative educational and management training role of the 
agencies involved; the revision and formulation of regulation for the advancement of 
co-operatives and for the securing of capital in co-operatives; and the bringing 
together of various government agencies under a National Co-operative Consultative 
Council to discuss and co-ordinate development programmes for co-operatives. The 
commitment of the Government to strengthen the co-operative movement, affirms 
Fredericks's (1986) argument that the establishment of co-operative societies and 
the development of the co-operative movement in Malaysia has been largely due to 
the initiative of the government. He regards it as a colonial legacy of intervention 
by the government in the co-operative movement. 
The figures pertaining to co-operatives in Malaysia do indicate the pattern of 
development and achievement of the co-operative sector. Issues pertaining to co-
operatives such as member participation, capital adequacy, conflicting goals, poor 
management, poor Board performance, inappropriate or poor implementation of 
strategies are the usual issues raised, which, according to Anderson and Henehan 
(2003) are issues on which much time has been spent discussing them over and over 
again. A study into the co-operative movement in Malaysia by a team from a local 
university that started in 1996, which served as the basis for the formulation of the 
NCP, incorporated these issues. The primary co-operatives are still, however, on 
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their own, surviving even without depending on secondary organisations. Some 
primary co-operatives have grown large and financially strong on their own. The 
secondary co-operatives, with the exception of their membership structure, seem just 
like any other primary co-operatives. The NCP acknowledges the dismal 
performance of the present secondary co-operatives and the OCD aims to encourage 
the establishment of many more secondary co-operatives (JPK, 2004b). 
In order to analyse the role of co-operatives in Malaysia, it is apparent that we need 
to explore detailed data at the co-operative level. This chapter has analysed 
aggregate information on co-operatives supplied by the OCD to give an overview of 
the Malaysian co-operative movement. In this thesis, we focus on two broad areas: 
the relationship between primary and secondary co-operatives; and the level of trust 
among co-operators. In order to conduct such analysis, an important contribution of 
this thesis lies in the collection of primary co-operative level data for Malaysia. As 
such, this empirical study is unique being based on such a survey for Malaysia. In 
Chapter 5, we will discuss the methods employed to collect data for the empirical 
analysis. 
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Appendix A4.1: The States of Malaysia 
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Appendix A4.2: The Bank Rakyat 
In the period when the co-operative credit movement began its rapid expansion in 
Peninsular Malaysia, credit co-operative societies established their own union banks 
to overcome difficulties in providing loan facilities to their members as well as in 
finding sources of funds. On 28th September 1954, eleven of these Banks 
amalgamated into an apex bank known as Bank Agong, which later became Bank 
Kerjasama Malaysia Berhad in 1967, which opened its membership both to 
individuals and co-operatives. Changes in by-laws allowed the Bank to create 
subsidiary companies and to open branches to serve customers as well as members 
all over the country. In 1973, its name was changed to Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia Berhad (Bank Rakyat). The Bank Rakyat is a primary co-operative 
registered under the Co-operative Act. A special provision for the Bank Rakyat 
known as the Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Act 1978 (Special Provision 202) 
was however enacted in 1978, which allows the Bank Rakyat to offer loans to non 
members. This activity puts the Bank under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance as well as under the Ministry for Co-operative Development in 1989. The 
Bank is therefore subject to the provisions of both Acts, but in the running of its 
operation, should there be any provision in the Co-operative Act that curbs the 
operation of the Bank, Act 202 prevails. A provision in Act 202 allows the Bank to 
apply for an exemption from the Minister concerned to exclude it from the 
requirements of the Co-operative Act, for example from holding an Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). This has given the Bank Rakyat a lot of advantages. In 2002, the 
Bank Rakyat was also placed directly under the supervision of the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia) under the Development of Financial Institution 
Act (DFIA). As a co-operative, the Bank Rakyat is also supervised by the DCD. 
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Appendix A4.3: Tables Relating to the Analysis of the Malaysian 
Co-operative Movement 
Table 4.1: Growth of Co-operatives in Malaysia (1990 to 2003) 
Year No of Co- Members Share/ Total Asset 
ops (Million) Subscription (RM Billion) 
(RM Billion) 
1990 3,028 3.33 1.64 6.15 
1991 3,083 3.44 1.75 6.55 
1992 3,288 3.66 1.92 7.60 
1993 3,388 3.91 2.18 8.33 
1994 3,473 4.06 2.44 10.14 
1995 3,554 4.25 2.74 10.39 
1996 3,735 4.21 2.83 12.17 
1997 3,847 4.13 3.17 12.96 
1998 3,942 4.55 3.60 14.10 
1999 4,050 4.33 3.84 14.10 
2000 4,154 4.50 4.21 15.82 
2001 4,246 4.76 4.30 18.90 
2002 4,330 5.03 4.40 19.00 
2003 4,469 5.21 5.57 25.14 
Notes: Data source: OeD, 2004 
101 
Chapter 4 The Co-operative Movement in Malaysia 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Co-operatives by State and by Activity in 2003 
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Table 4.3: Distribution of Co-operative Members by State and by 
Activity in 2003 
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Share Capital and Assets by Activity in 2003 
Business No. of % Share and % Asset % 
Sectorsl Activities Co- Subscription (RM mil.) 
ops (RM mil.) 
CrediUBanking: 447 10.0 4364.0 78.3 21 ,296.4 84.7 
- Credit 444 3,018.8 4,935.7 
- Banking 3 1,345.2 16,360.7 
Housing 92 2.1 93.7 1.7 463.0 1.8 
Consumer: 
Adult co-ops 1095 24.5 175.8 3.2 635.9 2.5 
School co-ops 1615 36.1 10.0 0.2 90.6 0.4 
Transport 438 9.8 62.0 1.1 170.1 0.7 
Plantation 224 5.0 206.4 3.7 1,045.9 4.2 
Small Industries 38 0.9 0.9 0.0 42.6 0.2 
Construction 111 2.5 18.8 0.3 152.0 0.6 
Services 409 9.2 642.1 11 .5 1,243.3 4.9 
Total 4469 100 5,573.6 100 25,139.8 100 
Notes: Data source: DeD published and unpublished data for 2003 
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Table 4.5: Composition of Co-operative Members according to 
Social and Economic Groups in 2003 
Grouping No.of No. of individual 
co-ops members 
Employees with fixed monthly 
income in: 
i. Public services 1,005 1,284,347 
- civil servants 233 362,647 
- Teachers 71 153,060 
- Armed forces 23 177,189 
- Statutory bodies 63 37,658 
- Government agencies 615 554,793 
ii. Private firms 160 246,649 
iii. Higher Education Institution 84 87,649 
Sub total 1,249 1,618,645 
Groupings of individuals not 
covered in the former category: 
i. KPDs 74 37,432 
ii. Small industries 26 2,065 
iii , Women 84 21,193 
iv, Others 1,385 1,835,841 
Sub total 1,569 1,896,531 
TOTAL 2,818 3,515,176* 
Notes: i) * Members of adult co-operatives only 
ii) + Excluding 1615 school co-operatives and 35 secondary co-
operatives 
iii) Data source: DeD unpublished data for 2003 
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Table 4.6: Co-operatives' Business Performance by Activity for 2003 
Co-op Business No. of Co-ops Sectors 
Credit/Banking 447 
Housing 92 
Consumer: 
- Adult co-ops 1095 
- School co-ops 1615 
Transport 438 
Plantation 224 
Small Industries 38 
Construction 111 
Services 409 
Total 4469 
Notes: I) *Total loan gIven out. 
ii) + Loan outstanding 
Business Profit I 
Volume (RM (Losses) 
mill.) (RM mill.) 
18,572.1* 15,577.6 
50.2 16.0 
247.6 33.2 
106.9 14.9 
128.8 8.7 
86.5 41.5 
5.1 (1.3) 
44.5 5.4 
135.9 69.6 
iii) Data source: DCD unpublished data for 2003 
Table 4.7: Number of Employees across Types of Co-operatives 
Activity Sector 2004 2005 
Banking 5119 1187 
Credit 5318 3096 
Plantation 1160 1142 
Housing 281 356 
Industries 456 58 
Consumer 4781 2884 
Construction 507 416 
Transport 1174 1058 
Services 2310 1247 
Total 21706 11444 
Notes: Data source: DCD database system (as at 19.05 .06) 
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Table 4.8: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by State and by 
Activity in 2003 
Activity of the 
Secondary Co-op 
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Table 4.9: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by 
Number of Primary Members 
Activity 
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Table 4_10: Active and Inactive Secondary Co-operatives (SCs) 
and their Primary Members 
The activity status of the secondary co- No. of SCs No. of primary 
operative members 
Active secondary co-ops: 27 593 
- Active secondary co-ops for co-ops in 7 260 
government development schemes 
- Other active secondary co-ops 20 333 
Inactive secondary co-ops: 8 408 
i. Gabungan Koperasi Peneroka FELDA 13 
Nasional BM. * 
ii. Koperasi Gabungan FELDA Kawasan 15 
Pahang Selatan Bhd. * 
iii. Kesatuan Koperasi Pulau Pinang Bhd. 12 
iv. Koperasi Gabungan SBB Bhd. 7 
v. Koperasi Gabungan Kesedar Bhd. * 10 
vi. Koperasi Pembangunan Negara Bhd. a 344 
vii. Sakilan Timber Co-op Federation Bhd. 3 
viii. Koperasi Menengah GPS Bhd. 4 
Total 35 1001 
Notes: i) * Secondary co-operative in state or federal government development 
schemes 
ii) a National level secondary co-operatives 
iii) Data source: OeD unpublished data for 2003. 
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Table 4.11: Distribution of Secondary Co-operatives by 
Performance and by Activity 
Performance status' 
~ 1/1 
0 <II C. 
-
<II > 9 0 <= 
:! Cl 0 0 C'tI 0 ~ « Activity 1/1 ... nI ~ Total <= <II 
-nI > 
Q) 0 Q) 
en « 3: z z 
Credit - 2 - - - 2 
Consumer 2 2 6 - - 10 
Plantation 1 - - - - 1 
Construction - - - - 1 1 
Services 1 6 5 - 1 13 
No Activity - - - 8 - 8 
Total 4 10 11 8 2 35 
Notes: i) • Evaluation of status by the DeD state offices where the 
secondary co-operatives are based. 
ii) Data source: OeD unpublished data for 2003. 
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Table 4.12: Activity and Business Performance of the 35 Secondary Co-operatives in 2003 
Main Volume of Profit/(Loss) Performance 
The Secondary Co-operative Activity business (RM) status ! 
(RM) 
1. Koperasi KOPEMA Berhad Services 1,223,961 356,918 Satisfactory 
2. Kop Gabungan FELDA Wit. Pahang Utara Bhd Services 34,103 17,033 Average 
3. Koperasi Bersekutu Pulau Pinang Berhad Services 129,790 35,974 Average 
4. Kesatuan Koperasi Malaysia Bhd. Services 51,927 28,711 Average 
5. Kesatuan Koperasi Midland Bhd. Services 24,325 5,334 Average 
6. Kop. Mercu Warisan Malaysia Bhd (Wholesale) Services 170,489 56,874 Average 
7. Gabungan Kop. Pembangunan Kg. Keda Bhd. Services 152,014 93 ,279 Average 
8. Koperasi Gabungnita Pulau Pinang Berhad Services 24 (76) Weak 
9. Gabungan Kop. Guru Nasional Bhd. Services 3,995 1,681 Weak 
10. Gabungan Koperasi Stevedoring Sabah Bhd. Services 4,800 3,532 Weak 
11. Kop. Pembangunan Negeri Kedah Berhad Services 14,824 (8,271) Weak 
12. Koperasi Kesihatan Berhad Services 36,730 (78,532) Weak 
13. Koperasi Peserta Felcra Negeri Pulau Pinang Bhd Services 
° ° 
New coop 
14. Kop. Pekebun Getah Nasional Bhd (NARSCO) Consumer 5,297,578 820,918 Satisfactory* 
15. Kop. Peserta-Peserta Felcra Bhd Consumer 4,030,689 2,171,433 Satisfactory* ! 
16. Gabungan Kop. Universiti Bhd. Consumer 68,791 6,272 Average 
17. Gabungan Kop. Peneroka FELDA Johor Bhd. Consumer 349,662 405,432 Average 
18. Konsortium Koperasi Industri Malaysia Bhd Consumer 312 211 Weak 
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Table 4.12: Activity and Business Performance of the 35 Secondary Co-operatives in 2003 (continued) 
Main Volume of Profit/(Loss) 
The Secondary Co-operative Activity business (RM) 
(RM) 
19. Konsortium Koperasi Kelantan Berhad Consumer 11 ,098 (20,213) 
20. Konsortium Kop. Pengguna Malaysia Bhd Consumer 824,915 (282,416) 
21. Kop. Kemas Kebangsaan Bhd (KOKEMAS) Consumer 19,200 (9,600) 
22. Koperasi Rakyat Sabah Bhd (KORAS) Consumer 25,300 (2,077,853) 
23. Konsortium Koperasi Terengganu Berhad Consumer 74,027 (36,279) 
24. Koperasi Rumpun Bumi Melaka Berhad Finance/ 23,610 17,448 
credit 
25. Gabungan Koperasi Melayu Berhad Finance/ 10,479 3,685 
credit 
26. Koperasi Gabungan Pekebun Kecil Perak Bhd Plantation 1,463,909 882,770 
27. Koperasi Pembangunan Seberang Prai Bhd Construction 0 0 
28. Gabungan Kop Peneroka FELDA Nasional Bhd - 0 0 
29. Kop Gabungan FELDA Kaw. Pahang Selatan Bhd - 0 0 
30. Kesatuan Koperasi Pulau Pinang Berhad - 1,100 500 
31. Koperasi Gabungan SBB Berhad - 0 0 
32. Koperasi Gabungan Kesedar Berhad - 0 0 
33. Kop. Pembangunan Negara Bhd. - 0 (2,955,164) 
34. Sakilan Timber Cooperative Federation Ltd. - 0 (2,360,037) 
35. Koperasi Menengah GPS Berhad - 0 (348) 
Total 14,047,652 (2,920,784) 
Notes: i) * The 3 satisfactory performing secondary co-operatives in government development schemes. 
ii) Data source: DCD, 2003. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE SURVEY OF CO-OPERATIVES IN MALAYSIA 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis presents empirical analysis of three important areas of the co-operative 
movement in Malaysia: the relationship between primary and secondary co-
operatives (Chapter 6); the determinants of the level of trust among Malaysian co-
operators (Chapter 7); and finally, the relationship between trust and co-operative 
size (Chapter 8). In order to conduct econometric analysis in these three areas, it 
was necessary to gather data at the co-operative level for Malaysia, since there are 
no such data sets available for Malaysia. As such, our empirical research identifies 
an under-researched area for Malaysia and is based on unique econometric analysis 
of an original data source constructed for this thesis. Hence, this chapter discusses 
the methods used to collect the data, a mail survey questionnaire. In Section 5.2, the 
chapter presents a detailed explanation of the mail survey questionnaire employed 
for the empirical research, which includes a discussion of the characteristics of the 
data collected for the empirical analysis. Finally, in Section 5.3, this chapter 
describes the profile of the co-operatives in the sample based on the responses to the 
mail survey questionnaire and the procedure we take to determine the size of the co-
operative. The description of the profile of the co-operatives in the sample and the 
determination of co-operative size provides an understanding of nature of the 
primary co-operatives in the Malaysian co-operative movement. Construction of 
such a profile represents an original and important contribution to this area of 
research, given the lack of official co-operative level data available for Malaysia. 
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The following section (Section 5.2) comprises: i) a description of the questionnaire, 
which includes the rate of response, in Section 5.2.1; ii) the population and the 
sample for the study; and iii) a description of the data provided by the responses to 
the questionnaire. 
5.2. TheMaii Survey Questionnaire 
The empirical analysis presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 is based on the responses to 
a mail survey questionnaire sent to primary co-operatives in Peninsular Malaysia.47 
Since this study is not confined to co-operatives in a specific economic sector, but 
instead includes all the 8 sectors of co-operative activity, the mail questionnaire 
method was chosen because it permits wide coverage with minimum time and 
expense, and it reaches potential respondents who would be difficult to locate and 
interview. To obtain a larger and a more representative sample of co-operatives, the 
study has to cover a wide area. Although there are disparate types of co-operatives 
in any of the 12 states (inclusive of the Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur) in the 
Peninsular, one state may have more of a particular type of co-operative and less of 
another because of the geographical suitability or other factors such as development 
and urbanization. In the state of Pahang, for example, there are more primary co-
operatives in land development schemes operating transport activities. Perak has 
more savings and thrift co-operatives, consumer co-operatives and co-operatives in 
plantation activities. Co-operatives in the small industry business sector are 
numerous in the state of Perak and Penang on the west coast of the Peninsular, and 
the state of Kelantan and Trengganu on the east coast, which are very far away 
geographically. If the study were to be confined to a particular state, there would be 
some sectors of activity that would not be represented at all. 
47 Additional data sources described in Chapters 7 and 8 supplement the survey data. 
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5.2.1. The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire (see Appendix AS.1) consists of 33 questions on ten pages in the 
national language (i.e. Bahasa Malaysia). It comprises 3 parts: 1) basic background 
information of primary co-operatives; 2) information on the primary co-operative's 
relationship with their secondary co-operative(s); and 3) information pertaining to 
the co-operator's trust. 
The questions are close-ended questions, which require respondents to just circle or 
tick the answers of their choice, except for the questions that asked for the name of 
the co-operative (Question 1) and the question that requires the respondents to name 
the secondary co-operative(s) in which their co-operative is a member (Question 
10). The close ended questions make the questionnaire less time consuming for the 
respondent to complete and aid the coding of the questions for computing and hence 
performing quantitative analysis. The questionnaire was posted to 467 primary co-
operatives at their postal address obtained from the DeD's data base system: the 
INFOKOP. It seems that not all co-operatives have offices: for some co-operatives 
the home address of one of the board members, either the Chairman, Secretary or 
Treasurer were listed in the INFOKOP. A self-addressed envelope with the correct 
postage stamp fixed on it was attached together with the questionnaire for the 
respondents to return their responses. 
We designed a questionnaire for co-operators that is relatively short, easy to 
understand, easy to complete with the language pitched to the level of the 
respondents. The questions were analysed by staff at the DCD who originated from 
various states, to ascertain if they understood them, as different words in the 
Malaysian language can be translated differently (even negatively) in different states 
or districts. In addition, we made sure that the questions were simple to understand 
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even at the layperson level. This was because we were not sure of the level of 
education among co-operators. Even though we directed the questionnaire to Board 
Members of the co-operatives, whom we assumed to possess a relatively higher 
level of education or at least on a par with their members, we also considered the 
difference between urban and rural co-operatives in this aspect. We only asked 
questions that do not need the respondents to search for figures such as figures on 
income or profit of the co-operative because to our knowledge some co-operatives in 
Malaysia still depend on Co-operative Inspectors from the DCn to help them with 
the book-keeping. We also omitted questions that might lead to refusal to answer, 
such as questions that might raise doubts in the study that could affect the rate of 
response or that the respondents would not give a true or sincere response to.48 
A covering letter with the University of Sheffield letterhead from the researcher 
introducing herself and a brief explanation of the research being undertaken was sent 
to members of the Board of the selected co-operatives (see Letter I in Appendix 
A5.2), seeking their participation in responding to the attached questionnaire. An 
accompanying letter of support for the research signed by the Deputy Director 
General II of the DCD with the DCD letterhead was also attached, asking co-
operators to give their co-operation to the researcher (see Letter 2 in Appendix 
A5.3). Our reason for using these official letterheads was to enhance confidence in 
the research project in the hope that it would encourage co-operators to respond to 
the questionnaire. We requested specifically in our letter to the co-operative that the 
questionnaire should be completed by anyone member of the co-operative Board. 
A member of the co-operative Board is a representative of the co-operative.49 Being 
48 For example, we omitted the question that directly asked whether the respondents trust the 
f90vemment, which we had intended to ask. . . . 
Under Section 44 of the Co-operative Act 1993, the co-operatIve Board of a regIstered co-operatIve 
society shall represent the society in all dealings with third persons. 
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a representative, a member of the co-operative Board gains access to more 
information and must defend the strategy of the co-operative [Ole Borgen, 2001]. 
The questionnaire was mailed to the co-operatives on 2ih September 2004, 
requesting respondents to respond by 25th October 2004. 
Out of the 467 co-operatives that we sent the questionnaire to, 106 co-operatives 
responded thus yielding a 22.7% response rate. The list of the 106 co-operatives is 
shown in Appendix A5.4. We consider this response rate as high relative to the 
study by Zeuli et ai. [2003b], especially since the co-operatives we surveyed were 
distributed throughout the Peninsular. The study on the primary-secondary co-
operative relationship by Zeuli et aI., which also used a mail survey, had a 19% 
response rate (113 responses from the 608 survey mailed out). Zeuli et ai. 
conducted a study with agricultural co-operatives in 4 states in the US: Illinois; 
Iowa; Minnesota; and Wisconsin, where they analysed the satisfaction of the 
primary co-operatives with the secondary co-operatives in their study on the future 
viability of the federated structure for agricultural co-operatives in the US. Their 
respondents were in management positions at the local (primary) co-operatives. 
Zeuli et ai. argued that the low response rate was caused by the comprehensive 
nature of their 13-page long survey. 
We consider the nature of our responses as unique as we could be analysing two 
kinds of responses: 1) a response from a respondent in his/her capacity as a co-
operative Board member, who, being a representative of the co-operative, speaks on 
behalf of the co-operative as required under the Co-operative Act 1993 (see footnote 
48); and 2) a response from the same respondent as an individual, who speaks for 
himlherself. This is because some questions in our questionnaire asked for specific 
information pertaining to the co-operative, such as questions on the benefits 
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acquired by primary co-operatives from being a member in a secondary co-
operative. Being a representative of the co-operative, i.e. a member of the co-
operative Board, the respondents are the 'organisation co-operators', whose roles are 
intimately related to identity and identification with the co-operative because they 
gain access to more information and must defend the strategy of the co-operative 
(Ole Borgen, 2001). Some questions, however, pertain to individuals' attitudes, 
such as questions that enquire about the individual's level of trust in various groups 
of people. 
5.2.2. The Population and the Sample 
The population in the study consists of all types of co-operatives registered with the 
DCD in 2003 totalling 4469 co-operatives. First, we exclude the 1615 school co-
operatives, leaving only 2854 adult co-operatives throughout the country. Then, we 
take out the 35 secondary co-operatives and the 2 co-operatives under the 
supervision of the DCD Headquarters, i.e. the Angkasa and the Bank Rakyat, 
leaving 2817 co-operatives. Finally, when we exclude the 710 adult co-operatives in 
East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), we have only 2107 co-operatives. From the 
2107 adult primary co-operatives in the Peninsular, the population for the sample is 
stratified into the 8 types of co-operative activity: creditlbanking; consumer; 
transportation; construction; plantation; housing; services; and small/cottage 
industry. 
We used stratified random sampling procedures with systematic random selection, 
to make sure that the samples constitute each and every type of co-operative. 
Sampling techniques, according to Black [1999:120-121], were devised to enhance 
the probability that any sample would be representative of a population, and the 
stratified sampling approach involves taking a random sample from identifiable 
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groups (strata) that are homogeneous for the desired characteristics. We took this 
approach as we wanted to be sure that the specific groups that make up the co-
operative population in Malaysia are represented in proportion to their existence in 
the population. It could be seen as an effort to minimize sampling errors, which 
"occurs simply because data are being collected on a sample and not on population" 
[Black, 1999: 126]. The population is, therefore, stratified according to the main 
activity of the co-operatives. We then set our samples systematically based on 2 
sampling fractions, which we designed ourselves based on the number of co-
operatives in each activity: 113 for the activities that have fewer than 200 co-
operatives and 115 for the rest. Thus, the number of samples by types of co-
operative activity is: 84 co-operatives in creditlbanking activity; 123 co-operatives 
in consumer activity; 85 co-operatives in transportation activity; 36 co-operatives in 
construction activity; 44 co-operatives in plantation activity; 28 co-operatives in 
housing activity; 56 co-operatives in service activity; and 11 co-operatives 10 
smalVcottage industry activity. Table 5.1 in Appendix A5.5s0 presents the detailed 
break-down of the co-operatives by activity according to the sampling fraction. 
Our samples thus constitute 22.2% of the population. Selection was made from the 
INFOKOP. Problems were encountered relating to the selection of co-operatives 
from the DeD's database since the system does not facilitate the search for co-
operatives according to type of activity. Therefore, the search had to be carried out 
according to the individual states. Nevertheless, except for a few, i.e. those co-
operatives that include in their registered name the activity they run, we could not 
tell from the list of co-operatives in each state, which co-operative fell into which 
activity. In some co-operatives, for example, there is the word 'kredit' in their 
so All other tables related to this section of the chapter (i.e. Section 5.3) are placed in Appendix A5.5 
at the end of the Chapter. 
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registered name, which denotes that the co-operative is a co-operative engaged in 
credit activity and the KIKs that are engaged in small/cortage industry activity have 
the words "Koperasi Industri Kampung" as part of their registered name that can 
clearly identify them from other types of co-operatives. Thus, we had to explore 
each individual co-operative in the state list to obtain the required information: the 
name of the co-operative, its address and its business sector (i.e. activity). As there 
are a few hundred co-operatives in each state, we selected a co-operative from every 
5 in the list for each state, until we obtained the exact number of samples required 
according to activity. In the selection process, we started off with the states in the 
central region, i.e. Selangor, Pahang, Perak, and the Federal Territory Kuala 
Lumpur. Where the required samples were not met, the selection of co-operatives 
was expanded to include other neighbouring states. 
5.2.3. The Data 
Our primary data will be used in the analysis of: 1) the relationship between the 
primary co-operative and their secondary organisations; 2) the co-operator's level of 
trust in co-operatives and in various groups of people; and 3) the relationship 
between co-operators' trust and co-operative performance. Hence, the data 
comprise the following: 
a. Current statistical information on primary co-operatives, i.e. the number of 
members of the co-operative (Question 2), the share capital and the assets of 
the primary co-operative (Questions 7 and 8); 
b. The characteristics of the primary co-operatives, I.e. the composition of 
members according to members' occupation, the racial composition of the 
members, the regional distribution of members, the co-operative's area of 
120 
Chapter S The Survey of Co-cperatives in Malaysia 
operation (Questions 3 to 6), and the activity of the co-operative (Question 
9); 
c. The primary co-operative's membership in secondary co-operatives, which 
includes the name of the secondary co-operative(s) that the co-operative is a 
member of and the tenure of membership in secondary co-operatives 
(Questions 10 and 11); 
d. The primary co-operative's level of satisfaction with the secondary co-
operative (Question 12), which is measured on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
possible responses: 'not at all satisfied'; 'not very satisfied'; 'neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied'; 'somewhat satisfied'; or 'very satisfied'. 
e. The benefits that the primary co-operatives have received from their 
membership in secondary co-operatives in terms of: their use of services 
provided by the secondary co-operatives; the primary co-operatives getting 
their needs supplied; receiving dividend or rebates from the secondary co-
operatives; whether membership in secondary co-operatives has resulted in 
an increase in the primary co-operative's income; an improvement in the 
primary co-operative's product or services; or an increase in the number of 
members of the primary co-operative (Questions 13 to 16). The answers to 
Questions 13 to 16 are either 'yes' or 'no'. 
f. The level of co-operators' agreement on the need for secondary co-
operatives (Question 19), which is also on a 5-point Likert scale. The 
possible responses were: 'totally disagree'; 'disagree'; 'neither agree nor 
disagree'; 'agree'; or 'strongly agree'. 
g. Information on the level of trust (Questions 21 to 29). Except for the 
attitudinal questions taken from the National Opinion Research Centre's 
General Social Survey (GSS) (Question 21), all other data on trust measures 
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the respondents' trust level on a Likert scale: 'don't trust at all'; 'don't trust 
very much'; 'neither trust nor distrust'; 'trust a little'; or 'trust completely'. 
The GSS trust question, on the other hand, asked respondents to indicate 
whether, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Questions 22 and 
25 are questions on trust in various groups of people such as family 
members, friends and fellow nationalssl , while Questions 23 and 24 are trust 
questions pertaining to lending money. 
h. Information is also gathered on co-operator's trust in co-operatives (Question 
29) and their trust that people are honest, that people would not take 
advantage and that people would put the interest of others first (Questions 26 
to 28).52 
1. Information on respondents' willingness to financially commit towards the 
start-up capital of a business opportunity to be run as a co-operative 
(Question 31), with possible responses: to contribute the minimum 5% 
required; to contribute the maximum 15% allowed; or not willing to commit 
yet. 53 
j. Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents: age of the respondent 
(Question 32); and employment status, i.e. whether they are a salary earner 
or self-employed (Question 33). 
" The questions on trust in various groups of people such as family members and fellow nationals are 
trust questions taken from the organization of the World Value Survey [Whiteley, 2000]. 
52 The trust questions pertaining to trust in lending money (Questions 23 and 24) and trust that 
people, in general, have particular values (Le. Questions 26 to 28) differ from the ass trust 
~uestions. 
5 This question was designed to elicit information on the co-operators entrepreneurial spirit. 
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In the following section, based on the responses to the mail survey questionnaire, we 
describe the profile of the co-operatives in the sample. Detailed analysis on 
responses to the satisfaction and trust questions are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
5.3. Profile of the Primary Co-operatives: Summary Statistics 
5.3.1. The Number of Members, Share Capital and Assets 
The data on the number of members (Question 2) consists of five categories: i) 100 
members or less; ii) 101 to 500 members; iii) 501 to 1000 members; iv) 1001 to 
1500 members; and v) more than 1500 members. We constructed an index from the 
responses, ranging from 0 (for the category with the least number of members) to 4 
(for the category with the largest number of members). Meanwhile, the data for the 
amount of share capital (Question 7) and the assets' value (Question 8) of a co-
operatives consists of six similar categories: i) not more than RM1000.00; ii) 
RM1001.00 - RMIO,OOO.OO; iii) RM10,001.00 - RMIOO,OOO.OO; iv) RMIOO,OOl.OO 
- RMl,OOO,OOO.OO; v) RM1,000,001.00 - RM50,000,000.00 and vi) more than 
RM50 million.54 The share capital and the assets indexes range from 0 to 5 for each 
variable, i.e. 0 for the category with the least amount of share capital or with the 
lowest value of assets and 5 for the category with the highest amount of share capital 
or with the highest value of assets. Table 5.2 in Appendix A5.5 presents the 
summary statistics of the primary co-operatives in the sample for the number of 
members, the share capital and the assets. 
For the number of members, a large number of the co-operatives in the sample have 
more than 100 members. 36.8% have between 100 to 500 members. This is 
because the minimum requirement to form a primary co-operative in Malaysia is 
54 RMIOOO.OO is equivalent to £143.00; RMIO,OOO.OO is equivalent to £1,429.00;. ~1.00,00?OO is 
equivalent to £14,286.00; RMI,OOO,OOO.OO is equivalent to £142,857.00; RM50 mllhon IS eqUIvalent 
to £7.1 million. 
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100 individuals. More than half of the co-operatives (57.6%) have more than 500 
members. Co-operatives that have more than 1500 individual members constitute 
34% of the sample. Only 6 co-operatives in the sample (5.7%) have 100 members 
or less. The number of members may have fallen below 100 due to death, or due to 
members leaving the co-operatives. This is because the minimum number is 
required upon registration only. Alternatively, the co-operative may have been 
formed under the special provision of the Co-operative Act 1993, which allows 
certain societies to consist of at least 20 members. 
Only 3.8% of the co-operatives in our sample have more than RM50 million in share 
capital. 51.9% of the co-operatives have share capital below RMI00,000.00 and 
44.3% have more than RMIOO,OOO.OO but less than RM50 million in share capital. 
Meanwhile, more than three quarters of the co-operatives have over RM100,000.00 
in assets, with 74.5% having between RMI00,000.00 and RM50,000,000.00 in 
assets and 3.8% with assets worth more than RM50 million. 
5.3.2. The Composition 0/ Members by Occupation and by Race; the 
Distribution o/the Co-operative IS Members; and the Co-
operative IS Area o/Operation 
Table 5.3 presents summary statistics of the primary co-operatives in the sample for 
the composition of members by occupation, the racial composition of members, the 
distribution of members and co-operative's area of operation. 
70.8% of the co-operatives have members from diverse occupations. Only 29.2% 
are co-operatives, whose members are individuals belonging to the same group of 
employment. 65% of the primary co-operatives have members from one race only, 
while 35% are multiracial co-operatives. 23.6% of the co-operatives have members 
distributed on a nationwide scale, 76.4% are co-operatives with members confined 
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to a region. Meanwhile in tenns of area of operation, 24.6% of the co-operatives 
operate nationwide and 75.7% are regional-based co-operatives. 
To detennine how well the composition and the distribution of the co-operatives' 
members and the co-operatives' area of operation fit the co-operative population, we 
ran a Chi-square (i) test for goodness of fit on the four variables: the composition of 
members by occupation; the racial composition of members; the distribution of 
members; and the co-operative's area of operation. In Table 5.3, the computed i 
value in the fourth column, for each of the variables, indicates that the observed 
frequencies of all the four variables differ significantly from the expected 
frequencies with a p-value of less than 1 %. The tests also indicate that the 
probability of this result being random is less than 1 %, which tells that it is highly 
unlikely that this result would happen by chance [Gravetter and Wallnau, 2000]. 
Thus, our sample is representative of the Malaysian co-operative population in tenns 
of the composition of co-operative members by occupation, racial composition of 
members, the distribution of members and the co-operative's area of operation. 
One might predict that co-operatives that have members distributed throughout the 
country would be operating on a nationwide scale. The 67% positive correlation 
between co-operatives that have regionally distributed members and co-operatives 
that operate on a regional area, indeed, indicates a strong relationship between the 
two. In other words, most of the co-operatives that have members distributed all 
over the country, operate on a nationwide scale, and vice versa. 
5.3.3 The Co-operative's Area of Activity 
The eight areas of co-operative activity are: credit; consumerism; transportation; 
construction; plantation; housing; services; and small/cottage industry. Some co-
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operatives in the sample were found to run several activities that made it difficult to 
tell which activity is the co-operative's main activity. In general, there are two 
types of co-operatives, i.e. the co-operatives that run only a single activity and the 
co-operatives with two activities or more (i.e. the multipurpose co-operatives). 
46.2% of the 106 co-operatives are single-activity co-operatives, while 53.8% are 
multipurpose co-operatives. 
Table 5.4 presents the distribution of the single-activity co-operatives by the area of 
activity and the multipurpose co-operatives by the number of activities. Credit co-
operatives constitute 24.5% of the single-activity co-operatives, followed by the 
services co-operatives (20.4%). Meanwhile, co-operatives with two and three 
activities together constitute the largest percentage of co-operatives in the 
multipurpose category, i.e. 78.9 % of the 57 co-operatives or 42.4% of the 106 co-
operative. Only a small percentage of the multipurpose co-operatives run more 
than 3 activities: 4.7% with 4 activities; 4.7% with 5 activities; and 1.9% with 6 
activities. 
For the multipurpose co-operatives, we ran a check in the INFOKOP for their main 
activity. Table 5.5 presents the distribution of the 106 co-operatives in the sample 
by their main activity. From here, we can calculate the rate of the responses 
according to the stratified sampling described in Table 5.1 in Section 5.2.2. Table 
5.5 also presents the rate of responses according to the indicated stratified sampling. 
In terms of the number of co-operatives, credit co-operatives constitute the largest 
(i.e. 25.5%) of the total 106 co-operatives in the sample. Consumer co-operatives 
constitute 17.9% of the total, followed by transport co-operatives (15.1 %), services 
co-operatives (14.2%), housing co-operatives (8.5%), plantation co-operatives 
(7.5%) and, lastly, construction co-operatives and small/cottage industry co-
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operatives (each with 5.7% responses). In terms of the rate of response according to 
the stratified sampling, the largest percentage of return comes from co-operatives 
with the main activity small/cottage industry (54.5%), followed by 32.1 % each from 
co-operatives having credit or housing as the main activity and then by co-
operatives with the main activity services (26.3%). Although co-operatives with the 
main activity being consumer activity constitute the largest number of co-operatives 
in the sampling frame, only 15.3% responded. 
Table 5.6 presents the number of co-operatives that are involved in the 8 types of 
activities, irrespective of whether they are single-activity or mUltipurpose co-
operatives. There are relatively more co-operatives involved in credit, consumerism 
and services activities. Not many of the co-operatives are involved in small/cottage 
industry activity. 55.6% of co-operatives that are involved in smalVcottage industry 
activity run it as a single activity. 32.4% of the co-operatives that are involved in 
credit activity run it as their only activity. Only 4.2% of the co-operatives that are 
involved in plantation activity run it as their only activity. 
5.3.4. Membership and Tenure of Membership in Secondary Co-operatives 
Question 10, which asked respondents whether their co-operative is a member of a 
secondary co-operative and the name of the secondary co-operative in which their 
co-operatives are a member, captures two kinds of information. First, information 
on whether a primary co-operative is a member of a secondary co-operative is given 
and second, information is provided on whether the respondents understand what a 
secondary co-operative is. We compare the names of the secondary co-operatives 
from the responses with the DCD's list of the 35 secondary co-operatives. We 
received responses that: 1) named other co-operatives that are not on the DCD's list 
of registered secondary co-operatives as their secondary co-operatives such as the 
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Bank Rakyat, which is a primary co-operative; 2) named the DCD as their secondary 
co-operative; and 3) named the ANGKASA as their secondary co-operative. 
41 co-operatives (38.7%) named the ANGKASA as their secondary co-operative 
although the ANGKASA is not included in the DCD's list of secondary co-
operatives. From the 41 co-operatives, 28 co-operatives (68.3%) named only the 
ANGKASA as their secondary co-operatives. These 28 co-operatives constitute 
26.4% of the total106 co-operatives in the sample. 
For the purpose of this study we counted ANGKASA as a secondary co-operative 
since the ANGKASA is, by nature of its establishment, a secondary co-operative 
whose members constitute primary co-operatives. The ANGKASA has always been 
perceived as a secondary co-operative by co-operators in Malaysia. The 
ANGKASA was declared an apex co-operative organisation to represent the co-
operative movement at the national and international level in a declaration made by 
the Minister for Co-operatives on the 23rd May 1996, that is after 24 years of its 
existence as a secondary co-operative. By counting the ANGKASA as a secondary 
co-operative, the number of primary co-operatives in the sample that are members of 
secondary co-operatives is 56 co-operatives or 52.8% of the total 106 co-operatives. 
The 28 co-operatives that named only the ANGKASA as their secondary co-
operative, therefore, constitute 50% of the secondary co-operative members in the 
sample. Table 5.7 lists the names of the secondary co-operatives obtained from the 
survey. 
The responses to Question 11 that asked about the tenure of membership in a 
secondary co-operative indicate that: 16.1 % of the 56 co-operatives have been 
members of a secondary co-operative for not more than 5 years; 23.2% have been 
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members between 6 and 10 years; 17.9% have been members between 11 and 15 
years; and 42.9% have been members of a secondary co-operative for more than 15 
years. 
In this section, we have described the profile of the primary co-operatives in the 
sample based on the responses to the mail survey questionnaire, which includes: 1) 
statistical information on the number of members, the share capital and the assets of 
the co-operatives; 2) co-operative characteristics (the composition and the 
distribution of co-operative members, the co-operative's area of operation and the 
co-operative's activity); and 3) the primary co-operative's membership in secondary 
co-operatives. In the survey, in Question 20, we also tried to capture co-operator's 
level of understanding of the role of secondary co-operatives. In the following 
section we describe the responses to this question. 
5.4. The Perceived Roles of Secondary Co-operatives 
Based on the existing literature pertaining to possible roles of secondary co-
operatives, Question 20 lists 14 roles that secondary co-operatives may play such as: 
to spread knowledge on co-operatives; to co-ordinate the activity of the primary co-
operatives; and to provide necessary training to primary co-operatives. Respondents 
were asked to indicate whether they agree or not with the roles. Each of the roles is 
given an index of 0 to 2: 0 for disagreeing; 1 for no response, which, in this case, we 
assume that the respondents neither agree nor disagree; and 2 for agreeing. Table 
5.8 presents summary statistics of the responses relating to the 14 roles of secondary 
co-operatives. 
Except for the role of assisting with the establishment and registration of new co-
operatives, the role of auditing the primary co-operatives 'and role of providing legal 
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advice to the primary co-operatives, most of the listed roles have a high mean value 
of over 1.5 (in which the minimum value is 0 and the maximum is 2), which 
indicates that there are more responses agreeing with the related roles for secondary 
co-operatives. The role of assisting with the establishment and registration of new 
co-operatives has the largest rate of response for not agreeing (29.3%), followed by 
the role of auditing (17.9%) and the role of giving legal advise (15.1%). The 
possible explanation for the respondents not agreeing to secondary co-operatives 
assisting with the establishment and registration of new co-operatives, auditing and 
giving legal advice could be because in Malaysia, these have been provided by the 
OeD. The responses in Table 5.8 indicate the roles of secondary co-operatives 
perceived by the co-operators. It also indicates that co-operators are aware of, or 
understand the roles that secondary co-operatives may play, even though some 
cannot differentiate a secondary co-operative from a non-secondary co-operative, as 
indicated from the responses to the question pertaining to membership in secondary 
co-operatives discussed in Section 5.3.4. 
5.5. Summary 
In this chapter, we have described the mail survey questionnaire employed to collect 
data for our empirical analysis in detail. We have also described the characteristics 
of the co-operatives in the sample of responses. Basically, there is only a small 
percentage (5.7%) of the primary co-operatives that have less than 100 members but 
in terms of share capital a large percentage (51.9%) of the co-operatives have less 
than RMlOO,OOO.OO in share capital. If we were to divide the RMlOO,OOO.OO in 
share capital with, for example, 200 members (since the minimum members 
required to form a co-operative is 100 and since the number of members would, 
arguably, have increased with time), then, on average, the contribution of each 
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member to the share capital of the co-operative is RM500.00.ss Ifwe were to divide 
the RMIOO,OOO.OO by 500 members (since quite a large percentage of co-operatives 
falls under this range of members), then, on average, the share capital is RM200.00 
per member. S6 In terms of composition of co-operative members by occupation, a 
large percentage of primary co-operatives in the sample have members that comprise 
individuals from diverse employment. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the 
co-operative activity, most likely, does not relate to what the members are doing for 
a living. 
In general, the survey data represents an original data source which is analysed in 
this thesis. There is a shortage of such data sets in Malaysia. Hence, the 
questionnaire provides the basis for our original econometric analysis presented in 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8. Chapter 6 presents empirical analysis of the relationship 
between primary co-operatives and secondary co-operatives. Chapter 7 presents 
empirical analysis of the level of trust among Malaysian co-operators and Chapter 8 
presents empirical analysis of the relationship between co-operators' trust and co-
operatives' size. The collection of the survey data analysed in this thesis represents 
an important contribution to the research on Malaysian co-operatives in particular 
and on co-operatives in general. The distinct shortage of detailed data on co-
operatives in Malaysia has led to this being an under-researched area. The analysis 
of the survey data presented in this chapter represents a first step towards aiding our 
knowledge and understanding of co-operatives in Malaysia. 
SS RM500.00 is equivalent to £71.00. 
56 RM200.00 is equivalent to £29.00. 
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Appendix 5.1: The Questionnaire 
I QNO I104/JJ/SU 
The Questionnaire Sent to Primary Co-operatives 
(Please circle or tick your answer where appropriate) 
Part I: Basic Information about your co-operative 
1. Name of your 
co-operative 
2. Number of members a. 100 or less 
b. 101 - 500 
c. 501 -1000 
d. 1001-1500 
e. more than 1500 
3. Composition of a. individuals, from various groups/types of 
members according to employment (mixed occupation) 
occupation b. individuals, from the same group of employment 
c. both individuals and organisations from all sorts of 
economic activities 
4. Composition of a. one-race only 
members according b. multiracial 
race 
5. Distribution of a. nationwide 
members b. specific area (StatelDistrict) 
6. Area of operation a. Nationwide 
b. State of ............... 
7. Share capital (RM) a. not more than 1000 
h. 1001- 10,000 
c. 10,001-100,000 
d. 100,001 - 1,000,000 
e. 1,000,001 - 50,000,000 
f. more than 50 million 
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8. Asset(RM) a. not more than 1000 
b. 1001 -10,000 
c. 10,001-100,000 
d. 100,001-1,000,000 
e. 1,000,001- 50,000,000 
f. more than 50 million 
9. Activity a. CreditlFinance 
b. Consumerism 
c. Transportation 
d. Construction work 
e. Plantation 
f. Housing 
g. Services 
h. Small/cottage industries 
i. No activity 
Part II: On Secondary Co-operative 
1 O( a). Is your co-operative a member of a secondary co-operative? If yes, proceed with 
the next question, if no, go to Question 18. 
(b). Name of secondary co-operative in which your co-operative is its member. 
No. Name of secondary co-operative 
11. How long has your co-operative been its member? 
a) Not more than 5 years 
b) 6 - I 0 years 
c) 11 - 15 years 
d) more than 15 years 
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12. Are you satisfied with the secondary co-operative? 
a. Very satisfied 
b. Somewhat satisfied 
c. Neither satisfied nor not satisfied 
d. Not very satisfied 
e. Not satisfied at all 
13. Does your co-operative use the services provided by the secondary co-operative? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
14. Does your co-operative get its needed input/resources (for example raw materials or 
information) supplied by the secondary co-operative? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
15. Does your co-operative receive dividends/rebates from the secondary co-operative? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
16. By being a member of the secondary co-operative, has there been: 
i) an increase in income of your co-operative? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
ii) an improvement in your co-operative product / services? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
iii) an increase in number of members of your co-operative? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
17. How would you describe the rate of shares/fees imposed by the secondary co-
operative? 
a. Too high 
b. High 
c. Neither high nor low 
d. Low 
e. Very low 
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18_ Had your co-operative ever been a member to a secondary co-op that now is no 
longer in existence or is no more in operation? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
19. Do you agree that primary co-operatives need secondary co-operative in order to 
develop? 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Totally disagree 
20. Do you agree with the following roles by secondary co-ops? Please tick ( .J ) in 
the appropriate box. 
Agree Do not 
agree 
a. Co-ordinate, inform and advise on activities 
b. Education and training to member co-ops 
c. Act as representative body for co-op activity 
d. Spread knowledge of co-op principles 
e. Develop strong and effective partnership with other 
co-op sectors 
f. Assist with the establishment and registration of new 
co-op societies 
g. Liaise directly with government agencies 
h. Link together scattered co-op societies 
i. Go into bigger business opportunities 
j. Audit service 
k. Constitutional and legal advise 
I. Produce publications on performance of member co-
ops 
m. Procurement 
n. Marketing 
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Part III 
Please give your answer according to the scale given below by circling (where 
appropriate) the answer o/your choice. 
I 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Do not trust at all 
2. Do not trust very much 
3. Neither trust nor distrust 
4. Trust a little 
5. Trust completely 
21. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people? 
a) Most people can be trusted 
b) Can't be too careful 
22. Generally speaking, can you trust: 
i) Your family members? 2 3 
ii) Your friends? 2 3 
23. Do you trust the following people to lend them your money? 
i) Your family members? 
ii) Your friends? 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
24. Do you trust that the following people will repay the money you lend them? 
a. Your family members? 2 3 4 5 
b. Your friends? 2 3 4 5 
25. Describe your level of trust in the following people: 
i) people from the same district 2 3 4 5 
ii) people from the same state 2 3 4 5 
iii) people from the same country 2 3 4 5 
26. Generally speaking, do you trust that people are honest? 
2 3 4 5 
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27. Generally speaking, do you trust that people would not take advantage? 
2 3 4 5 
28. Generally speaking, do you trust that people would put the interests of others first? 
2 3 4 5 
29. Generally speaking, do you trust the co-operative? 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. How often did you get help from: 
i) individuals? 
a. never 
b. once a while 
c. often 
ii) Organisations/institutions (including government)? 
a. never 
b. once a while 
c. often 
31. A small group of people you are familiar with, plans to start a business as a co-
operative. You are invited to join in by contributing between 5% and 15% towards 
the start-up capital of the business. This is a business opportunity for you. You can 
afford it, but how much are you willing to contribute? 
a. minimum required (5%) 
b. maximum 15% 
c. will not commit yet (will wait and see) 
32. What is your age? 
a. under 20 
b. 21 - 30 years old 
c. 31 - 40 years old 
d. 41 - 50 years old 
e. above 50 
33. Are you: 
a. a salary earner? 
b. self-employed? 
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Appendix A5.2: Letter 1 - Translated Version ofthe Researcher's Letter to 
Members of the Co-operative Board, which 
accompanied the Questionnaire 
(The University of Sheffield letterhead) 
Koperasi ................... . 
Dear Members of the Co-operative Board, 
CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH IN MALAYSIA 
I refer to the above mentioned matter. 
I am an officer with the Department of Co-operative Development, currently pursuing PhD 
research at the University of Sheffield in the UK, researching on how to develop the 
Malaysian co-operative movement. In particular, the research project is directed towards 
developing secondary co-operatives. For the purpose of this research, I have designed a 
questionnaire directed to co-operatives at the primary level. The questionnaire, which 
consists of 3 parts and incorporates trust into the study on developing the Movement, is 
enclosed herewith. 
I would be very grateful if anyone member of the co-operative Board could respond to the 
attached questionnaire. I give my assurance that all information provided will be used 
strictly for academic purposes only. Please return the answered questionnaire to me in the 
provided stamped self-addressed envelope, no later than 25 October 2004. 
Your co-operation towards the effort to develop the co-operative movement in this country 
is very much appreciated and I thank you in advance. 
Thank you, 
(Signed) 
Juliawati binti Janius 
Phd Research Student 
Department of Economics 
Sheffield University 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S 1 4DT, UK 
e-mail: ecq02jj@sheffield.ac.uk 
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Appendix A5.3: Letter 2 - Translated Version ofthe DCD's Letter to the Co-
operatives 
(The DCD's official letterhead) 
Our ref: JPK.IP.(AM) 7158 Jld.4 (34) 
Date: 28 September, 2004 
The Secretary 
Koperasi ................... . 
Dear Sir, 
CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH IN MALAYSIA 
It is hereby certified that Mrs. Juliawati binti Janius, is an officer with the 
Department of Co-operative Development, who is currently pursuing PhD research 
at the University of Sheffield in the UK. She is undertaking a research project to 
develop the Malaysian co-operative movement with emphasis on developing 
secondary co-operatives. The Department supports this research in the hope that it 
will project benefit to the co-operative movement in this country. 
We would be glad if you could extend your co-operation to the researcher as she has 
requested in her letter to you. 
Thank you. 
(Motto of the Civil Service) 
(Signed) 
ABDUL RAUF BIN ALIAS 
Deputy Director General 
(Development and Administration) 
Department of Co-operative Development 
MALAYSIA 
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Appendix A5.4: List of Primary Co-operatives in the Sample 
Serial Name of Co-operative 
Number 
001 Koperasi Industri Kampung Kampung Jambu Bongkok 
002 Koperasi Serbaguna Pegemas Berhad 
003 Koperasi Ampang Jaya Berhad 
004 Koperasi Belia Negeri Pahang Berhad 
005 Koperasi Peneroka RKT JlTekoh Berhad 
006 Koperasi Serbaguna Pembatik Kelantan Berhad 
007 Koperasi Jaya Sarna Berhad 
008 Koperasi Peneroka Felda Sg. Paneing Utara Bhd 
009 Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Parit Berhad 
010 Koperasi Bersatu Gadong Jaya Labu Berhad 
011 Koperasi Peserta-peserta Felcra Kebun Baru Bhd. 
012 Koperasi Perwanis Berhad 
013 Koperasi Serbaguna Chukai (KOSECB) Berhad 
014 Koperasi Atas Bonggol Berhad 
015 Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Daerah BesutiSetiu Bhd. 
016 Koperasi Serbaguna Pekerja-pekerja Malaysia Berhad 
017 Koperasi Industri Keeil Laksa Jaafar Mek Limah (JML) Berhad 
018 Koperasi Jimat Cermat & Pinjaman Orang-orang Melayu Berjawatan 
Kerajaan Daerah Hulu Langat Bhd. 
019 Koperasi Sri Maju Berhad (Komaju) 
020 Kopersai Serbaguna Sungai Besi Berhad 
021 Koperasi Serbaguna Ayer Kala Berhad 
022 Koperasi Perumahan Angkatan Tentera Berhad 
023 Not indicated 
024 Not indicated 
025 Koperasi Mercantile Ipoh Berhad 
026 Koperasi Koguma Berhad 
027 Not indicated 
028 Koperasi Guru-guru Lepasan Maktab/Pusat Latihan Harian Pahang Bhd. 
029 Koperasi Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Berhad 
030 Koperasi Kemajuan Tanah Sungai Buloh Berhad 
031 Koperasi Serbaguna Felda Ijok Berhad 
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Serial Name of Co-operative 
Number 
032 Koperasi Perdanajaya Malaysia Berhad 
033 Koperasi Industri Keeil Sulaman dan Jahitan Kelantan Berhad 
034 Koperasi Batu Talam Berhad 
035 Koperasi Sri Nilam Berhad 
036 Koperasi Sedar Berhad 
037 Koperasi Belia Nasional Berhad 
038 Koperasi Pekebun Keeil Daerah Marang berhad 
039 Koperasi Melayu Pulau Pinang Berhad 
040 Koperasi Serbaguna Iman Malaysia Berhad 
041 Koperasi Pelaburan Pekerja Safeguards Berhad 
042 Koperasi Kenderaan dan Pengangkutan (M) Hulu Perak dan Kuala Kangsar 
Berhad 
043 Koperasi Industri Kampung Paka Dungun Terengganu Berhad 
044 Koperasi Usahasama Felda Palong Tiga Berhad 
045 Koperasi Pelaburan Pekerja Permint Plywood Dungun Bhd. 
046 Koperasi Kakitangan Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Johor Berhad 
047 Koperasi Kemas Negeri Johor Berhad 
048 Koperasi Pembangunan Pendidikan Berhad 
049 Koperasi Peserta-peserta Felcra Gugusan Keruak Besut Berhad 
050 Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Negeri Sembilan Bhd. 
051 Koperasi Pekebun Keeil Daerah Dungun Bhd. 
052 Koperasi Bekas-bekas Perajurit Negeri Kelantan Bhd. 
053 Koperasi Felda Jerangau Barat Terengganu Bhd. 
054 Koperasi Universiti Kolej Terengganu Berhad 
055 Koperasi Pegawai Petempatan (M) Bhd. 
056 Koperasi Maju Ekonomi Pekerja Bhd. 
057 Koperasi Serbaguna Anak-anak Selangor Bhd. 
058 Koperasi Peke bun Keeil Daerah Hulu Langat Bhd. 
059 Koperasi Gerakan Belia 4B Berhad 
060 Koperasi Guru-guru Melayu Larut Matang, Selama dan Dinding Taiping 
Bhd. 
061 Koperasi Pekebun Getah Kelantan Selatan Bhd. 
062 Koperasi Peneroka RKT Kesedar Renok Baru Bhd. 
063 KOPERASI Pekebun Getah Daerah Jerantut Bhd. 
064 Not indicated 
065 Koperasi Tenaga Setia Tanah Merah Bhd. 
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Serial Name of Co-operative 
Number 
066 Koperasi Peserta-peserta Rancangan Felcra Kubang Kenyeng Bhd. 
067 Koperasi Serbaguna Teras Semenyih Bhd. 
068 Koperasi Pekerja-pekerja Telekom Negeri Sembilan, Melaka dan Johor Bhd. 
069 Koperasi Bina Berhad 
070 Koperasi Belia Islam Malaysia Berhad 
071 Koperasi Anggota Kerajaan Ipoh Bhd. 
072 Koperasi Jabatan Penjara Kuala Lumpur Bhd. 
073 Not indicated 
074 Koperasi Pasaran dan Pemiagaan Perak Berhad 
075 Koperasi Keluarga Pemandu Berhad 
076 Koperasi Kakitangan Kerajaan dan Badan Berkanun (KOKANUN) 
Terengganu Bhd. 
077 Koperasi Guru-guru Sekolah Malaysia Berhad 
078 Koperasi Serbaguna Bumiputra Taiping Bhd. 
079 Koperasi Felda Tenang Besut Jerteh Bhd. 
080 Koperasi Pembangunan Tanah Kg. Som Jerantut Bhd. 
081 Koperasi Pekerja-pekerja Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu Kelantan Bhd. 
082 Koperasi Kemas Terengganu Bhd. 
083 Koperasi Kredit dan Serbaguna Pekerja Pusat Percubaan Penyelidikan Getah 
Sungai Buluh Bhd. 
084 Koperasi Industri Kecil Melati Berhad 
085 Koperasi Teksi Melayu Terengganu Berhad 
086 Koperasi Ladang Sungai Tong Bhd. 
087 Koperasi Pekerja-pekerja Perindustrian Terengganu Utara Bhd. 
088 Koperasi Pembangunan Daerah Besut Berhad 
089 Koperasi Serbaguna Felda Sungai Tekam Berhad 
090 Koperasi Felda Kg. Rahmat Chalok Terengganu Bhd. 
091 Koperasi Tentera Bhd. 
092 Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Manjong Berhad 
093 Koperasi Pegawai Melayu Kelantan Berhad 
094 Koperasi Perumahan Melayu Kinta Berhad 
095 Koperasi Pekebun Kecil Daerah Kuala Terengganu Bhd. 
096 Koperasi Pekerja-pekerja Kerajaan Hilir Perak Berhad 
097 Koperasi Peserta-peserta Rancangan Felcra Gugusan Bukit Tandak Bhd. 
098 Koperasi Serbaguna Hulu Perak Berhad 
099 Koperasi Permodalan dan Perusahaan Perak Selatan Bhd. 
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Serial Name or Co-operative 
Number 
100 Koperasi Seri Rembau Bhd. 
101 Koperasi Peke bun Kecil Daerah Raub Bhd. 
102 Koperasi Perniagaan Guru-guru Muar Bhd. 
103 Koperasi Hannan Berhad 
104 Koperasi Didik Berhad 
105 Koperasi Pekerja-pekerja Kilang Penapis Shell Bhd. 
106 Koperasi Serbaguna Tanjung Karang Bhd. 
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Appendix AS.S: Summary Statistics for the Co-operatives in the Sample 
Table 5.1: Number of Samples by Types of Activity 
Activity No. of Sampling No. of 
Co-ops Fraction Samples 
CrediUBanking 421 1/5 84 
Consumer 616 1/5 123 
Transportation 426 1/5 85 
Construction 110 1/3 36 
Plantation 134 1/3 44 
Housing 85 1/3 28 
Service 281 1/5 56 
Small/Cottage 34 1/3 11 
Industry 
Total 2107 467 
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of the Number of Members, the Share Capital and the 
Assets of the Primary Co-operatives in the Sample 
Observation Mean Standard Min. Max. 
Deviation 
Number of Members 106 2.2830 1.4058 0 4 
Share Capital 106 3.0943 1.0913 0 5 
Assets 106 2.2547 1.5059 0 5 
No. of Co-ops Percentage 
Number of Members: 
0) 100 or less 6 5.7 
1) 101 - 500 members 39 36.8 
2) 501 - 1000 members 16 15.1 
3) 1001 - 1500 members 9 8.5 
4) More than 1500 members 36 34.0 
Share Capital (RM): 
O} Not more than 1000.00 17 16.0 
1) 1001.00 -10,000.00 22 20.8 
2} 10,001.00 - 100,000.00 16 15.1 
3} 100,001.00 - 1,000,000.00 23 21.7 
4) 1,000,001.00- 24 22.6 
50,000,000.00 
5} More than 50 million 4 3.8 
Assets (RM): 
0) Not more than 1000.00 5 4.7 
1) 1001.00-10,000.00 3 2.8 
2) 10,001.00 -100,000.00 15 14.2 
3) 100,001.00 - 1,000,000.00 41 38.7 
4) 1,000,001.00- 38 35.8 
50,000,000.00 
5) More than 50 million 4 3.8 
Notes: Source: Primary Data from the Survey of Malaysian Co-operatives, 2004 
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of the Profile of the Primary Co-operatives in the Sample 
No. of % Mean Standard Computed p-value 
Co-op Deviation x: value 
Composition of co-op's members 
by occupation: 
0) Diverse occupation 75 70.8 
1) Homogeneous in occupation 31 29.2 
Total 106 100.0 0.2925 0.4571 29.585 .000 
Racial Composition of Members: 
0) Multiracial co-op 37 35.0 
1) Single-raced co-op 69 65.0 
Total 106 100 0.6509 0.4789 27.509 .000 
Distribution of Members: 
0) Nationally distributed 25 23.6 
1) Regionally distributed 81 76.4 
Total 106 100.0 0.7642 0.4265 9.660 .002 
Co-op area of operation: 
0) Nationwide 26 24.5 
1) Regional 80 75.4 
Total 106 100.0 0.7547 0.4323 18.624 .000 
Notes: Source: Primary Data from the Survey of Malaysian Co-operatives, 2004. 
146 
Chapter 5 The Survey of Co-operatives in Malaysia 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the Single-Activity and the Multipurpose 
Co-operatives 
The Area of Activity of the No. of Co-ops Percentage 
Single-Activity Co-ops: 
Credit 12 24.5 
Consumer 6 12.2 
Transport 6 12.2 
Construction 5 10.2 
Plantation 1 2.0 
Housing 4 8.2 
Services 10 20.4 
Small/cottage industries 5 10.2 
Total 49 100.0 
(46.2%) 
Number of activity of the No. of Co-ops Percentage 
Multipurpose Co-ops: 
2 activities 26 24.5 
3 activities 19 17.9 
4 activities 5 4.7 
5 activities 5 4.7 
6 activities 2 1.9 
Total 57 100.0 
(53.8%) 
Notes: Source: Primary Data from the Survey of Malaysian 
Co-operatives, 2004 
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Table 5.5: Distribution of the Co-operatives in the Sample by Main Activity and by 
Response Rate according to the Stratified Sampling 
No. of No. of co-ops in Percentage 
Main Activity co-ops Percentage the stratified of the return 
sampling by activity 
Credit 27 25.5 84 32.1 
Consumer 19 17.9 123 15.3 
Transport 16 15.1 85 18.8 
Construction 6 5.7 36 16.7 
Plantation 8 7.5 44 18.2 
Housing 9 8.5 28 32.1 
Services 15 14.2 56 26.3 
Small/cottage 6 5.7 11 54.5 
industries 
Total 106 100.0 467 
Notes: Source: Primary Data from the Survey ofMaJaysian Co-operatives, 2004. 
Table 5.6: Involvement of the Co-operatives in the Sample in the Various 
Types of Activities 
No. of Single-activity 
Activity Co-ops co-ops 
Credit 37 12 
Consumer 33 6 
Transport 27 6 
Construction 28 5 
Plantation 24 1 
Housing 21 4 
Services 36 10 
Small/cottage 9 5 
industries 
49 
Notes: Source: Primary Data from the Survey of MaJaysian 
Co-operatives, 2004 
Percentage 
32.4 
18.2 
22.2 
17.9 
4.2 
19.0 
27.8 
55.6 
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Table 5.7: Secondary Co-operatives to the Primary Co-operatives in the Sample 
No. Name of Secondary Co-operative Years of Status* 
Existence* 
1. Konsortium Koperasi Pengguna Malaysia Bhd 7 weak 
2. Konsortium Koperasi Industri Malaysia Bhd. 2 weak 
3. Koperasi Kemas Kebangsaan Bhd (KOKEMAS) 20 weak 
4. Koperasi. Peserta-Peserta Felera Bhd 23 satisfactory 
5. Koperasi Pekebun Getah Nasional Bhd (NARSCO) 21 satisfactory 
6. Gabungan Koperasi Universiti Bhd. 15 average 
7. Gabungan Koperasi Peneroka FELDA Nasional 5 inactive 
Bhd 
8. Konsortium Koperasi Kelantan Berhad 2 weak 
9. Koperasi Pembangunan Negeri Kedah 8hd 6 weak 
10. Konsortium Koperasi Terengganu 8erhad 1 weak 
11. Koperasi Pembangunan Negara Bhd. 19 inactive 
12. Koperasi Gabungan Pekebun Keeil Perak Bhd 21 satisfactory 
13. Koperasi KOPEMA 8erhad 17 satisfactory 
14. ANGKASA 31 
Notes: i) • Information on the years of existence of secondary co-operatives and the status 
of secondary co-operatives (in terms of their financial performance) are 
obtained from the DCD's 2004 unpublished documents. 
ii) Source: Primary Data from the Survey of Malaysian Co-operatives, 2004. 
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Table 5.8: Perceived Roles of Secondary Co-operalives 
Do not Neither Agree 
agree agree no Mean Standard 
Roles of Secondary Co- disagree Deviation 
operatives (0) (1 ) (2) 
Co-ordinate, inform and 7 21 78 1.6698 0.5972 
advise on activities (6.60) (19.81) (73.58) 
Education and training to 5 22 79 1.6981 0.5550 
members (4.72) (20.75) (74.53) 
Represent specific co-op 14 24 68 1.5094 0.7204 
activity. (13.21) (22.64) (64.15) 
Spread knowledge of co-op 4 21 81 1.7264 0.5261 
principles (3.77) (19.81) (76.42) 
Develop strong and 3 23 80 1.7264 0.5077 
effective partnership with (2.83) (21.70) (75.47) 
other co-op sectors 
Assist with establishment 31 24 51 1.1887 0.8631 
and registration of new co- (29.25) (22.64) (48.11) 
ops. 
Liaise directly with 7 23 76 1.6509 0.6023 
government agencies (6.60) (21.70) (71.70) 
Link together scattered co- 5 23 78 1.6887 0.5583 
ops (4.72) (21.70) (73.58) 
Go into bigger business 7 23 76 1.6509 0.6023 
opportunities (6.60) (21.70) (71.70) 
Audit service to members 19 25 62 1.4057 0.7780 
(17.92) (23.58) (58.49) 
Constitutional and legal 16 25 65 1.4623 0.7455 
advise (15.09) (23.58) (61.32) 
Produce publications on 5 24 77 1.6792 0.5614 
performance of members (4.72) (22.64) (72.64) 
Procurement 9 24 73 1.6038 0.6426 
(8.49) (22.64) (68.87) 
Marketing members 7 23 76 1.6509 0.6023 
produce (6.60) (21.70) (71.70) 
Notes: i) The figures in parentheses denote percentages. 
ii) Source: Primary Data from the Survey of Malaysian Co-operatives, 2004. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
CO-OPERATIVES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.1. Introduction 
In a number of countries, the co-operative sector has made a significant contribution 
to the economy of their country, although they may account for a relatively small 
share of the total economic activity of the country. Impressive figures on the 
economic contribution of co-operatives, more often than not, reflect the successes of 
secondary co-operatives. For example, in consumer activity, the CWS in Britain 
was one of the largest businesses in the world in 1958 with sales of £463 million and 
production of £143 million (Bonner, 1961). In 2002, the Co-operative Group in the 
UK reported having sales of over £7 billion, profits of £231 million and employing 
over 70,000 people.57 The Mondragon Co-operative in Spain is an example of a 
secondary co-operative for workers co-operatives. The Mondragon group of co-
operatives consisted of 85 industrial, 6 agricultural and 14 housing co-operatives in 
1982, that is 25 years after starting the first co-operative. In 2002, the Mondragon 
contributed 3.7% towards the total GDP of the Basque region in Spain. By the end 
of 2005, the Mondragon had created 78,455 jobs, of which 81 % were members of 
co-operatives, whilst international sales amounted to €3,136 million in 2005.58 The 
Marketing Unions in Greece, which are secondary co-operatives for the small local 
agricultural co-operatives employed more than 6,500 people on a permanent basis, 
or 61 % of the total co-operative labour force in 1985 (Oustapassidis, 1992). The 
57 The Co-operative Group's May 2003 Fact Sheet, available online at http://www.co-op.co.uk 
10910312004]. 
8 All figures pertaining to the Mondragon Co-operative are obtained from the Mondragon's 2005 
Annual Report, available online at http://www.mcc.es/ing/magnitudes/cifras Lhtml [0211 112006]. 
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Portuguese Wine Co-operatives (PWCs), also secondary co-operatives, control 
about 50% of the Portuguese wine production and represent the output of some 
70,000 growers at the primary level (Rebelo et aI., 2002). In Spain, the COREN, the 
ANECO-OP and the AN are ranked among the top Spanish agro-food firms by 
turnover with sales amounting to €610 million, €350 million and €200 million 
respectively in 2001 (Arcas-Lario and Hemandez-Espallardo, 2003). 
Savings deposits in credit co-operatives in Germany totalled €183,824 million, 
which was 30% of the total savings deposits of €613,015 million in 2004. The 
successful credit co-operative movement in Germany lies in the successful vertical 
structure of the co-operative movement. In Germany, local primary credit co-
operatives set up regional or national co-operative banks, i.e. secondary co-
operatives, to deposit their excessive funds in, so as to earn interest on such funds 
and also to have funds readily available when required. It is the regional or the 
national co-operative banks that invest funds in country-wide projects and these co-
operative banks are the ones that borrow funds from other private banks or from 
government agencies with ease (Enriquez, 1986). The Japanese Consumer Co-
operative Union (JCCU), a secondary co-operative, reported that the retail sales of 
the 572 consumer co-operatives in Japan accounted for 2.83% of the total market 
share in the retail sector in Japan in 2003 (JCCU, 2003). 
The figures described above, which illustrate the significant economic contribution 
of the co-operative sector, are largely the outcome of the secondary co-operatives' 
co-ordinated activities with the primary co-operatives. It is thus not surprising that 
the literature on co-operatives has focused on the common issues that affect the 
relevance, the existence, the future viability or the failure of secondary co-operatives 
(Peter and Scully, 1987; Soegaard, 1994; OlIi11a, 1994; Baker, 1997; Guinnane and 
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Henrikson, 1998; Fairbairn, 2000; Birchall, 2000; Levasseur and Rousseau, 2001; 
Lambert and Bliss, 2001; Chloupkova et aI., 2003; Anderson and Henehan, 2003; 
Zeuli et aI., 2003; and Hogeland, 2003). Alternatively, studies have specifically 
analysed the performance of a particular type of secondary co-operative 
(Oustapassidis, 1992; Oustapassidis and Vlachvei, 1998; Singh et aI., 2000; Rebelo 
et aI., 2002; Arcas-Lario and Hernandez-Espallardo, 2003; Russo, 1999; Fukuyama 
et aI., 1999; Guinnane, 2001; and Haan et aI., 2003). This chapter therefore fits in 
with the first group, which focuses on secondary co-operatives from a general 
perspective. In particular, this chapter explores the relationship between primary 
and secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. 
If a co-operative movement were to contribute significantly to the economy of a 
country, then the work of co-operatives at a higher level than the primary level, in 
particular the secondary co-operatives, may be important. Most importantly, the 
economic contribution of the secondary co-operatives follows from their effective 
functioning as secondary organisations towards their primary members. Therefore, 
the inability of the co-operative sector in Malaysia to make a significant contribution 
to the economy may be associated with the ineffective functioning of secondary co-
operatives. This chapter explores the relationship between primary and secondary 
co-operatives in Malaysia using data derived from the survey described in Chapter 
5. We present empirical analysis of the effect of being a member ofa secondary co-
operative on 4 measures of primary co-operative size: the number of members of the 
primary co-operative; the share capital of the primary co-operative; the assets of the 
primary co-operative; and an aggregate measure of primary co-operative size. We 
explore a variety of measures of the size of primary co-operatives since, as Lin and 
Nugent (1995) argue, the measurement of size is ambiguous. It can mean the 
153 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
number of members, the amount of resources, or some combination thereof. This 
chapter also explores the relevance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia from the 
primary co-operative's perspective, as the growth of the movement reviewed in 
Chapter 4 seems to indicate an insignificant role of secondary co-operatives. The 
remaining sections of this chapter are arranged as follows: Section 6.2 presents a 
literature review of secondary co-operatives; Section 6.3 presents a discussion of the 
data and the methodology for the analysis of the primary-secondary co-operative 
relationship; Section 6.4 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship 
between primary and secondary co-operatives in Malaysia; Section 6.5 presents the 
analysis of the relevance of secondary co-operatives; and finally concluding 
comments are presented in Section 6.6. 
6.2. A Review of the Literature on Secondary Co-operatives 
In many successful co-operative movements in the West, the task of creating greater 
visibility, of accessing certain markets and participating in the global market has 
been taken over by the secondary or federated structure. This is because, 
individually, co-operatives at the primary level may face limitations in the 
furtherance of their activities (Soegaard, 1994). Primary co-operatives are usually 
small firms that need support systems to help in areas such as banking, credit, 
accounting, transportation and marketing (New Renaissance Magazine)59. By 
themselves, they cannot fulfil all the functions of a large company. Primary co-
operatives cooperate where necessary to realise the common interest and to maintain 
their basic autonomy where possible. It is the common interest in survival and the 
need to cooperate to survive that should exist among the primary co-operatives and 
59 Online magazine article published by the RenaissanceUniversal. (n.a.). Cooperative Economics: An 
Interview with Jaroslav Vanek. Renaissance Universal. Available: http://www.ru.orgl5Icooper.html 
[10/0812005] 
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which represent the characteristics of secondary cooperatives (Soegaard, 1994). The 
secondary co-operatives provide the support system that would follow in the same 
spirit of the larger firm, maximizing welfare and income for all members. A 
secondary co-operative is thus the unit of primary co-operatives integrated to 
achieve economies of scale, greater negotiating power in the market and higher 
efficiency (ibid: 1994). 
In general, primary co-operatives in the same line of activity will join together to 
meet their collective needs. The formation of coalitions is fundamentally attributed 
to economies of scale pertaining to functions performed by a collective organisation, 
and where an individual member organisation "does not have the competence or 
ability to respond sufficiently intelligently or flexibly to the problems faced" 
(Soegaard, 1994: 1 08). From the perspective of the resourced-based view of the 
firm, forming or joining secondary co-operatives offers small primary co-operatives 
a pathway to resources that are critical to the primary co-operatives' economic 
success, such as access to market information, logistic procedures and new 
production or development of new products (Arcas-Lario and Hemandez-
Espallardo, 2003). According to transaction cost theory, each of the primary co-
operatives is too small to accomplish the task separately; together they can 
ameliorate the possibility of market failure (Soegaard, 1994). 
Economies of scale explain the transfer of functions to the secondary level. Small 
individual co-operative firms do not have the market power to control the critical 
resources required to be competitive. Their strategic weakness could be overcome 
through inter-organisational relationships. The role of inter-organisational power 
can be seen as a motive for this inter-organisational relationship or collective 
strategy (Soegaard, 1994). If cooperation did not extend beyond the first-level 
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groups, and neither economies of scale nor support links with a broader system were 
developed, the development of the co-operative movement would lose momentum 
(Carroll and Bebbington, 2000). Second-level organisations or federations 
constitute a mechanism through which heterogeneous interests and concerns might 
gain access to broader institutional spheres, for example, in addressing wider issues 
such as the emergence of new product markets or services that could probably not be 
resolved at the individual primary level (ibid., 2000). 
It is the secondary co-operatives who detect trends early which are relevant for the 
group, who formulate strategies, and who push forward the systematic development 
of the group (Schwarz, 1994). They push through product innovations, advertising, 
marketing, members and employee training and consultancy programmes (e.g. 
merchandising, technology, and information technology) (ibid., 1994). Schwarz 
noted that the potential for accumulating specialized and professional expertise as 
well as management and marketing know-how at superordinate levels also gives 
secondary co-operatives a definite added value, which manifests itself in the 
functions of leadership, drive and promotion. Secondary co-operatives fulfil the 
functions conferred on them through production and performing services. Their 
services are reserved for members only, with the purpose of enhancing the economic 
activity of members with respect to efficiency and effectiveness. As an organisation 
created by primary co-operatives, the roles of the secondary co-operatives are to 
support, strengthen and promote the primary cooperatives. In other words, second-
level organisations play an important role in the development of primary co-
operatives (Schwarz, 1994; Cracknell, 1996). 
Secondary co-operatives function better if members need them and if they can give 
some benefits to members. As organisations owned by primary co-operatives, 
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activities of secondary co-operatives are being decided upon by the primary co-
operatives based on the common needs of the primary co-operatives, such that the 
better functioning of secondary co-operatives towards their members would depend 
on whether the secondary co-operatives can function as an integrated unit with the 
primary co-operatives, providing the co-operatives a pathway to critical resources 
for the success of the primary co-operatives. Thus, the main activity of the 
secondary organisation has to be in line with, or closely related to the members' own 
business at the primary level for the primary-secondary co-operatives' relationship 
to create economic value for the primary co-operatives (Soegaard, 1994) and for the 
stability of the business (Nilsson, 2001). Through the establishment of a vertical 
structure, co-operatives integrate members' own interests to obtain power in 
negotiations, market power, cost reduction and to ameliorate the possibility of 
market failure. The secondary co-operative specializes in the task of combining 
information from diverse sources, then feeding back to the appropriate parts of the 
system. Thus, primary co-operatives are assumed to benefit from such integration. 
Otherwise, the question of whether primary co-operatives need secondary co-
operatives will arise (Zeuli et aI., 2003b). Zeuli et al. also argue for the need for 
secondary co-operatives when the primary co-operatives have grown as large as 
their secondary co-operatives, i.e. when primary co-operatives, as single entities, 
have grown large and are able to address wider issues individually for their survival, 
in areas such as in credit, product development and marketing. This statement from 
Zeuli et al. should imply that a secondary co-operative may find its relevance among 
small primary co-operatives. 
In some countries where secondary co-operatives appear to be successful, such as 
the Andalusian co-operatives and the Mondragon in Spain, the secondary co-
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operatives are made up of primary co-operatives whose members are small in 
number. 88.3% of the Andalusian co-operatives of associated workers in Spain are 
made up of fewer than 12 members, only 0.96% have more than 100 members 
(Romero and Perez, 2003). The Mondragon co-operatives in Spain had an average 
of 195 members in 1986 (Benham and Keefer, 1991). Benham and Keefer argue 
that, although the group size of the Mondragon co-operatives is still large by co-
operative standards, the Mondragon is an exceptional case because of their 
involvement in manufacturing activity, which demands specialization. In other 
countries, the secondary co-operatives grouped together primary members in the 
same economic activity or which have similar produce, such as the milk unions in 
India and the marketing unions in Greek. In general, secondary cooperative 
members are often in the same industry and have common economic interests, 
which may involve joint marketing, purchasing of supplies and/or the provision of 
services. Therefore, two elements should constitute the characteristics of a 
secondary co-operative, i.e. small group size of the primary members (Romero and 
Perez, 2003; Benham and Keefer, 1991) and homogeneity of members' activities 
(Oustapassidis, 1992; Rebelo et aI., 2002; Singh et aI., 2000). 
North (1990) argues that co-operation among economic agents is more likely to exist 
when economic agents are relatively small in number. In the context of co-
operatives, each one of the primary co-operatives is too small to accomplish the task 
of ameliorating possible market failure, separately. The co-operative banks in 
Western European countries are a product of the simplest classical forms of credit 
co-operation, where at first, small credit co-operatives are established and, after 
some time, they join to form co-operative banks on a regional or central level. 
Studies of secondary co-operatives such as Oustapassidis (1992), Singh et al. (2000), 
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Rebelo et al. (2000) and Arcas-Lario and Hernandez-Espallardo (2003) indicate that 
members of the secondary co-operatives constitute small groups of co-operative 
businesses. The secondary co-operatives in these studies are large while their 
member co-operatives are small. 
Co-operatives belong to the collective type of socio-economic action. Collective 
action refers to activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more 
individuals. It involves group actions intended to further the interest or well-being 
of members (Sandler, 1992). In the theory of collective action, small groups are 
preferred to large groups as small groups are considered effective, largely because a 
small group with homogeneous narrowly focused objectives would be easier to 
organize (Lin and Nugent, 1995). Homogeneity is thus an important factor for a 
successful group approach. Other group characteristics that make collective action 
feasible, besides small group size and homogeneity, are close social and physical 
proximity among group members (Olsen, 1965; Lin and Nugent, 1995). Olsen 
(1965) argues that the advantages of these group characteristics may be strengthened 
by organizing local, homogeneous groups into federations at the regional or national 
level (Olsen, 1965). Drimer (1997) focuses on group size, arguing that the size of 
co-operative groups at the primary level should be small for the organisation and 
functioning of co-operatives of second, third, or fourth degree. 
This concise review of the literature on secondary co-operatives highlights the 
important role of secondary co-operatives in a co-operative movement, especially 
where the co-operative sector has been contributing significantly towards the 
economy. It also highlights issues relating to the relevance of the secondary 
organisations for the primary co-operatives. The following sections present the 
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econometric analysis of the primary-secondary co-operative relationship and the 
analysis of the relevance of the secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. 
6.3. Data and Methodology for the Analysis of the Primary-Secondary 
Co-operative Relationship 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter uses the data collected from the 
survey described in Chapter 5. Our focus is on whether membership in secondary 
co-operatives influences the primary co-operatives in terms of the number of 
members, the share capital and the assets of the primary co-operatives.6o Hence, we 
initially explore three different dependent variables. Our three dependent variables, 
membership in co-operative i (M;), share capital of co-operative i (S;) and assets of 
co-operative i (A;) are defined as: 
M;= 
S;= 
o if the co-operative has 100 members or less 
1 if the co-operative has 101 to 500 members 
2 ifthe co-operative has 501 to 1000 members 
3 if the co-operative has 1001 to 1500 members 
4 if the co-operative has more than 1500 members 
o if share capital is RM1000.00 or less 
1 if share capital is from RM1001.00 to RM10,000.00 
2 if share capital is from RM10,001.00 to RMI00,000.00 
3 if share capital is from RMI00,001.00 to RMl,OOO,OOO.OO 
4 if share capital is from RMI ,000,00 1.00 to RM50,000,000.00 
5 if share capital is more than RM50 million 
60 The aim of our analysis is to pick correlations, not on causality, although causality may operate in 
both directions i.e. where membership of a secondary co-operative is a function of the primary co-
operative's size. 
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o if assets are RMI 000.00 or less 
1 if assets are from RMI001.00 to RMI0,000.00 
A j = 2 if assets are from RM 10,00 1.00 to RMlOO,OOO.OO 
3 if assets are from RM 1 00,00 1.00 to RM 1 ,000,000.00 
4 if assets are more than RM 1 million 
The three dependent variables are categorical variables that are inherently ordered in 
a sequence, i.e. an index.61 The percentage of observations in each category of the 
dependent variables is presented in Table 5.2 in Appendix A5.5 of Chapter 5. For 
the econometric analysis of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives on 
M j , Sj and A j , we adopt an ordered probit model, given the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variable. In general, the probit model is a variant of the qualitative 
response regression models, often known as probability models. It is a model where 
Y is qualitative, and the objective is to find the probability of an event occuring 
(Wooldridge, 2003). In the case of the ordered probit model, our objective is to 
ascertain the effect of the regressors on the probability that Y = 1, 2, 3, 4, ... n. 
Ordinary regression analysis would treat the difference between 4 and 3 the same as 
that between 3 and 2, whereas in fact they only reflect a ranking (Greene, 1997). 
The ordered probit model is built around the latent variable framework: 
y* =x'fi+e (1) 
61 Initially, there were 6 categories of assets (A;), similar to that of share capital (S;). However, we 
have collapsed the six categories of assets (i.e. 0, I, 2, 3, 4, and 5) into 5 categories (i.e. 0 to 4) due to 
the small number of observations in the fifth category. Category 5 of the assets (i.e. if assets are 
more than RM50 million) has been recoded into category 4 (i.e. if assets are more than RM I million). 
The value of the ranges for share capital and assets are specified in the Malaysian Ringgit (RM), 
where the exchange rate is £1 for approximately RM7. 
161 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
wherey· is unobserved.62 What we do observe is: 
y= 0 if y*~ 0 
y=l if O~y·~,ul 
y=2 if ,u1~y*~,u2 
. . 
·f • y=J 1 ,uj-I~y (2) 
where J is the number of categories of the dependent variable, ,u are the thresholds 
the latent variable must cross to change the value of y. The ,u's are unknown 
parameters to be estimated along with p. Assuming that e is normally distributed 
across observations, the mean and variance of e is normalised to 0 and 1 
respectively. We therefore have the following probabilities: 
Prob(y = 0) = <1>( - x' p ) 
Prob(y = 1) = <1>(uI-X' P) - <1>( -x' p) 
Prob(y = 2) = <1>(u2 - x' p) - <1>(u1 - x' p) 
Prob(y = J) = 1 - <1>«(uj-1 - x' P) (3) 
where <l> denotes the standard normal distribution. From the above equations, the 
probability that y = 0, for example, is a function of the characteristics x and 
parameter p, which are evaluated based on the standard normal distribution. For the 
probabilities to be positive, we must have 0 <,ul <,u2 < ... < ,uj-l. 
62 The technical analysis from equations (l) to (3) is taken from Greene (1997). 
162 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
Therefore, for our analysis of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives 
on the number of members of a co-operative (M;), we model the number of members 
as: 
(4) 
where AI is the unobserved propensity of the co-operative i to have members, which 
is a latent variable. M is the observed number of members for the individual co-
operative. x; is a vector of explanatory variables, 8 1M denotes the random error 
term. 
For our analysis of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives on the share 
capital of a co-operative (S;), we model share capital as: 
(5) 
where S* is the unobserved propensity of the co-operative i to have share capital. S 
is the observed amount of share capital that the individual co-operative has and 8 iS 
denotes the random error term. 
For our analysis of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives on the 
assets of a co-operative (Ai), we model assets as: 
(6) 
where A* is the unobserved propensity of the co-operative i to have assets. A is the 
observed value of assets owned by the individual co-operative and 8 iA denotes the 
random error term. The data from our survey comes from 106 primary co-
operatives so i = 1, ... , n, where n=106. 
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Besides membership in a secondary co-operative (SECOOP), there are other factors 
that can be used to explain the number of members of a co-operative, the share 
capital of a co-operative and the assets of a co-operative. These measures of co-
operative size would, in general, describe whether the co-operative is a small or a 
large co-operative. Small groups are characterised by local nature and homogeneous 
members (Olsen, 1965), where homogeneity may come in several forms such as 
homogeneity in sex, race, occupation and income. Therefore, we include 
homogeneity of the primary co-operative members in terms of homogeneity in 
members' occupation (HOCCUP) and in the racial composition of the members 
(SRACE) as explanatory variables. For local characteristics, we include the 
distribution of co-operative members (REGIMB) and the co-operative's area of 
operation (REGIOP) as explanatory variables because these two characteristics of 
the co-operative describe the relative local nature of a primary co-operative in 
Malaysia as compared to a primary co-operative with members distributed 
nationwide and a primary co-operative that operates on a nationwide scale, 
respectively. In addition, we also include the main activity of the co-operative 
(MAINACn in our set of explanatory variables, based on the argument in Enriquez 
(1986) that the activity of the co-operatives can also affect the number of members, 
the share capital and the assets of co-operatives. For example, a consumer co-
operative, which serves consumers by retailing, requires a relatively larger 
membership as compared to a worker co-operative to boost sales so as to cover costs 
and leave sufficient margins. We control for the main activity of the co-operatives 
by distinguishing between 8 categories of activity: credit, consumerism, 
transportation; construction; plantation; housing; services; and small/cottage 
industries. 
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All of the explanatory variables are dummy variables, which take the value of either 
o or 1: SECOOP equals 1 if the co-operative is a member of a secondary co-
operative and 0 if otherwise; HOCCUP equals 1 if the co-operative members are 
individuals from the same occupation or employment and 0 if otherwise; SRACE 
equals 1 if the co-operative members are single-raced and 0 if otherwise; REGIOP 
equals 1 if the co-operative operates on a regional scale and 0 if otherwise; REGIMB 
equals 1 if the members of the co-operative are distributed regionally and 0 if 
otherwise. 
There are 8 dummy variables for co-operative activity, i.e. credit, consumerism, 
transportation; construction; plantation; housing; services; and smalVcottage 
industries. The value is 1 if the main activity of a co-operative falls into a specific 
category. For example, for the category credit as the main activity, 'credit' equals 1 
if the main activity of the co-operative is credit and 0 if otherwise. 63 
6.4. The Results 
6.4.1. The primary co-operatives' membership and secondary co-operatives 
Table 6.1 in Appendix A664 presents two specifications of the ordered probit 
analysis of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives and the other 
explanatory variables on the number of members of a primary co-operative. 
Specification 1 represents the model specified above, while in Specification 2, we 
have replaced the membership in a secondary co-operative dummy variable with the 
primary co-operative's tenure of membership in the secondary co-operative. The 
tenure of membership in the secondary co-operative (TENURE) comprises four 
63 Summary statistics relating to the dependent variables and the explanatory variables can be found 
in Chapter 5. 
64 Table 6.1 and all the other tables (unless otherwise stated) are presented at the end of Chapter 6 in 
Appendix A6. 
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categories of dummy variables: not more than 5 years; 6 to 10 years; 11 to 15 years; 
and more than 15 years. The omitted category for TENURE is where the co-
operatives are not members of a secondary co-operative. It is interesting to analyse 
the TENURE variable as this allows us to explore the effect of a long standing 
relationship with secondary co-operatives on the number of members in the primary 
co-operative. 
In Specification 1, the estimated coefficient of being a secondary co-operative 
member on the number of members after controlling for the other explanatory 
variables is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient 
representing regionally distributed members is negative and statistically significant. 
With respect to area of activity, credit is the omitted category, the group against 
which comparisons are made for the other seven activities.65 The estimated 
coefficients representing transportation activity, construction activity, plantation 
activity, services activity and small/cottage industry activity are all negative and 
statistically significant. 
In Specification 2, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable representing 
more than 15 years of tenure of membership in a secondary co-operative is positive 
and statistically significant, while the estimated coefficient for not more than 5 years 
of membership in a secondary co-operative is negative and statistically significant. 
It is reasonable to expect that a short relationship with a secondary co-operative may 
not result in an increase in the size of primary co-operatives in terms of the number 
of members, as compared to primary co-operatives with long standing relationship 
with secondary co-operatives. Although it may be argued that the tenure of 
membership in secondary co-operatives may be picking up an age effect of co-
65 By including all the eight area of activity dummy variables, we would introduce perfect coIlinearity 
(Wooldridge, 2003). 
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operatives, i.e. co-operatives that have joined secondary co-operatives longer would 
probably be older co-operatives, it is also important to note that co-operatives that 
have joined secondary co-operatives less than 5 years may also be older co-
operatives, as the decision to join a secondary co-operatives lies with the primary 
co-operative.66 The estimated coefficients for regionally distributed membership, 
transportation activity, construction activity, plantation activity, services activity and 
small/cottage industry activity are all negative and statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficients measure the effect of a particular explanatory variable on 
the number of members in the primary co-operative, holding all other explanatory 
variables constant. To interpret the coefficients, we need to focus on the marginal 
effects. This is because the marginal effects of the regressors on the probabilities are 
not equal to the coefficients. Assume for example, that there are three categories, 
then the three probabilities are: 
Prob(y = 0) = 1 - <1>( - x' p ) 
Prob(y = 1) = <1>(u - x' P) - <1>( - x' P) 
Prob(y = 2) = 1 - <1>(u - x' P) (7) 
Equation (7) above and equation (8) below are taken from Greene (1997). As for 
the three probabilities, the marginal effects of changes in the regressors are given by: 
8prob(y = 0) = _¢(X' P)P 
ax 
8prob(y = 1) = [¢( _ x' P) - ¢(J.l- x' P)]p 
ax 
8prob(y = 2) = ¢(J.l- x' P)P 
ax 
(8) 
66 Unfortunately, there is no data pertaining to age of the co-operatives that we collected in our 
survey. 
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The marginal effects give the predicted effects of the regressors on the probability of 
each category of the dependent variable occurring. For an ordered dependent 
variable with five categories, in this case the number of members, there are 5 
probabilities (probability Y= 0, 1,2,3, and 4), arranged in a sequence, in which 0 is 
the category denoting the lowest number of members and 4 is the category denoting 
the largest number of members. The model thus has four threshold parameters. By 
focusing on the marginal effects, we can find out what category of the dependent 
variable can be directly attributable to the regressors. Table 6.2 presents the 
computed marginal effects of the significant estimated coefficients for Specification 
1 and for Specification 2 in Table 6.1. 
The marginal effects present the predicted effects of the explanatory variables on 
each category of the number of members. In Specification 1, with respect to having 
100 members or less, a co-operative that is a member of a secondary co-operative 
has a 19% lower probability of having between 101 and 500 members relative to a 
co-operative that is not a member of a secondary co-operative. There is a 19% 
higher probability of co-operatives that are members of secondary co-operatives 
having more than 1500 members relative to co-operatives that are not members of a 
secondary co-operative. This finding indicates the positive effect of membership in 
a secondary co-operative on the number of members of the primary co-operative for 
Malaysia. Co-operatives that are members of secondary co-operatives are more 
likely to have a larger membership. 
In Specification 2, co-operatives that have been members of secondary co-operatives 
for not more than 5 years have a 37% higher probability of having between 101 and 
500 members, a 9% lower probability of having between 1001 and 1500 members 
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and a 24% lower probability of having more than 1500 members relative to co-
operatives that are not a secondary co-operative member. However, co-operatives 
that have been members of a secondary co-operative for more than 15 years, have a 
47% lower probability of having between 101 and 500 members, with an increasing 
probability of having a larger number of members relative to co-operatives that are 
not a secondary co-operative member. There is only a 11 % lower probability of 
having between 501 and 1000 members and a 59% higher probability of having 
more than 1500 members relative to co-operatives that are not a secondary co-
operative member. These findings indicate that primary co-operatives that have a 
long standing relationship with secondary co-operatives are more likely to have a 
larger number of members. 
As for the other explanatory variables with significant estimated coefficients, i.e. 
regional distribution of members, transport activity, construction activity, plantation 
activity, services activity and smalVcottage industry activity, they all have a similar 
pattern of probabilities for both Specification 1 and Specification 2, i.e. a decreasing 
probability of having a larger number of members. For example, in Specification 1, 
co-operatives that have members distributed regionally have a 35% higher 
probability of having between 101 and 500 members and a 41% lower probability of 
having more than 1500 members relative to co-operatives whose members are 
distributed nationwide. In Specification 2, co-operatives that have members 
distributed regionally have a 33% higher probability of having between 101 and 500 
members and a 36% lower probability of having more than 1500 members relative 
to co-operatives that have members distributed on a national scale. For the other 
explanatory variables mentioned above, we will focus on the results for 
Specification 2 because Specification 2 has a larger pseudo R-squared, i.e. 0.2753 
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(0.1764 in Specification 1). The pseudo R-squared is the coefficient of 
determination for binary responses. It is comparable to the usual R-squared, which 
tells us the proportion of the variation in the dependent variables explained by the 
explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2003; Gujarati, 1999). For Specification 2, about 
28% of the variation in the number of members can be explained by the explanatory 
variables. 
Therefore, in Specification 2, relative to credit activity (Le. the omitted category), 
co-operatives with transport activity as their main activity have a 42% higher 
probability of having between 101 and 500 members, a 11% lower probability of 
having between 501 and 1000 members, a 10% lower probability of having 1001 to 
1500 members and a 29% lower probability of having more than 1500 members. 
The construction co-operatives have a 37% higher probability of having between 
101 and 500 members, a 18% lower probability of having 501 to 1000 members, a 
12% lower probability of having 1001 to 1500 members and a 27% lower 
probability of having more than 1500 members relative to credit co-operatives. This 
pattern can be observed in the co-operatives engaged in plantation activity and 
services activity. Co-operatives in plantation activity have a 37% higher probability 
of having 101 to 500 members, a 9% lower probability of having 1001 to 1500 
members and a 24% lower probability of having more than 1500 members relative 
to the credit co-operatives. The services co-operatives have a 44% higher 
probability of having 101 to 500 members, a 13% lower probability of having 501 to 
1000 members, a 11 % lower probability of having 1001 to 1500 members and a 
30% lower probability of having more than 1500 members relative to the credit co-
operatives. However, for the small/cottage industry co-operatives, the higher 
probability of having between 101 and 500 members is not statistically significant, 
170 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
but they have a 22% lower probability of having between 501 and 1000 members, a 
13% lower probability of having between 1001 and 1500 members and a 30% lower 
probability of having more than 1500 members relative to the credit co-operatives. 
The finding that co-operatives with regionally distributed members are more likely 
to have a smaller number of members accords with our expectations. It is 
reasonable to predict that primary co-operatives, whose members are confined 
within a specific region, would not have a large membership, relative to co-
operatives whose members are distributed on a wider area. It is also reasonable to 
predict that in Malaysia, transportation co-operatives, construction co-operatives, 
plantation co-operatives, services co-operatives and small/cottage industry co-
operatives would also have a smaller membership relative to credit co-operatives. 
This is because, in Malaysia, most of the credit co-operatives are formed by 
employees in public services. With more than 1.2 million civil servants throughout 
the country, it seems reasonable to predict that credit co-operatives formed in the 
public services would have a large membership, even though the co-operatives 
operate on a regional scale. Credit co-operatives in the public services that operate 
on a nationwide scale normally comprise of employees from a specific organisation 
of the public services such as the credit co-operative of the armed forces. Credit co-
operatives in the public services that operate on a regional scale normally comprise 
civil servants working in a particular state irrespective of the organisation they are 
working for. Therefore, whether they are nationwide or regional credit co-
operatives, the credit co-operatives are able to pool together a relatively large 
number of individuals with heterogeneous social and economic characteristics as 
members. 
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For transport and plantation co-operatives, we expect that these co-operatives, in 
particular, would not have a large number of members because the transportation 
and the plantation businesses essentially group together individuals who are actually 
involved in these businesses, as members. For example, taxi co-operatives group 
together taxi drivers and coconut growers' co-operatives, which manage coconut 
plantations, group together coconut growers. These two areas of co-operative 
activity require a certain degree of involvement of their members in these activities, 
which may account for the lower probabilities of co-operatives engaged in these 
activities having a large number of members. The small/cottage industry co-
operatives are the KIKs. As noted in Chapter 4, the KIKs are one of the types of 
co-operatives that have been granted the special provision under Subsection 8(1) of 
the Co-operative Act to be registered as a co-operative with less than 100 members. 
We would, therefore, expect that the small/cottage industry co-operatives would not 
have a large number of members. 
6.4.2. The primary co-operatives' share capital and secondary co-operatives 
Table 6.3 presents the results corresponding to two specifications of the ordered 
pro bit analysis focusing on the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives on 
the share capital of the primary co-operatives. 
Neither membership in a secondary co-operative in Specification 1 nor the tenure of 
membership in secondary co-operative in Specification 2, have statistically 
significant estimated coefficients. These results indicate that the share capital of a 
co-operative is not influenced by the co-operative's membership in a secondary co-
operative. The share capital of a co-operative represents the contribution of the co-
operative's members. In Malaysia, where the primary co-operative members are 
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mostly individuals, who do not depend on co-operatives for a living,67 it seems 
reasonable to predict that members would not contribute much to co-operative 
capital. Where the primary co-operative members are a group of individuals running 
a business activity that they depend on for living, and where the primary 
cooperative's membership in secondary co-operatives may enhance the economic 
activity of the members, leading to increased welfare and income of the members, it 
may be the case that members would be motivated to invest more in the co-
operative's capital. 
In both Specification 1 and Specification 2, the estimated coefficients for the racial 
composition of members, the main activity of transportation and the main activity of 
plantation are negative and statistically significant. Since the pseudo R-squared for 
Specification 2 is larger, we present in Table 6.4, the marginal effects of the 
variables with statistically significant estimated coefficients for Specification 2. In 
Table 6.4, the single-race co-operatives have a 10% higher probability of having 
between RM1001.00 and RM10,000.00 in share capital relative to the multiracial 
co-operatives. The probability of the single-race co-operatives having a higher 
amount of share capital decreases, with a significant 5% lower probability of having 
between RMI00,001.00 and RMl,OOO,OOO.OO in share capital and a 16% lower 
probability of having between RMl,OOO,OOl.OO and RM50,000,000.00 in share 
capital relative to the multiracial co-operatives. A similar pattern is observed in the 
co-operatives in transport and in plantation. In general, relative to the credit activity 
co-operatives, the transport activity co-operatives and the plantation activity co-
operatives have a higher probability of having between RM1001.00 and 
RM10,000.00 in share capital, with a 11% higher probability for the transport 
67 The review of co-operatives in Malaysia in Chapter 4 indicates that members of primary co-
operatives are mostly employees in an organization with a fixed income. 
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activity co-operatives and a 9% higher probability for the plantation activity co-
operatives. However, the probability of co-operatives in these two areas of activity 
having a higher category of share capital decreases, with them having a significantly 
lower probability of having more than RMI00,OOO.OO in share capital. There is a 
16% lower probability of the transport activity co-operatives having between 
RMI00,OOl.OO and RMl,OOO,OOO.OO and a 21% lower probability of having 
between RMl,OOO,OOl.OO and RM50,OOO,OOO.OO in share capital relative to the 
credit co-operatives. The plantation activity co-operatives have a 15% lower 
probability of having between RMI00,OOl.OO and RMl,OOO,OOO.OO and a 18% 
lower probability of having between RMl,OOO,OOl.OO and RM50,OOO,OOO.OO in 
share capital relative to the credit co-operatives. 
A priori expectations suggested that most of the explanatory variables would be 
associated with a higher probability of having low levels of share capital. Such 
expectations were based on the characteristics of the primary co-operative members 
discussed in Chapter 4, which indicated that most of the co-operative members are 
fixed income earners. As individuals employed with a fixed income, it is reasonable 
to assume that it is less likely that the co-operative's members would be 
entrepreneurs. Davis (1999) argues that where entrepreneurs are absent in co-
operatives, it would be difficult for co-operatives to accumulate capital. In such a 
case, as in Malaysia, we might predict that, in general, primary co-operatives would 
have low levels of share capital. It is also reasonable to assume that co-operative 
members tend to keep their contributions to the co-operative's capital to the 
minimum, as argued by de Drimer (1997). Co-operatives with high levels of share 
capital would then be co-operatives with a large number of members. Cross-
tabulations between share capital and the number of members indicate that 75% of 
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the co-operatives representing the largest two categories of share capital (i.e. having 
between RMl,OOO,OOl.OO and RM50,OOO,OOO.OO in share capital or having more 
than RM50 million in share capital) belong to the category of co-operatives that 
have the largest number of members, i.e. more than 1500 members (see the shaded 
area of Table 6.5). 
Although, in accordance with expectations, the estimated coefficients representing 
most of the other explanatory variables are negative, only the estimated coefficients 
representing the transport co-operatives, the plantation co-operatives and the single-
raced co-operatives are statistically significant. As indicated in Section 6.4.1, the 
transport co-operatives and the plantation co-operatives are more likely to have a 
smaller number of members. Therefore, a possible explanation for the low levels of 
share capital of these co-operatives may, therefore, lie in them having a smaller 
number of members. The same explanation can also be used for the single-raced co-
operatives. Limiting membership to a particular race may be regarded as a fonn of 
group homogeneity, which is a characteristic for small groups (Olsen, 1965). Thus, 
smaller groups are more likely to have small share capital and this may be 
particularly the case with co-operatives in Malaysia. 
6.4.3. The primary co-operatives' assets and secondary co-operatives 
Table 6.6 presents the ordered pro bit analysis focusing on the effect of membership 
in secondary co-operative on the level of assets of primary co-operatives. In 
Specification 1, the negative estimated coefficient for membership in a secondary 
co-operative is insignificant. In Specification 2, however, the estimated coefficients 
of the dummy variables denoting tenure of not more than 5 years and 11 to 15 years 
of membership in a secondary co-operative are negative and statistically significant. 
Also negative and statistically significant in both Specifications 1 and 2 are the 
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estimated coefficients representing regionally distributed membership, transport 
activity and small/cottage industry activity. However, the estimated coefficient 
representing services activity is negative and statistically significant only in 
Specification 2. Once again, for Specification 2, the marginal effects of the 
statistically significant variables are presented in Table 6.7. 
Co-operatives that have been members of a secondary co-operative for not more 
than 5 years have a significantly 24% lower probability of having more than RMI 
million in assets relative to co-operatives that are not members of a secondary co-
operative. Meanwhile, co-operatives that have been members of secondary co-
operatives between 11 and 15 years have a significantly 12% higher probability of 
having between RMIO,OOl.OO and RMIOO,OOO.OO in assets and a significantly 23% 
lower probability of having more than RMI million in assets relative to co-
operatives that are not members of a secondary co-operative. 
Co-operatives whose members are regionally distributed have a 13% higher 
probability of having between RMlO,OOl.OO and RMIOO,OOO.OO in assets, a 20% 
higher probability of having between RMI00,001.00 and RMl,OOO,OOO.OO in assets 
and a 40% lower probability of having more than RMI million in assets relative to 
co-operatives whose members are distributed nationwide. The transport co-
operatives, the service co-operatives and the small/cottage industry co-operatives 
also, are more likely to have smaller assets relative to the credit co-operatives. They 
respectively have 13%, 12% and 17% higher probabilities of having between 
RMI0,001.00 and RMlOO,OOO.OO in assets and 26%, 24% and 32% lower 
probabilities of having more than RMI million in assets relative to the credit co-
operatives. These findings accord with our expectations based on the discussion of 
co-operatives' assets in Chapter 4, which indicated that 84.7% of the assets of co-
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operatives in Malaysia are owned by credit co-operatives, which are mostly co-
operatives with members distributed nationwide. One might expect therefore that 
the rest of the co-operatives would be more likely to have lower assets. 
6.4.4. An Aggregate Measure of Primary Co-operative Size 
Finally, we analyse the effect of membership in a secondary co-operative on an 
aggregate measure of the size of the primary co-operative. So far, we have analysed 
3 measures of size: the number of members; the share capital; and the assets of the 
primary co-operative. We analysed a 5-point index for the number of members, a 6-
point index for the amount of share capital, and a 6-point index for assets. In this 
section, we analyse an aggregate index by summing all three indexes for each co-
operative. Higher values of the index represent larger co-operatives in terms of 
membership, share capital and assets. The minimum aggregate value of the three 
indexes is 3.00 and the maximum is 17.00. Although it may be accepted that co-
operatives with higher aggregate values are larger co-operatives, the index for the 
number of members, the share capital and the assets of co-operatives that have the 
same aggregate value, are not the same. Some co-operatives may have a large 
number of members index and a low share capital index, whilst another co-operative 
with the same aggregate value may have a low number of members index and a 
large share capital index, but when the indexes of each of co-operatives are added 
together, their aggregate value may be the same. 
The distribution of the co-operatives by the aggregate index is given in Table 6.8 
below. 
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Table 6.8: Distribution of Co-operatives by the Aggregate Index 
Value of the Aggregate Percentage 
aggregate index (G;) value 
0 3 0.9 
1 4 2.8 
2 5 0.9 
3 6 3.8 
4 7 7.5 
5 8 14.2 
6 9 11.3 
7 10 7.5 
8 11 13.2 
9 12 5.7 
10 13 8.5 
11 14 5.7 
12 15 14.2 
13 16 0.9 
14 17 2.8 
Total 100.0 
To analyse the effect of membership in a secondary co-operative on the aggregate 
index, we define the dependent variable (G;) as in Table 6.8 above. As G; is an 
ordered variable, we again specify an ordered pro bit model to analyse the 
relationship between membership in a secondary co-operative and the aggregate 
measure of the size of the primary co-operative. The model has the same set of 
explanatory variables as in the previous three subsections.68 
Table 6.9a in the Appendix presents two specifications of the ordered probit 
analysis of the effect of membership in a secondary co-operative and the other 
explanatory variables on the aggregate size index. In Specification 1, the estimated 
coefficient for membership in a secondary co-operative is positive but not 
significant. However, in Specification 2, the estimated coefficient for not more than 
68 We have also co \lapsed G; into 5 categories: aggregate values 3 to 8 (group 1); aggregate values 9 
(group 2); aggregate values 10 and 11 (group 3); aggregate values 12 to 14 (group 4); and aggregate 
values 15 to 17 (group 5). While the results of the analysis without co\Iapsing the dependent variable 
are presented in Table 6.9a, we also present the results from co\Iapsing the dependent variable into 
five categories in Table 6.9b. 
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5 years membership in a secondary co-operative is negative and statistically 
significant and the estimated coefficient for more than 15 years membership in a 
secondary co-operative is positive and statistically significant. As discussed in 
Section 6.4.1, although it may be argued that the tenure of secondary co-operatives 
may be picking up an age effect of co-operatives, there may be also older co-
operatives that have become a member of secondary co-operatives for not more than 
5 years. 
The estimated coefficients for transport activity, services activity and small/cottage 
industry activity are all negative and statistically significant for both Specification 1 
and Specification 2. However, the estimated coefficient for consumer activity is 
negative and statistically significant only in Specification 1 and the estimated 
coefficient of plantation activity is negative and statistically significant only in 
Specification 2. Since the explanatory variables in Specification 2 explain about 
13% of the variation in the size of co-operatives as compared to about 9% in 
Specification 1, we will present the marginal effects for Specification 2 in Tables 
6.10a and 6.10b. 
With the collapsed categories of the aggregate index (see Table 6.9b), the estimated 
coefficient representing consumer activity co-operatives is negative and significant 
only in Specification 1. In general, in Specification 1, there is no difference in the 
results between the collapsed 5-point index in Table 6.9b and the I5-point aggregate 
index (Gi ) in Table 6.9a in terms of the estimated coefficients of the statistically 
significant variables. However, in Specification 2, the negative and significant 
estimated coefficients representing the single-raced co-operatives and not more than 
5 years membership in a secondary co-operative in Table 6.9a remain negative but 
insignificant for the collapsed categories of the aggregate index (Table 6.9b). 
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Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient representing the construction co-operatives, 
which was negative and insignificant in Table 6.9a, remains negative but is now 
statistically significant in Table 6.9b. 
For the collapsed categories of the aggregate index, we present the marginal effects 
for Specification 2 in Table 6.1 Dc, as the explanatory variables in Specification 2 
explain about 17% of the variation as compared to about 13% in Specification 1. 
Hence, we focus upon the interpretation of the marginal effects for Specification 2 
associated with the estimates presented in Table 6.9b (Le. the collapsed index). 
It is apparent from Table 6.1 Dc that co-operatives that have been members of a 
secondary co-operative for more than 15 years are more likely to be co-operatives 
with a higher value of the aggregate index, Le. larger co-operatives. There is a 23% 
lower probability of being in category 1 of the collapsed index, a 8% lower 
probability of being in category 2 of the collapsed index, a 13% higher probability 
of being in category 4 of the collapsed index and a 23% higher probability of being 
in category 5 of the collapsed index, relative to co-operatives that are not members 
of a secondary co-operative. These results indicate that the tenure of membership in 
a secondary co-operative does influence the size of the primary co-operative. Co-
operatives that have been secondary co-operative members for more than 15 years 
are relatively large in size as measured by the aggregate index. 
The overall size of primary co-operatives can also be explained by the other 
explanatory variables. Co-operatives with regionally distributed members have a 
26% higher probability of being in category 1 of the collapsed index, a 9% higher 
probability of being in category 2 of the collapsed index, a 14% lower probability of 
being in category 4 of the collapsed index, and a 29% lower probability of being in 
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category 5 of the collapsed index, relative to co-operatives whose members are 
distributed nationwide. The findings relating to co-operatives with regionally 
distributed members suggest that this characteristic of the primary co-operative is 
likely to affect the size of the primary co-operative. 
With respect to economic activity, relative to the credit activity co-operatives (i.e. 
the omitted category), transport activity, construction activity, plantation activity, 
services activity and small/cottage industry co-operatives are more likely to be 
smaller co-operatives. The transport co-operatives have a 49% higher probability of 
being in category 1, a 13% lower probability of being in 3, a 24% lower probability 
of being in category 4, and a 14% lower probability of being in category 5, relative 
to the credit co-operatives. The construction co-operatives have a 35% higher 
probability of being in the collapsed category 1, a 18% lower probability of being in 
the collapsed category 4, and a 10% lower probability of being in the collapsed 
category 5 relative to the credit co-operatives. 
The plantation activity co-operatives have a 43% higher probability of being in 
category 1, 21 % and 11 % lower probabilities of being in categories 4 and 5 
respectively, relative to credit co-operatives. The services activity co-operatives 
have a 47% higher probability of being in category 1, 12%, 23% and 13% lower 
probabilities of being in categories 3, 4 and 5 respectively, relative to credit co-
operatives. If co-operatives are in the small/cottage industry activity, they have a 
37% higher probability of being in category 1, a 19% lower probability of being in 
category 4, and a 10% lower probability of being in category 5, relative to the credit 
co-operatives. 
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The findings for transport co-operatives, construction co-operatives, plantation co-
operatives, services co-operatives and small/cottage industry co-operatives indicate 
that these co-operatives are the co-operatives that are less likely to belong to the 
large size range relative to the credit co-operatives. The findings pertaining to co-
operatives with regionally distributed members, accord with our expectations that 
co-operatives with this characteristic are likely to be in the small size range. 
6.4.5. Summary 
In this section, using the data from the survey of Malaysian co-operatives, we have 
analysed the effect of being a secondary co-operative member on 4 measures of co-
operative size: the number of members; the share capital; the assets of the primary 
co-operatives; and the aggregate index. Our aim was to explore the relationship 
between primary and secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. The findings indicate 
that the effect of membership in a secondary co-operative is only statistically 
significant for the number of members of the primary co-operative, especially for 
co-operatives that have a long standing relationship with secondary co-operatives. 
The review of co-operatives in Malaysia in Chapter 4 indicates that there is a large 
number of primary co-operatives that are not members of a secondary co-operative. 
Out of the 2817 adult primary co-operatives in 2003, only 1001 co-operatives are 
members of a secondary co-operative, 1816 (64.5%) co-operatives are not. The 
question arises therefore as to whether secondary co-operatives are relevant among 
the primary co-operatives in Malaysia. In the following section, we present 
econometric analysis pertaining to the relevance of secondary co-operatives for 
primary co-operatives in Malaysia. 
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6.5. Analysis of the Relevance of Secondary Co-operatives 
From the review of co-operatives in Malaysia in Chapter 4, it is apparent that there 
are primary co-operatives that are larger than secondary co-operatives. There is also 
quite a large number of primary co-operatives that are not members of a secondary 
co-operative. This observation is also apparent in the questionnaire survey, in which 
out of the 106 primary co-operatives in our sample, 56 co-operatives are members of 
a secondary co-operative (see Chapter 5). Although over 50% of the sample are 
members of a secondary co-operative, the percentage of non-members of secondary 
co-operatives is almost as high as the secondary co-operative members. 
In the context of primary co-operatives growing as large as their secondary co-
operatives, Zeuli et al. (2003b) raise the question of what the primary co-operatives 
are using the secondary co-operatives for. This question is also appropriate where 
secondary co-operatives constitute different types of primary co-operatives as 
members. In general, in contrast to the secondary co-operatives in the West, most 
of the secondary co-operatives in Malaysia comprise primary co-operatives that do 
not have a common economic activity. Thus, it is less likely that in such a situation 
the presence of the secondary co-operative may create economic value in the 
primary-secondary co-operative relationship and give added value for the existence 
of secondary co-operatives. It is therefore important to explore the relevance of 
secondary co-operatives in Malaysia, to ascertain whether, in general, the secondary 
co-operatives have been functioning as they should towards their members and 
whether secondary co-operatives are needed by the primary co-operatives. 
Zeuli et al. (2003b) study the relevance of secondary co-operatives among 
agricultural co-operatives in the US by analysing the satisfaction of the primary co-
operatives with their secondary co-operative. In their study, they included sales 
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growth, the co-operative's perception of duplication of service by the secondary co-
operatives, the increase in product and services offered by the primary co-operatives, 
the increase in the number of the primary co-operative's members and the amount of 
patronage refunds received from the secondary co-operatives, to explain the 
satisfaction of the primary co-operative with their secondary co-operatives. In their 
study of agricultural co-operatives, it is apparent that the co-operatives have a 
common economic activity and that the secondary co-operatives play the role of 
supporting and strengthening the primary co-operatives for the survival of the 
primary co-operatives. 
Since this thesis does not focus on any particular type of secondary co-operative in 
Malaysia, but instead focuses on the co-operative movement in general and since 
most of the secondary co-operatives have different types of co-operatives as 
members, in this chapter, we analyse the relevance of secondary co-operatives in 
Malaysia from these two perspectives: 1) the satisfaction of the primary co-
operatives with their secondary co-operatives, which we analyse in Section 6.5.1; 
and 2) the perceptions of the need for secondary co-operatives, which we analyse in 
Section 6.5.2. We analyse the satisfaction of the primary co-operatives with their 
secondary co-operatives from their responses pertaining to the benefits they have 
acquired from membership in a secondary co-operative (i.e. Questions 13 to 16 in 
the survey) and we analyse the perceived need for secondary co-operatives from the 
responses to Question 19 in the questionnaire survey, which asked respondents 
whether they agree that primary co-operatives need secondary co-operative to 
develop. 
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6.5.1. Satisfaction with Secondary Co-operatives 
Question 12 in the questionnaire survey asked respondents if they are satisfied with 
the secondary co-operatives. The satisfaction of the primary co-operative with the 
secondary co-operative is measured on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 5 (1 
denotes 'not at all satisfied', 2 denotes 'not very satisfied', 3 denotes 'neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied', 4 denotes 'somewhat satisfied' and 5 denotes 'very 
satisfied'). Since only the primary co-operatives that are members in a secondary 
co-operative responded to this question, we assign the 0 category as the category for 
non-members of secondary co-operatives because our sample for the econometric 
analysis with only the 56 secondary co-operative members would, otherwise, be 
somewhat small. Also, considering that the decision to join or to form a secondary 
co-operative lies with the primary co-operatives, it would not be appropriate to 
record the non-members of secondary co-operatives under the 5-point scale of 
satisfaction in secondary co-operatives (in this case it would be under the category 
that denotes 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied'). Table 6.11 below presents the 
responses to Question 12 on the satisfaction of the primary co-operative with 
secondary co-operatives for the sample of 106 co-operatives. 
Table 6.11: The Level of Satisfaction with 
Secondary Co-operatives 
Level of 
Satisfaction (Ti) Percentage 
0 47.2 
1 1.9 
2 7.5 
3 12.3 
4 27.4 
5 3.8 
100.0 
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From the table above, if we take levels 4 and 5 to denote satisfied with secondary 
co-operatives and levels 1 and 2 to denote dissatisfied with secondary co-operatives, 
then there is a larger percentage of co-operatives (31.2%) that expressed satisfaction 
with their secondary co-operatives as compared to 9.4% that expressed 
dissatisfaction.69 The higher percentage of co-operatives that are satisfied with their 
secondary co-operatives does not accord with our expectations as the discussion on 
the performance of the secondary co-operatives presented in Chapter 4 does not 
seem to indicate that secondary co-operatives have been performing towards the 
furtherance of the activities of the primary co-operatives. It is reasonable to assume 
that it is less likely that the secondary co-operatives would be able to enhance the 
economic activity of members, where, in general, the activities of secondary co-
operatives are not related to the activities of the different types of primary co-
operatives. Hence, based on the responses presented in Table 6.11 above, our 
dependent variable satisfaction with secondary co-operatives (Ti) with the six levels 
of outcome (i.e. 0 to 5) is defined as: 
o if the co-operative is not a member of a secondary co-operative 
1 if the co-operative is not at all satisfied with the secondary 
co-operative 
2 if the co-operative is not very satisfied with the secondary 
T; = co-operative 
3 if the co-operative is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the 
secondary co-operative 
4 if the co-operative is somewhat satisfied with the secondary 
co-operative 
5 if the co-operative is very satisfied with the secondary co-operative 
69 In Zeuli et al. [2003b], the measure of primary co-operative's satisfaction with secondary co-
operatives were categorised into: 'Very Satisfied'; 'Somewhat Satisfied'; and 'Not Satisfied'. 
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As the dependent variable (T;) is an ordered variable, we specify an ordered probit 
model to analyse the satisfaction with secondary co-operatives.'o 
Satisfaction with secondary co-operatives may be explained by the perceived and 
real benefits that primary members receive from their membership with secondary 
co-operatives (Zeuli et aI., 2003b). Such benefits may be in the form of: 1) primary 
co-operatives using the services provided by their secondary co-operatives 
(USERV); 2) primary co-operatives getting their needs supplied by the secondary co-
operatives (NSUPP); 3) primary co-operatives receiving dividends or rebates from 
the secondary co-operatives (DIVDN); 4) primary co-operatives experiencing an 
increase in income (INCOME); 5) primary co-operatives experiencing an 
improvement in their products/services (PRODUCn; and 6) primary co-operatives 
experiencing an increase in the number of members (MEMBRS). The information 
on the perceived benefits from secondary co-operatives is provided by the responses 
to the survey sent to primary co-operatives in Malaysia (i.e. Questions 13 to 16, see 
Chapter 5, in Appendix AS.I). 
In addition, it can be argued that satisfaction with secondary co-operatives could be 
related to the ability of secondary co-operative to fulfil the functions conferred on 
them. Secondary co-operatives fulfil the functions conferred on them through 
production and performance of services with the purpose of enhancing the economic 
activity of members with respect to efficiency and effectiveness (Schwarz, 1997), 
especially among small, local and homogeneous activity primary co-operatives 
70 Collapsing the 0 category and the 1 category of the dependent variable leads to no difference in the 
results pertaining to the statistically significant explanatory variables. We have also collapsed 
categories 1 and 2 together and categories 4 and 5 together to create a 4-point index. The estimated 
coefficients for the statistically significant explanatory variables remain unchanged. While the results 
of the analysis without collapsing the dependent variable are presented in Table 6.l2a, in Table 
6.12b, we also present the results of the two ordered probit analysis from collapsing the dependent 
variable into four categories. 
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(Benham and Keefer, 1991; Oustapassidis, 1992; de Drimer, 1997; Nilsson, 2001, 
Arcas-Lario and Hermmdez-Espallardo, 2003; Romero and Perez, 2003). Therefore, 
these characteristics of primary co-operatives (Le. small, local and homogeneous 
group) can also be used to explain satisfaction with secondary co-operatives. 
As discussed in Section 6.3, a small group is characterised by homogeneous 
members (Olsen, 1965), in which case homogeneity may be in the form of, for 
example, homogeneity in religion, occupation or income. Therefore, the 
homogeneous characteristics of the co-operative in terms of the composition of the 
co-operative members by occupation and by race may also account for the co-
operative being small, relative to co-operatives that are characterised by members 
comprising individuals in diverse occupations and by a multiracial composition of 
members. Also, in the context of the Malaysian co-operative, in general, co-
operatives that operate on a regional area and co-operatives with regionally 
distributed members are co-operatives with local characteristics relative to co-
operatives that operate on a nationwide scale and relative to co-operatives that have 
members distributed nationwide. Therefore, as explanatory variables used to 
determine the primary co-operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-operative, 
we therefore include the following co-operative characteristics: whether the 
occupations of the primary co-operative's members are homogeneous (HOCCUP); 
whether the membership is comprised of a single race (SRACE); whether the co-
operative operates on a regional area (REGIOP); and whether the co-operative 
members are distributed regionally (REGIMB). 
Our set of explanatory variables in the analysis of the primary co-operative's 
satisfaction with the secondary co-operatives therefore includes the benefit variables 
(USERV, NSUPP, DIVDN, INCOME, PRODUCT and MEMBRS) and the co-
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operative characteristics (HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, and REGIMB). The 
explanatory variables are all dummy variables. The benefit variables are defined as 
follows: USERY equals 1 if the co-operative uses the services provided by the 
secondary co-operative and 0 if otherwise; NSUP P equals 1 if the co-operative gets 
its needs supplied by the secondary co-operative and 0 if otherwise; DIVDN equals 1 
if the co-operative received a dividend or rebate from the secondary co-operative 
and 0 if otherwise; INCOME equals 1 if there is an increase in income of the co-
operative and 0 if otherwise; PRODUCT equals 1 if there is an improvement in the 
product or services of the co-operative and 0 if otherwise; MEMBRS equals 1 if 
there is an increase in the number of members of the co-operative and 0 if otherwise. 
As has been described earlier in the previous analysis, the co-operative characteristic 
HOCCUP equals 1 if the co-operative members are individuals from the same 
occupation or employment and 0 if otherwise, SRACE equals 1 if the co-operative 
members are single-raced and 0 if otherwise, REG/OP equals 1 if the co-operative 
operates on a regional scale and 0 if otherwise, and REGIMB equals 1 if the 
members of the co-operative are distributed regionally and 0 if otherwise. 
The Results 
Table 6.12a presents the results of the ordered probit analysis of the primary co-
operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-operative. The estimated coefficients 
for the co-operatives receiving benefits from the secondary co-operative in the form 
of using the services provided by the secondary co-operative, experiencing an 
improvement in their product or services and experiencing an increase in their 
membership are all positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients 
for co-operatives whose members are homogeneous in occupation and for single-
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raced co-operatives are positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects of 
the variables with the significant estimated coefficients are presented in Table 6.13. 
Although there is a 10% higher probability that co-operatives would be neither 
satisfied nor not satisfied with the secondary co-operative if the benefit they receive 
is in the form of the primary co-operative using the services provided by the 
secondary co-operative, there is a 48% higher probability that they will be somewhat 
satisfied relative to the co-operative that did not receive this form of benefit from 
their secondary co-operatives. If, by being a member of secondary co-operatives, 
there is an improvement in the co-operative's product or services, there is a 7% 
higher probability of them being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and a 29% higher 
probability of being somewhat satisfied with the secondary co-operatives relative to 
the co-operatives that did not experience any improvement in their product/services 
from their membership in the secondary co-operative. An increase in the primary 
co-operative's membership as a result of membership in secondary co-operatives has 
a 6% higher probability of primary co-operatives being neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied with secondary co-operatives relative to the co-operatives that did not 
experience an increase in their membership as a result of their membership in the 
secondary co-operative. 
There is a 5% higher probability for co-operatives whose members are homogeneous 
in occupation to be neither satisfied nor not satisfied and a 15% higher probability of 
them being somewhat satisfied with their secondary co-operatives relative to the co-
operatives whose members constitute individuals from diverse occupation. For 
single-raced co-operatives, there is a 11 % higher probability of them being neither 
satisfied nor not satisfied and a 19% higher probability of them being somewhat 
satisfied with their secondary co-operatives relative to the multiracial co-operatives. 
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The findings that relate the benefits in the form of the use of the services provided 
by the secondary co-operative and the improvement in the co-operative's 
product/services with the primary co-operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-
operatives accord with our expectations. Our expectations are based on the 
responses from the survey pertaining to the primary co-operative's membership in 
the secondary co-operative in Chapter 5, where quite a large percentage of co-
operatives (38.7%) in our sample indicate membership in the ANGKASA. The 
membership fee and loan collection service provided by the ANGKASA to members 
is a popular service among co-operatives. If the co-operatives in the sample were to 
indicate satisfaction with their secondary co-operatives, one might predict that it is 
in the use of services provided by the secondary co-operatives and in co-operatives 
experiencing improvements in their product/services that would generate the most 
satisfaction. It is reasonable to expect that, by using the ANGKASA fee and loan 
collection services, the co-operative can be certain that it would receive payments 
from members and the co-operative may be driven to make improvements in the co-
operative product/services, especially among co-operatives that offer credit facilities 
to their members. 
The study by Zeuli et al. (2003b) demonstrates that the growth in the number of 
producer members in a primary co-operative had a negative impact on satisfaction 
with secondary co-operatives in terms of their prices, products and services. Even 
though our survey of the primary co-operative's satisfaction with their primary co-
operatives was not confined to a particular type of secondary co-operative, the 
results of our analysis pertaining to the impact of an increase in co-operative 
membership on satisfaction with secondary co-operatives, more or less tie in with 
the findings of Zeuli et al. (2003b). Although the growth in the number of co-
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operative members in our analysis indicates a positive impact on satisfaction, 
nevertheless the marginal effects for growth in membership only indicate statistical 
significance in the case of an increase in the likelihood of being neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied with secondary co-operatives. 
In theory, the findings that relate the relatively small co-operatives in terms of 
homogeneous composition of members by occupation and by race with an increase 
in the likelihood of being somewhat satisfied with the secondary co-operatives, 
accord with our expectations. Theoretically, small primary co-operatives are 
supposed to benefit from the formation of secondary co-operatives. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that the relatively smaller co-operative groups, especially co-
operatives with members in the same occupation, would have a more focused 
objective when joining as members of a secondary co-operative and are therefore 
more likely to be somewhat satisfied with the secondary co-operatives. 
Summary 
Our analysis of the pnmary co-operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-
operatives was not confined to primary co-operatives and their secondary co-
operatives in a particular economic sector, in contrast to the study by Zeuli et al. 
(2003b), which was confined to agricultural co-operatives, where co-operatives 
··71 d h h· occupy a strong pOSItIOn an were t e pnmary co-operatives would have 
common terms of reference in expressing satisfaction for the secondary co-
operative. As our study was set within a more general setting, the findings in our 
analysis of the primary co-operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-operative 
for Malaysia, should be regarded as illustrative rather than definitive. For the 
71 In Malaysia, however, across the individual sectors of co-operative activity, perhaps only credit is 
in a strong position. 
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analysis of primary co-operative's satisfaction with the secondary co-operative, 
ideally, the sample would comprise the primary co-operatives that are members of a 
secondary co-operative. The findings indicate however that even in a situation 
where the presence of secondary co-operatives does not seem to be economically 
significant, such as in Malaysia, secondary co-operatives can still have some degree 
of relevance if they are able to offer services that can be used by the different types 
of primary co-operatives in the running of their activity as a single business entity. 
6.5.2. The Perception o/the Need/or Secondary Co-operatives 
Finally, in this section, we explore the relevance of secondary co-operatives in 
Malaysia from another perspective, i.e. from the analysis of the need for secondary 
co-operatives. Question 19 in the questionnaire survey, asked respondents whether 
they agree that primary co-operatives need secondary co-operatives in order to 
develop. The responses to Question 19 are measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 0 
denotes 'totally disagree'; 1 denotes 'disagree'; 2 denotes 'neither agree nor 
disagree'; 3 denotes 'agree'; and 4 denotes 'strongly agree'. We collapsed the five 
categories into three categories: 0 denotes 'disagree' (totally disagree and disagree); 
1 denotes 'neither agree nor disagree'; and 2 denotes 'agree' (agree and strongly 
agree). 
From the 106 responses, 51 % indicate that they agree that primary co-operatives 
need secondary co-operatives in order to develop, 13.2% neither agree nor disagree 
and 35.9% disagree. In analysing the relevance of secondary co-operatives based on 
the primary co-operatives' perceived need for secondary co-operatives, the 
dependent variable (Nj ) is defined as: 
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o if the co-operative does not agree that primary co-operatives need 
secondary co-operatives to develop 
1 if the co-operative neither agrees nor disagrees that primary co-
operatives need secondary co-operatives to develop 
2 if the co-operative agrees that primary co-operatives need secondary 
co-operatives to develop 
Since the dependent variable is a measure of the level of agreement, which is 
arranged in an ordered sequence, we again specify an ordered probit model for the 
analysis of the need for secondary co-operatives. The determinants of the need for 
secondary co-operatives (N;) may be related to arguments that relate the primary co-
operative characteristics with what makes secondary co-operatives necessary. While 
some researches argue on the grounds that primary co-operatives are small (Zeuli et 
aI., 2003b; de Drimer, 1997; Lele, 1981; Oustapassidis, 1992; Nilsson, 2001; and 
Arcas-Lario and Hemandez-Espallardo, 2003), others focus on the local settings of 
the primary groups (Olsen, 1965; McCarthy et al.; 1998; and Lambert and Bliss, 
2001). Lambert and Bliss (2001) argue that not all types of primary co-operatives 
find secondary co-operatives useful, for example, the case of housing co-operatives 
in England, while Soegaard (1994) focuses on the ability of the primary-secondary 
co-operative relationship to create economic value for the primary co-operatives, 
which may be related to the assumption that primary co-operatives are supposed to 
benefit from the presence of secondary co-operatives. 
Based on the above arguments, the perceived need for secondary co-operatives may 
therefore be explained by: 1) the group of co-operative characteristics that make up 
the profile of primary co-operatives: homogeneity of members' occupation 
(HOCCUP); racial composition of its members (SRACE); the co-operative's area of 
operation (REG/OP); and the distribution of the co-operative's members (REGIMB); 
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2) the main activity of the primary co-operative (MAINAC1), which comprises 8 
categories of activity (i.e. credit, consumerism, transportation, construction, 
plantation, housing, services and smalVcottage industry); and 3) the benefits from 
being members of secondary co-operatives, which comprise: primary co-operatives 
use the services provided by their secondary co-operatives (USERV); primary co-
operatives get their needs supplied by the secondary co-operatives (NSUPP); primary 
co-operatives receive dividends or rebates from the secondary co-operatives 
(DIVDN); primary co-operatives experience an increase in income (INCOME); 
primary co-operatives experiencing an improvement in their products/services 
(PRODUCT); and primary co-operatives experiencing growth in the number of their 
members (MEMBRS). 
By controlling for these factors, we can explore which particular characteristic(s) of 
co-operatives, which co-operative activity and which particular benefit(s) are related 
to the perceived need for secondary co-operatives. Based on the state of the 
development of the Malaysian co-operative movement discussed in Chapter 4, we 
expect that the need for secondary co-operatives is more likely to be expressed by 
co-operatives in which members are, to a certain extent, operating in the same 
activity as the activity of their co-operatives, for example transport co-operatives 
and small/cottage industry co-operatives and also by co-operatives that have 
experienced benefits from their membership in secondary co-operatives, especially 
with primary co-operatives that use the services provided by their secondary co-
operatives. The descriptions of all the above explanatory variables are already given 
in Sections 6.3 and 6.5.1. 
Table 6.14 presents the results of the ordered probit analysis of the determinants of 
the need for secondary co-operatives. The estimated coefficients representing 
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service co-operatives and small/cottage industry co-operatives are positive and 
statistically significant. Also positive and statistically significant are the estimated 
coefficients representing secondary co-operative members (i.e. the primary co-
operatives) that use services provided by their secondary co-operatives, that receive 
dividends or rebates from their secondary co-operatives and primary members that 
have experienced an increase in the number of their members due to their 
membership in secondary co-operatives. The result for small/cottage industry co-
operatives accords with our expectations as this type of co-operative is, in general, 
not only small but also it is the type of co-operative in which members are, to a 
certain extent, engaged in the economic activity that is reflected in the activity of the 
co-operative, which would make secondary co-operatives necessary. 
It is also interesting to note here the result for co-operatives getting their needs 
supplied by the secondary co-operatives. The finding indicates that getting their 
needs supplied by secondary co-operatives does not affect the primary co-
operative's view regarding the need for a secondary co-operative, especially where 
secondary co-operatives' activities are not related to the activity of the primary co-
operatives. In such a case, as in Malaysia, the secondary co-operatives are just 
another kind of primary co-operatives, the difference being their membership 
structure. It might, therefore, be reasonable to assume that the primary co-operatives 
would find the need for secondary co-operatives if the secondary co-operatives can 
give dividends from the primary co-operatives' share capital in secondary co-
operatives. 
Table 6.15 presents the marginal effects of the explanatory variables with 
statistically significant estimated coefficients. There is a 13% lower probability of 
small/cottage industry co-operatives, a 10% lower probability of co-operatives that 
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receive dividend or rebates from their secondary co-operatives and a 12% lower 
probability of co-operatives that have experienced an increase in their members from 
their membership in secondary co-operatives to neither agree nor disagree with the 
need for secondary co-operatives. Service co-operatives and small/cottage industry 
co-operatives are more likely to agree with the need for secondary co-operatives 
with each respectively having a 30% and a 40% higher probability of agreeing with 
the need for secondary co-operatives relative to the credit co-operatives. Primary 
co-operatives that use the services provided by their secondary co-operatives, that 
receive dividend or rebates from their secondary co-operatives and that experience 
growth in their members due to their membership in secondary co-operatives are 
also more likely to agree with the need for secondary co-operatives, with each 
respectively having a 31 %, a 39% and a 51 % higher probability of agreeing with the 
need for secondary co-operatives. The results pertaining to the positive association 
between the benefits from membership in secondary co-operatives and agreement 
with the need for secondary co-operatives can be viewed as answering the question 
raised in Zeuli et al. (2003b), i.e. what are the primary co-operatives using their 
secondary co-operatives for. In general, our findings suggest that the need for 
secondary co-operatives is related to the services that the secondary co-operatives 
provide, to the increased membership of the primary co-operative and to the 
dividends or rebates received from the secondary co-operative. 
6.6. Summary 
The success of secondary co-operatives in some countries, in terms of their 
economic contribution, has been related to the successful functioning of secondary 
co-operatives (Oustapassidis, 1992; Nilsson, 2001; Rebelo et aI., 2002; Arcas-Lario 
and Hermmdez-Espallardo, 2003; and Haan et aI., 2003). Secondary co-operatives 
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function better if the number of primary co-operative members is small and the 
secondary co-operatives exist to provide support systems and resources to small 
primary co-operatives, so as to maximise the income of the co-operative members. 
The review of co-operatives in Malaysia in Chapter 4, where the growth of the co-
operative movement has been dominated by primary co-operatives rather than 
secondary co-operatives did not indicate that the secondary cooperatives have been 
functioning as their counterparts in countries where the co-operative movement has 
been successful. In addition, in cases where the activity of most of the secondary 
co-operatives does not seem to relate to the primary members' business operations, 
it appears that primary co-operatives in Malaysia do not depend on secondary co-
operatives to survive. 
This chapter has thus analysed the relationship between primary co-operatives and 
secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. The analysis of the primary-secondary co-
operative's relationship was conducted by analysing the effect of membership in 
secondary co-operatives on the number of members, the share capital, the assets and 
the size of the primary co-operatives. The findings indicate that the effect of 
membership in secondary co-operatives is only positive with respect to the number 
of members of the primary co-operatives. This chapter has also analysed the 
relevance of secondary co-operative organisations from two perspectives: by 
analysing the satisfaction of the primary co-operatives with their secondary co-
operatives; and by analysing the perceived need for secondary co-operatives. The 
analysis of the relevance of the secondary co-operatives was intended to explore 
what the primary co-operatives are using their secondary co-operatives for and the 
possibility that secondary co-operatives could be redundant in the Malaysian co-
operative movement. From the findings we conclude that secondary co-operatives 
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in Malaysia have not been very resourceful towards their primary members but that 
secondary co-operatives are by no way redundant. The need for secondary co-
operatives, which was expressed in the survey, can be regarded as showing support 
for secondary co-operatives, especially from co-operatives that have benefited from 
being a member of a secondary co-operative. The ability of secondary co-operatives 
to give some benefits to primary co-operatives, which accounts for the satisfaction 
of primary co-operatives with secondary co-operatives and the support secondary 
co-operatives receive, can be taken as some evidence of the relevance of secondary 
co-operati ves. 
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Appendix A6: Results Tables 
Table 6.1: Determinants of the Number of Members of Primary Co-operatives 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 
Coefficient 
Homogeneous occupation of 0.0246 
members 
Single-raced -0.3963 
Regional operation 0.2373 
Regionally distributed members -1.1092 -
Main Areas of Activity: 
- Consumerism -0.5169 
- Transportation -1.0299-
- Construction -1.0731" 
- Plantation -0.9342 
. 
- Housing -0.2035 
- Services -0.8915 -
- Small industries -2.7660-
Membership in secondary co-op 0.5557 -
Tenure of Membership in 
Secondary Co-operative: 
- not more than 5 years 
- 6 to 10 years 
- 11 to 15 years 
- more than 15 years 
Cut Off Point 1 -3.4799 
Cut Off Point 2 -1.5207 
Cut Off Point 3 -1.0282 
Cut Off Point 4 -0.7404 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 
log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
T-Statistic 
0.09 
-1.37 
0.48 
-2.13 
-1.36 
-2.50 
-1.76 
-1.92 
-0.44 
-2.22 
-4.57 
2.13 
0.4695 
0.3758 
0.3675 
0.3620 
106 
52.06 
-121.5232 
0.1764 
Specification 2 
Coefficient T-Statistic 
-0.0144 -0.05 
-0.4839 -1.60 
-0.1535 -0.30 
. 
-1.0097 -1.91 
-0.2940 -0.72 
-1.3788-
-3.16 
-1.8190-
-2.73 
-
-1.1741 -2.28 
-0.3881 -0.80 
-1.5425-
-3.41 
-2.6834-
-3.95 
-1.1944 - -2.34 
0.5699 1.40 
0.2659 0.63 
1.6943- 4.56 
-4.2455 0.5400 
-1.9421 0.4146 
-1.3425 0.4011 
-0.9928 0.3920 
106 
81.24 
-106.9322 
0.2753 
ii) Omitted tenure category: co-operatives not a member of secondary co-operatives 
iii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
iv) The degrees of freedom for Specification 1 = 12; for Specification 2=15. 
v) For the cut-off points' in both Specifications, standard errors are shown, rather 
than t-statistics. 
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Table 6.2: Marginal Effects (ME) for the Significant Coefficients in Table 6.1 
Dependent Variable = Number of Members 
Explanatory Variables 101-500 
(1 ) 
ME 
Specification 1: (T-stat) 
-Regionally distributed 0.3467 
members (2.60) 
-Transportation activity 0.3048 
(3.37) 
Construction activity 0.2862 -
(3.36) 
-Plantation activity 0.2736 
(2.84) 
-Services activity 0.2754 
(2.80) 
Small/cottage industry -0.0144 
activity (-0.08) 
Member of secondary co-op -0.1921 
.. 
(-2.12) 
Specification 2: 
Regionally distributed 0.3285 
.. 
members (2.29) 
Transportation activity 0.4232 -
(4.76) 
-Construction activity 0.3730 
(3.24) 
-Plantation activity 0.3690 
(3.59) 
-Services activity 0.4395 
(5.48) 
Small/cottage industry 0.1746 
activity (0.75) 
-Not more than 5 years 0.3748 
membership in secondary (3.74) 
co-op 
-More than 15 years -0.4730 
membership in secondary (-6.02) 
co-op 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically Significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
501-1000 
(2) 
ME 
(T-stat) 
0.0480 
(1.05) 
-0.0614 
(-1.36) 
-0.0803 
(-1.11) 
-0.0617 
(-1.10) 
-0.0497 
(-1.19) 
-
-0.1862 
(-4.23) 
0.0037 
(0.28) 
0.0480 
(0.90) 
. 
-0.1142 
(-1.89) 
-
-0.1827 
(-2.51 ) 
-0.1058 
(-1.44) 
.. 
-0.1341 
(-2.22) 
-
-0.2240 
(-4.22) 
-0.1066 
(-1.46) 
.. 
-0.1116 
(-2.23) 
1001-1500 more than 
1500 
(3) (4) 
ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) 
.. 
-0.0126 -0.4081 
(-0.70) (-2.17) 
-0.0604 
. 
-0.2684 -
(-1.86) (-3.45) 
-
-0.0660 -0.2498 
(-1.58) (-3.03) 
-
-0.0569 -0.2361 
(-1.57» (-2.84) 
-0.0523 
. 
-0.2407 -
(-1.68) (-2.91 ) 
- -
-0.1096 -0.3446 
(-3.15) (-6.67) 
.. 
0.0237 0.1867 
(1.59) (2.19) 
. 
-0.0279 -0.3579 
(-1.44) (-1.85) 
.. 
-
-0.0982 -0.2878 
(-2.41 ) (-4.45) 
- -
-0.1157 -0.2699 
(-2.80) (-5.06) 
-0.0876 
.. 
-
-0.2396 
(-2.03) (-3.67) 
- -
-0.1067 -0.3011 
(-2.63) (-4.74) 
-0.1292 - --0.2998 
(-3.16) (-5.57) 
.. 
-
-0.0888 -0.2446 
(-2.05) (-3.85) 
-0.0060 0.5926 
(0.22) (5.28) 
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Table 6.3: Determinants of the Share Capital of Primary Co-operatives 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 
Coefficient 
Homogeneous occupation of -0.1076 
members 
-Single-raced -0.5709 
Regional operation 0.3049 
Regionally distributed members -0.6418 
Main Area of Activity: 
- Consumerism -0.3705 
- Transportation -0.9954 -
- Construction -0.1364 
- Plantation -0.8456 
. 
- Housing 0.0109 
- Services -0.2284 
- Small/cottage industry -0.7516 
Membership in secondary co-op 0.1359 
Tenure of Membership in 
Secondary Co-operative: 
- not more than 5 years 
- 6 to 10 years 
- 11 to 15 years 
- more than 15 years 
Cut Off Point 1 -2.1060 
Cut Off Point 2 -1.3827 
Cut Off Point 3 -0.9363 
Cut Off Point 4 -0.2125 
Cut Off Point 5 1.1707 
Number of Observations 
likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
-0.43 -0.1106 -0.44 
-2.13 -0.5877 - -2.19 
0.71 0.1512 0.34 
-1.39 -0.5488 -1.18 
-1.07 -0.3808 -1.07 
-
-2.61 -1.0888 -2.83 
-0.25 -0.3273 -0.59 
-
-1.87 -1.0023 -2.16 
0.03 -0.0831 -0.20 
-0.63 -0.4633 -1.23 
-1.48 -0.5567 -1.03 
0.59 
-0.4484 -1.02 
0.4374 1.22 
-0.2449 -0.65 
0.4187 1.44 
0.3451 -2.2496 0.3542 
0.3345 -1.5167 0.3430 
0.3304 -1.0542 0.3380 
0.3194 -0.2917 0.3240 
0.3433 1.1285 0.3468 
106 106 
30.57 36.13 
-164.5770 -161.7974 
0.0850 0.1004 
ii) Omitted tenure category: co-operatives not a member of secondary co-operatives 
iii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
iv) The degrees of freedom for Specification 1= 12; for Specification 2=15. 
v) For the cut-off points' in both Specifications, standard errors are shown, rather 
than t-statistics. 
202 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-opcratives: An Empirical Analys is 
Table 6.4: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.3 
Dependent Variable = Share Capital 
RM1001 - RM10,001 - RM100,001 -
Explanatory RM10,OOO RM100,000 
Variables (1) (2) 
ME ME 
( T-stat) (T-stat) 
.. 
Single- 0.0955 0.0303 
raced (2 .03) (1.44) 
... 
Transport 0.1050 -0.0260 
activity (3.10) (-0.76) 
... 
Plantation 0.0900 -0.0314 
activity (2.81 ) (-0.71) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
RM1 million 
(3) 
ME 
( T-stat) 
-0.0458 
(-1.87) 
.. 
-0.1592 
(-2.34) 
. 
-0.1531 
(-1 .88) 
RM1 million-
RM50 million 
(4) 
ME 
( T-stat) 
.. 
-0.1575 
(-2.12) 
.. . 
-0.2070 
(-3.67) 
. .. 
-0.1827 
( -3.20) 
more than 
RM50 
million 
(5 
ME 
( T-stat) 
-0.0270 
(-1 .30) 
-0.0205 
(-1 .59) 
-0.0164 
(-1 .55) 
Table 6.5: Relationship between Share Capital and the Number of Members 
Number of Members 
Share capital Less 101-500 501- 1001- More Total than 1000 1500 than 
100 1500 
Less than 2 9 2 0 4 17 
RM1000 
RM1001 .00- 2 2 4 4 3 22 
RM10,OOO.00 
RM1 0,001 .00 - 0 13 0 0 3 16 
RM100,000.00 
RM100,001 .00 - 2 8 7 1 5 23 
RM1,000,000.00 
RM1,000,001.00 0 0 3 3 18 24 
- RM50 million 
More than 0 0 0 1 3 4 
RM50 million 
Total 6 39 16 9 36 106 
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Table 6.6: Determinants of the Assets of Primary Co-operatives 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 
Coefficient 
Homogeneous occupation of 0.0681 
members 
Single-raced -0.1258 
Regional operation 0.4596 
.. 
Regionally distributed members -1.0848 
Main Area of Activity: 
- Consumerism -0.4720 
. 
- Transportation -0.6755 
- Construction 0.3180 
- Plantation 0.2011 
- Housing 0.3181 
- Services -0.4934 
.. 
- Small/cottage industry -1.2242 
Membership in secondary co-op -0.2349 
Tenure of Membership in 
Secondary Co-operative: 
- not more than 5 years 
- 6 to 1 0 years 
-11 to 15 years 
- more than 15 years 
Cut Off Point 1 -2.8768 
Cut Off Point 2 -2.6187 
Cut Off Point 3 -1.8803 
Cut Off Point 4 -0.6398 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
0.25 0.0917 0.34 
-0.44 -0.1162 -0.40 
0.97 0.3205 0.67 
-2.10 -1.0368 .. -2.01 
-1.28 -0.4582 -1.20 
-1.72 -0.7736 
.. 
-1.94 
0.52 0.1379 0.22 
0.41 0.0935 0.18 
0.65 0.2660 0.54 
-1.27 -0.7314 
. 
-1.79 
-2.36 -1.1188 
.. 
-2.02 
-0.96 
-0.7303· 
-1.63 
-0.1919 -0.51 
-0.6892 
. 
-1.75 
0.2119 0.67 
0.4156 -3.0381 0.4305 
0.4010 -2.7726 0.4154 
0.3805 -2.0143 0.3944 
0.3516 -0.7265 0.3627 
106 106 
29.00 35.35 
-118.6205 
-115.4495 
0.1089 0.1328 
ii) Omitted tenure category: co-operatives not a member of secondary co-operatives 
iii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
iv) The degrees of freedom for Specification 1 = 12; for Specification 2= 15. 
v) For the cut-off pOints' in both Specifications, standard errors are shown, rather 
than t-statistics. 
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Table 6.7: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.6 
Dependent Variable - Assets 
RM1001.00 - RM10,001.00 -
Explanatory RM10,000.00 RM100,000.00 
Variables (1) (2) 
ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) 
.. 
Regionally 0.0251 0.1306 
Distributed (1.53) (2.33) 
Members 
· Transport 0.0358 0.1289 
activity (1.23) (1.90) 
· Services 0.0337 0.1224 
activity (1.18) (1.77) 
... 
Small/cottage 0.0593 0.1703 
industry activity (1.30) (2.61) 
Not more than 0.0349 0.1225 
5 years (1.07) (1.62) 
membership in 
secondary co-
op 
11 to 15 years 0.0323 0.1160 · 
membership in (1.15) (1.75) 
secondary co-
op 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
••• Statistically significant at the 1% level 
RM1 00,001.00 -
RM1,000,000.00 
(3) 
ME 
(T-stat) 
. 
0.2034 
(1.69) 
0.0208 
(0.45) 
0.0221 
(0.50) 
-0.0635 
(-0.50) 
0.0103 
(0.18) 
0.0162 
(0.36) 
more than 
RM1 million 
(4) 
ME 
(T-stat) 
-0.3957 
.. 
(-2.18) 
-0.2573 
.. 
(-2.33) 
.. 
-0.2447 
(-2.13) 
-0.3177 -
(-3.23) 
.. 
-0.2388 
(-2.03) 
.. 
-0.2288 
(-2.11) 
205 
1, " 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
Table 6_9a: Determinants of the Size of Primary Co-operatives (Aggregate Measure) 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 
Coefficient 
Homogeneous occupation of -0.0211 
members 
Single-raced -0.3977 
Regional operation 0.2883 
.. 
Regionally distributed members -1.0949 
Main Area of Activity: 
. 
- Consumerism -0.5652 
... 
- Transportation -1.0932 
- Construction -0.1852 
- Plantation -0.7132 
- Housing -0.0709 
- Services -0.6119· 
... 
- Small/cottage industry -1.6591 
Membership in secondary co-op 0.1919 
Tenure of Membership in 
Secondary Co-operative: 
- not more than 5 years 
- 6 to 10 years 
- 11 to 15 years 
- more than 15 years 
Cut Off Point 1 -4.1925 
Cut Off Point 2 -3.4482 
Cut Off Point 3 -3.3239 
Cut Off Point 4 -2.9718 
Cut Off Point 5 -2.5189 
Cut Off Point 6 -1.9690 
Cut Off Point 7 -1.6180 
Cut Off Point 8 -1.3887 
Cut Off Point 9 -0.9717 
Cut Off Point 10 -0.7710 
Cut Off Point 11 -0.4158 
Cut Off Point 12 -0.1314 
Cut Off Point 13 1.0686 
Cut Off Point 14 1.2419 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
T-Statistic 
-0.09 
-1.54 
0.68 
-2.42 
-1.67 
-2.98 
-0.35 
-1.63 
-0.17 
-1.72 
-3.32 
0.86 
0.5632 
0.4074 
0.3958 
0.3750 
0.3579 
0.3452 
0.3390 
0.3360 
0.3321 
0.3300 
0.3249 
0.3198 
0.3452 
0.3633 
106 
47.95 
-235.6587 
0.0923 
Specification 2 
Coefficient T-Statistic 
-0.0362 -0.15 
. 
-0.4388 -1.69 
0.0373 0.09 
.. 
-1.0040 -2.20 
-0.4900 -1.14 
-1.3120" -3.51 
-0.5618 -1.04 
.. 
-0.8815 -1.95 
-0.2192 -0.53 
-1.0011" -2.67 
.. 
-1.3264 -2.52 
-1.0025 
.. 
-2.35 
0.3409 0.98 
-0.2182 -0.59 
... 
0.8313 2.91 
-4.6960 0.6225 
-3.8329 0.4298 
-3.6946 0.4155 
-3.3277 0.3931 
-2.8544 0.3759 
-2.2730 0.3623 
-1.8964 0.3552 
-1.6378 0.3507 
-1.1744 0.3446 
-0.9532 0.3418 
-0.5562 0.3349 
-0.2348 0.3281 
1.0705 0.3527 
1.2464 0.3700 
106 
65.82 
-226.7222 
0.1268 
ii) Omitted tenure category: co-operatives not a member of secondary co-operatives 
iii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
iv) The degrees of freedom for Specification 1= 12; for Specification 2=15. 
v) For the cut-off points' in both Specifications, standard errors are shown, rather 
than t-statistics. 
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Table 6.9b: Determinants of the Size of Primary Co-operatives (collapsed categories 
of the aggregate measure)* 
Explanatory Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 
Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic 
Homogeneous occupation of -0.2622 -1.00 -0.2614 -0.99 
members 
Single-raced -0.2364 -0.85 -0.2741 -0.98 
Regional operation 0.4664 0.92 0.1388 0.27 
Regionally distributed members -1.3170 
_. 
-2.48 -1.1384 - -2.17 
Main Area of Activity. 
. 
- Consumerism -0.6319 -1.78 -0.5771 -1.57 
-1.2031 - -3.02 -1.3699 -- Transportation -3.38 
- Construction -0.6032 -1.08 
. 
-0.9568 -1.67 
- Plantation -0.4211 -1.10 --1.1808 -2.41 
- Housing -0.2941 -0.68 -0.4280 -0.96 
-0.9170 - -2.43 -
- Services -1.3196 -3.28 
- Small/cottage industry -1.2684 
.. 
-2.38 -1.0045 
. 
-1.76 
Membership in secondary co-op 0.3332 1.37 
Tenure of Membership in 
Secondary Co-operative: 
- not more than 5 years -0.7160 -1.53 
- 6 to 10 years 0.5156 1.37 
- 11 to 15 years -0.1370 -0.35 
- more than 15 years 0.9467 - 3.03 
Cut Off Point 1 -2.0009 0.3612 -2.2878 0.3789 
Cut Off Point 2 -1.6449 0.3558 -1.9063 0.3725 
Cut Off Point 3 -0.9996 0.3462 -1.1932 0.3589 
Cut Off Point 4 -0.1820 0.3332 -0.2834 0.3407 
Number of Observations 106 106 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 41.75 55.56 
Log likelihood -144.8443 -137.9403 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1260 0.1676 
Notes: i} *The collapsed category of the aggregate measure as described in Footnote 68 on 
page 178 
ii} • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
_. Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
ii} Omitted tenure category: co-operatives not a member of secondary co-operatives 
iii} Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
iv} The degrees of freedom for Specification 1 = 12; for Specification 2=15. 
v} For the cut-off points' in both Specifications, standard errors are shown, rather 
than t-statistics. 
207 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
Table 6.10a: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for Specification 2 
in Table 6.9a 
Explanatory Variables 
Single-raced Regionally Not more than 5 
distributed years 
Aggregate members membership in 
Index secondary co-op 
ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) 
1 0.0098 0.0165 
(1.23) (1.38) 
·2 0.0040 0.0069 
(0.88) (0.95) 
· 3 0.0163 0.0286 
(1.37) (1.68) 
.. 
4 0.0355 0.0657 
(1.56) (2.16) 
.. 
5 0.0587 0.1205 
(1.61) (2.38) 
.. 
6 0.0327 0.0793 
(1.46) (1.94) 
7 0.0129 0.0409 
(1.16) (1.48) 
8 -0.0041 0.0231 
(-0.41) (0.68) 
9 -0.0138 -0.0150 
(-1.38) (-1.18) 
.. 
10 -0.0368 -0.0620 
(-1.53) (-2.28) 
11 -0.0332 · -0.0690 
(-1.47) (-1.88) 
· 12 -0.0756 -0.2056 
(-1.51) (-1.80) 
13 -0.0027 -0.0102 
(-0.77) (-0.80) 
14 -0.0047 -0.0212 
(-0.86) (-0.89) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level 
-Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
ME 
(T-stat) 
0.0623 
(1.11) 
0.0193 
(0.87) 
0.0653 
(1.42) 
. 
0.1031 
(1.94) 
-0.1033 
(2.98) 
0.0186 
(0.77) 
-0.0156 
(-0.65) 
-0.0750 
(-1.51) 
. 
-0.0479 
(-1.75) 
.. 
-0.0862 
(-2.23) 
.. 
-0.0583 
(-2.13) 
... 
-0.0946 
(-2.88) 
-0.0023 
(-0.85) 
-0.0035 
(-0.98) 
More than 15 
years 
membership in 
secondary co-op 
ME 
(T-stat) 
-0.0141 
(-1.44) 
-0.0059 
(-0.96) 
. 
-0.0247 
(-1.79) 
.. 
-0.0566 
(-2.43) 
-
-0.1031 
(-2.73) 
.. 
-0.0664 
(-2.20) 
-0.0330 
(-1.65) 
-0.0148 
(-0.64) 
0.0153 
(1.42) 
.. 
0.0561 
(2.27) 
.. 
0.0596 
(2.01) 
.. 
0.1663 
(2.32) 
-0.0076 
(0.87) 
0.1511 
(1.02) 
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Table 6.10b: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for 
Specification 2 in Table 6.9a (continued) 
Explanatory Variables 
Aggregate Transport Plantation 
Index activity activity 
ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) 
1 0.0907 0.0503 
(1.44) (0.96) 
2 0.0265 0.0162 
(0.96) (0.82) 
3 0.0862 
. 
0.0558 
(1.82) (1.27) 
- 0.0913 
. 
4 0.1286 
(2.57) (1.73) 
.- 0.0969 .-5 0.1193 
(3.21 ) (2.59) 
6 0.0158 0.0216 
(0.61 ) (1.12) 
7 -0.0230 -0.0108 
(-1.01) (-0.49) 
0.0958 - -0.0636 8 
(-2.16) (-1.25) 
9 -0.0595- -0.0424 
(-2.12) (-1.49) 
-
. 
10 -0.1066 -0.0777 
(-2.69) (-1.87) 
11 -0.0725- -0.0533 
. 
(-2.36) (-1.91) 
12 -0.1211 - -0.0875 -
(-3.32) (-2.64) 
13 -0.0032 -0.0021 
(-0.87) (-0.86) 
14 -0.0050 -0.0032 
(-1.02) (-0.99) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
-- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Services 
activity 
ME 
(T-stat) 
0.0567 
(1.20) 
0.0181 
(0.90) 
0.0622 
(1.56) 
-0.1017 
(2.16) 
0.1090-
(2.94) 
0.0257 
(1.33) 
-0.0105 
(-0.57) 
-0.0687 
(-1.64) 
-0.0468 
. 
(-1.80) 
-
-0.0870 
(-2.27) 
-
-0.0607 
(-2.11) 
--
-0.1028 
(-2.91) 
-0.0027 
(-0.87) 
-0.0041 
(-1.02) 
Small/cottage 
industry activity 
ME 
(T-stat) 
0.1099 
(1.13) 
0.0301 
(0.89) 
0.0937 
(1.55) 
-0.1283 
(2.42) 
-0.0986 
(2.42) 
-0.0045 
(-0.11) 
-0.0359 
(-1.04) 
. 
-0.1102 
(-1.90) 
-
-0.0613 
(-1.99) 
-0.1030 -
(-2.58) 
-0.0659 -
(-2.33) 
-
-0.1008 
(-3.15) 
-0.0023 
(-0.85) 
-0.0035 
(-0.98) 
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.-
Table 6.10c: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients for Specification 2 in Table 6.9b 
Collapsed Regionally More than 15 distributed years 
categories of the 
members membership 
aggregate index in secondary {aggregate value} 
co-op 
ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) 
1 (3 - 8) 0.2631 - -0.2276 -
smallest size (2.86) (-3.69) 
- -2 (9) 0.0894 -0.0762 
(2.02) (-2.33) 
3(10-11) 0.0774 -0.0590 
(1.18) (-1.35) 
-- -4 (12 -14) -0.1446 0.1334 
(-3.03) (2.99) 
. 
-5 (15 -17) -0.2857 0.2293 
largest size (-1.71) (2.39) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
-Statistically significant at the 5% level 
-Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Explanatory Variables 
Transport Construction Plantation 
activity activity activity 
ME ME ME 
(T-stat) (T-stat) (T-stat) 
- -0.4912 0.3512 0.4333 
(3.50) (1.58) (2.41 ) 
0.0127 0.0156 0.0082 
(0.44) (0.53) (0.25) 
. 
-0.1253 -0.0896 -0.1184 
(-1.93) (-0.96) (-1.46) 
- - -
-0.2396 -0.1795 -0.2110 
(-3.68) (-1.97) (-2.92) 
- -
-0.1120 --0.1390 -0.0977 
(-3.43) (-2.70) (-3.17) 
-
-- _.- _.-
Services 
activity 
ME 
(T-stat) 
-0.4750 
(3.35) 
0.0132 
(O.48) 
-0.1214 
. 
(-1.91) 
-
-0.2330 
(-3.48) 
-0.1338-
(-3.39) 
--
Small/cottage 
industry 
activity 
ME 
(T-stat) 
. 
0.3688 
(1.67) 
0.0146 
(0.47) I 
-0.0953 
(-1.02) 
-
-0.1868 
(-2.12) 
--
-0.1013 
(-2.77) 
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Table 6.12a: Determinants of the Primary Co-operative's 
Satisfaction with Secondary Co-operatives 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
Homogeneous occupation of members 0.5355 
. 
Single-raced 0.8007~ 
Regional operation 0.7128 
Regionally distributed members -0.5836 
Co-operative uses the services 1.6523 -
provided by the secondary co-operative 
Co-operative gets their need supplied -0.0480 
by the secondary co-operative 
Co-operative received dividend or -0.3573 
rebate from the secondary co-operative 
There is an increase in income of the 0.1894 
co-operative 
There is an improvement in 0.956( 
product/services of the co-operative 
There is an increase in number of 0.6800 
. 
members of the co-operative 
Cut Off Point 1 1.5204 
Cut Off Point 2 1.5730 
Cut Off Point 3 1.9705 
Cut Off Point 4 2.6943 
Cut Off Point 5 4.8917 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared (10) 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
T-statistic 
1.79 
2.23 
1.11 
-0.86 
4.12 
-0.13 
-1.00 
0.47 
2.14 
1.62 
0.3629 
0.3648 
0.3811 
0.4185 
0.5808 
106 
96.21 
-93.8401 
0:3389 
ii) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-
statistics 
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Table 6.12b: Determinants of Primary Co-operatives Satisfaction with 
Secondary Co-operatives (collapsed categories of the 
dependent variable) 
Explanatory Variable Coefficienta CoefficientD 
(T-statistic) 
Homogeneous occupation of members 0.5649 
(1.87) 
.. 
Single-raced 0.8068 
(2.22) 
Regional operation 0.7543 
(1.14) 
Regionally distributed members -0.4775 
(-0.68) 
-Co-operative uses the services 1.6457 
provided by the secondary co-operative (4.09) 
Co-operative gets their need supplied 0.0022 
by the secondary co-operative (0.01 ) 
Co-operative received dividend or -0.3745 
rebate from the secondary co-operative (-1.05) 
There is an increase in income of the 0.2577 
co-operative (0.63) 
There is an improvement in 0.8663 
.. 
product/services of the co-operative (1.93) 
There is an increase in number of 0.6971 
. 
members of the co-operative (1.64) 
Cut Off Point 1 1.7090 
(0.3782) 
Cut Off Point 2 2.1116 
(0.3968) 
Cut Off Point 3 2.7872 
(0.4318) 
Cut Off Point 4 4.9704 
(0.5921) 
Number of Observations 106 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 93.05 
Log likelihood -89.1582 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
•• Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
0.3429 
(T-statistic) 
0.6647 
(2.02) 
0.8481 
.. 
(2.14) 
0.7229 
(1.09) 
-0.4619 
(-0.65) 
1.6266 -
(3.79) 
-0.2389 
(-0.56) 
-0.3875 
(-0.91) 
0.5801 
(1.26) 
0.9137" 
(1.85) 
0.7986 
. 
(1.74) 
1.7171 
(0.3970) 
2.1816 
(0.4143) 
2.9363 
(0.4548) 
106 
98.95 
-77.1438 
0.3907 
ii) a Collapsing the satisfaction categories 0 and 1 (see Footnote 67 
on page 183). 
iii) b Collapsing the satisfaction categories 1 and 2 together and 4 and 5 
together (see Footnote 67 on page 183). 
iv) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-
statistics. 
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Table 6.13: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients In Table 6.12a 
Dependent Variable = Satisfaction Level 
Not Not so 
satisfied at satisfied 
Explanatory all 
Variables 
(1 ) (2) 
ME ME 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
-0.0036 -0.0098 Homogeneous 
occupation of (-0.78) (-0.62) 
members 
-0.0019 0.0116 Single-raced 
(-0.61) (0.53) 
Co-operative uses 
-0.0108 -0.0462 
the services (-0.94) (-1.35) provided by the 
secondary co-op 
There is an -0.0075 -0.0309 
improvement in 
product/services of 
(-0.85) (-0.99) 
the co-operative 
There is an -0.0049 -0.0162 
increase in number (-0.76) (-0.67) 
of members of the 
co-operative 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
•• Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Neither Somewhat 
satisfied satisfied 
nor 
dissatisfied 
(3) (4) 
ME ME 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
· 
. 
0.0591 0.1525 
(1.74) (1.65) 
0.1091 · -0.1866 
(1.84) (2.46) 
· 0.4739-· 0.0963 
(1.92) (4.05) 
0.0741 - -0.2861 
(2.02) (1.96) 
· 0.0641 0.1979 
(1.77) (1.49) 
Very 
satisfied 
(5) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
0.0027 
(0.83) 
0.0022 
(0.90) 
. 
0.0204 
(1.11 ) 
0.0075 
(0.81) 
0.0040 
(0.73) 
213 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Co-operatives: An Empirical Analysis 
Table 6.14: Determinants of the Need for Secondary Co-operatives 
Independent Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Homogeneous occupation of members -0.1288 -0.42 
Single-raced -0.3143 -0.90 
Regional operation 0.7197 1.39 
Regiona"y distributed members 0.0274 0.05 
Main Area of Activity: 
- Consumerism 0.5039 1.15 
- Transportation 0.3555 0.76 
- Construction 0.3301 0.35 
- Plantation 0.1935 0.32 
- Housing 0.1940 0.38 
- Services 0.8460' 1.86 
- Small/cottage industry 1.3780 
.. 
2.15 
. 
Co-operative uses the services 0.8322 1.67 
provided by the secondary co-operative 
Co-operative gets their need supplied -0.6123 -1.19 
by the secondary co-operative 
.. 
Co-operative received dividend or 1.1391 2.18 
rebates from the secondary co-
operative 
There is an increase in income of the -0.4115 -0.73 
co-operative 
There is an improvement in -0.4823 -0.77 
product/services of the co-operative 
There is an increase in number of 1.5276 
.. 
2.40 
members of the co-operative 
Cut Off Point 1 0.7151 0.3720 
Cut Off Point 2 1.1780 0.3794 
Number of Observations 106 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared (18) 49.18 
Log likelihood -82.2069 
Pseudo R Squared 0.2076 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
ii) Omitted main area of activity: credit 
iii) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-
statistics. 
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Table 6.15: Marginal Effects for the Significant Coefficients in Table 6.14 
Dependent Variable = The Need for 
Secondary Co-operatives 
Neither agree 
Explanatory Variables nor disagree 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
Services activity -0.0750 
(-1.46) 
.. 
Small/cottage industry activity -0.1285 
(-2.14) 
Co-operative uses the services -0.0585 
provided by the secondary co- (-1.34) 
op 
. 
Co-operative received dividend -0.0966 
or rebates from secondary co- (-1.73) 
op 
There is an increase in number -0.1172 
.. 
of members of the co-operative (-2.11 ) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Agree 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
0.3009" 
(2.24) 
0.4048 -
(3.77) 
0.3140 
. 
(1.83) 
0.3944 -
(2.83) 
0.5100-
(3.34) 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE 
LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG MALAYSIAN CO-OPERATORS 
7.1. Introduction 
The analysis of the primary-secondary co-operative relationship in Malaysia, 
presented in the previous chapter, suggests that primary co-operatives could use 
their membership in secondary co-operatives to increase membership in the primary 
co-operatives but not to encourage their members to increase their contributions to 
the share capital of the primary co-operative. Where primary co-operatives do not 
depend much on secondary co-operatives to survive, it is mostly the case that the 
activity of the primary co-operatives does not relate to the activity of the secondary 
co-operative. Also, where members are not induced to contribute much to the co-
operative's capital, it may be the case that the activity of the primary co-operative is 
not related to members' businesses. Ole Borgen (2001) argues that where the co-
operative activity and members' business are related, this may induce members to 
identify with the co-operative, which serves as a mechanism for generating trust in 
the co-operative. The members' strong identification with the co-operative may be 
induced through the existence of joint products, goals and strategy, which is 
especially the case if a co-operative consists of members who depend on the co-
operative activity for living (ibid., 2001). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that where 
members of co-operatives strongly identify with the co-operatives, this should be 
reflected in higher levels of trust in the co-operative relative to members who do not 
identify with the co-operative. On the other hand, Spear (2000) argues that it is the 
values upheld by co-operatives that make co-operatives trustworthy. 
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Primary co-operatives, whose activities are related to members' businesses, are 
common among producer co-operatives, such as agricultural marketing co-
operatives and worker co-operatives. Basically, these types of co-operatives, for 
example worker co-operatives, comprise members, who set up a co-operative to start 
an economic activity and who depend on the co-operative for their living. The 
worker co-operatives usually comprise people from specific social structures, i.e. 
family members and friends, as members (Romero and Perez, 2003; Woodin, 2006). 
These groups of people, i.e. family members and friends, are people, who belong to 
a high trust environment (Casson, 1995). Therefore, trust may be an important 
factor in the formation of a co-operative group. 
Casson (1995) argues that voluntary associations of individuals in economic activity 
presume a higher degree of trust. Similarly, Romero and Perez (2003) argue that 
high levels of trust are necessary in setting up a co-operative enterprise because it is 
an adventure with great risks and sacrifices. In a similar vein, Haddad and Mallucio 
(2003) argue, from the perspective of a financial group, that a financial group, where 
members' financial resources are crucial for the group, requires a conscious decision 
to participate that is often conditioned on trust. A type of co-operative in which a 
high level of individual trust is needed is the worker co-operatives, i.e. co-operatives 
in which the owners, i.e. members, commit to both invest and work in the 
business.72 Involvement in most worker co-operatives means financial investment. 
One technology-oriented worker co-operative in the US, for example, requires an 
initial ownership investment of USD$1 0,000. 
72 The worker co-operative model dates back to the 1760's in England and to the 1790's in the United 
States. In general, a worker co-operative is a collection of individuals that make a mutual pact to be 
in business together. The workers/owners govern the business on the one member one vote principle. 
They jointly own the business, sharing the company profits as well as the risks. 
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Casson (1995), Romero and Perez (2003) and Haddad and Mallucio (2003) all refer 
to trust in family members and friends. These arguments that relate to the formation 
of a co-operative with people from high trust social structures may be taken to imply 
that the membership of a cooperative should be based on trust, which should lead to 
co-operatives being formed among family members and friends. However, the 
formation of primary co-operatives in Malaysia, in general, has been largely among 
employees of organisations. Based on the argument in Buchan et al. (2002) that 
says that the many non-family run businesses in America and Japan is a 
demonstration of a high level of general trust displayed by the Americans and the 
Japanese, the many non-family run co-operative businesses in Malaysia may be 
taken to reflect a high level of general trust among the Malaysian co-operators. A 
high level of general trust in a country or in a society is where the level of trust in 
others is high. 
The arguments discussed above point to two main aspects pertaining to the 
relatedness of a member's business to the activity of the co-operative: 1) the 
generation of trust in co-operatives; and 2) the importance of trust in the formation 
of a co-operative. Based on these two main arguments, in this Chapter, we analyse 
the determinants of the level of trust among Malaysian co-operators. Basically, in 
this chapter we analyse co-operators' trust in co-operatives where, initially, in 
Section 7.2, we discuss the role played by trust in the formation of a co-operative 
group, followed by a background discussion on trust in Section 7.3, which includes 
the definition of trust, the measurement of trust and the determinants of trust. In 
Section 7.4, we analyse the determinants of the level of trust among co-operator's, in 
which we explore: i) co-operators' trust in co-operatives; ii) co-operators' trust in 
co-operatives relative to other types of trust, i.e. trust in various groups of people 
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and trust in values; and iii) the relationship between trust in co-operatives and 
willingness to financially commit towards a hypothetical co-operative business. The 
empirical analysis is based on the data derived from the questionnaire survey 
described in Chapter 5. As the high level of general trust in the argument of Buchan 
et al. (2002) relates to a high level of general trust in a country or in a society and 
since the survey in this thesis only concerns co-operators, we have conducted an 
electronic mail survey on trust among a more general sample of individuals in 
Malaysia to compare the general level of and pattern of trust between the sample of 
co-operators and the more general sample of individuals, which we discuss in 
Section 7.4.73 
7.2. Trust in the Formation of Co-operative Groups 
Co-operatives are often referred to as economic groups that are formed on a 
voluntary basis. In the ideology of economic organisations, a voluntary association 
is an association where individuals with common interests and beliefs naturally 
associate with each other, for purposes of production and for other activities 
(Casson, 1995). Casson argues that the voluntary association of individuals in 
economic activities presumes a higher degree of trust than individualism and 
collectivism. In individualism, low trust has a more central role because it validates 
the emphasis on competition between individuals, while in collectivist societies low 
trust is said to be "an unintended consequence of a repressive political regime 
arising from failure of the society to respond to the anticipation of the leaders" 
(Casson, 1995: 175). Therefore, as voluntary associations of individuals in economic 
activity, high trust is necessary in co-operatives, especially in setting up a 
73 Issues relating to co-operative size and trust are analysed in Chapter 8. 
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cooperative enterprise, which according to Romero and Perez, (2003), IS an 
adventure with great risks and sacrifices. 
The need for high trust in the formation of a co-operative group is a direct analogy 
to financial capital. Individuals engaged in economic activity can use social 
relations to meet their financial capital requirements (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993). Portes and Sensenbrenner use examples from the immigration literature to 
explore the different forms in which social structures affect economic actions. They 
argue that immigrants' economic destinies depend heavily on the social structures in 
which they become incorporated. Bonding together in tight knit communities based 
on trust provides a potential source for start-up capital and the basis for the rapid. 
growth of fledgling immigrant enterprises such as the Chinese immigrants in New 
York and San Francisco in the United States. Normally small budding businesses 
resort to family resources, and to a further extent friends, on the grounds of trust, for 
potential start-up capital because financial institutions usually are less optimistic 
about lending due to the perception of risk and the fear that obligations may not be 
met in the event of failure (Casson, 1995). 
Henehan and Anderson (200 I) argue that one of the 6 phases of co-operative 
formation concerns the development of trust among potential members.74 This may 
not, however, be necessary if the formation of a co-operative group takes place 
among people who trust each other highly. Smith-Ring (1997) argues that economic 
actors have to invest in the time dimension of relationship to have a track record of 
trust. Developing trust among people who hardly know each other takes time, for it 
74 The first two phases are, firstly, identifying the opportunity and secondly, building consensus on 
the potential for a cooperative, while the rest of the co-operative formation phases include securing 
member commitment, involving other stakeholders and starting up the cooperative enterprise 
(Henehan and Anderson, 2001). 
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involves the process of building trust, before a group can be formed. 7s Trust, 
especially interpersonal trust, is regarded as important for the formation of economic 
groups, in this case co-operatives, because it is crucial for individuals to pursue their 
economic activity, i.e. in its ability to raise adequate financial capital for a business. 
It is reasonable to expect that when it comes to making resources available to others 
to start a business, not many would be willing. 
Portes (1998) argues that the actual source of advantage for the individual, which 
lies in his/her relationship to others, should be recognised. What really motivates 
those to make resources available to a person is not uniform. Normally their 
willingness comes with the expectation that they will be fully repaid in the future~ 
which makes it a sort of an exchange only that it differs from the purely economic 
exchange in two ways. Firstly, these obligations are repaid in a different "currency" 
from that with which they were originally incurred and "may be as intangible as the 
granting of approval or allegiance" (Portes, 1998:7); and secondly, the timing of 
repayment is unspecified. 
The importance of trust can be seen in the setting up of worker co-operatives. 
Basically worker co-operatives in the West started off among family members and 
friends, i.e. from social structures where there is high trust environment. The 
Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative in the UK for example, which is the largest retailer 
of bicycles in the UK, was set up by 5 university graduates who were friends 
(Woodin, 2006) and the Andalusian cooperatives of associated workers in Spain 
selected their cooperative members at the time of creation, among family members 
75 Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) make reference to Balkin (1993) who discussed the difficulty of the 
Chicago's Full Circle Fund to form a group that replicated the Grameen Bank, which took 6 to 8 
months to be established. Balkin is quoted as saying that "in a setting where potential members, 
generally, do not initially know each other ... it does seem that it would take considerable time for 
people to perceive just how honest and trustworthy others would be" (Balkin, 1993:242-242 in 
Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). 
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and friends who had earned their complete trust (Romero and Perez, 2003). 
Lazerson (1988) argues that the selection of business partners is always problematic 
because of the question of trust. Interpersonal relationships in business form the 
ground for relational contracting, one that settles for an agreement that frames the 
relationship without attempting the impossible task of complete contracting. This 
type of relationship not only opens up opportunities but also acts as a safety net or 
insurance against risk that makes the relationship unworthy of exploitation (ibid., 
1988). Thus, social structures play an important part in the formation of an 
economic group such as a co-operative. 
In the following sections, we discuss the definition of trust used in the existing 
literature in Section 7.3.1, how trust has been measured in the existing literature in 
Section 7.3.2 and the determinants of trust identified in the existing literature in 
Section 7.3.3. 
7.3. Trust 
7.3.1. The Definition of Trust 
Researchers taking a micro-perspective regard trust as a moral resource, or a 'soft' 
variable, which has been used in explaining socio-economic behaviour. Casson and 
Cox (2001) argue that trust involves a belief that the other person will be honest. To 
trust means that you rely on others not to take advantage of you. Generally, "when 
we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental 
to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of co-operation with 
him" (Gambetta, 1998:217). Trust belongs to one of the incentives that people have 
traditionally deployed to regulate their common activity besides "solidarity, 
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reciprocity, reputation, pride, respect, vengeance and retribution" (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002:F424). 
According to Williamson (1993), there are 2 types of trust: 'trust' and 'calculative 
trust'. Williamson envisages 'trust' as the high trust among specific social groups, 
referring to personal relations between family, friends and lovers, while he 
conceives 'calculative trust' as a calculative behaviour, meaning trust-based 
decisions, which rest on calculative economic reasoning. Smith-Ring's (1997) use 
of the terms 'resilient trust' and 'fragile trust' in differentiating trust coincides with 
Williamson's (1993) 'trust' and 'calculative trust', respectively. Smith-Ring's 
'resilient trust' relates to interfamily connections and kinship ties that emphasis~ 
trust as "faith in the moral integrity or goodwill of others on whom economic actors 
depend for the realization of collective and individual goals as they deal with future, 
unpredictable issues" (Smith-Ring, 1997:122). 'Fragile trust' permits economic 
actors to deal with each other, but only in a guarded way and is strengthened by 
parties relying on a formal means, for example, on contracts, for governing and 
safeguarding their relationship (ibid., 1997). 
Where trust appears in the argument pertaining to the membership of a group 
(Benham and Keefer, 1991; Romero and Perez, 2003; La Porta et aI., 1997; Casson, 
1995; Haddad and Maluccio, 2003 and Van Bastelaer, 2002), it is the type of trust 
that is described as tolerant of and is founded on a Willingness to, endure risk and 
uncertainty (Hart, 1988; Pagden, 1988). This is the kind of trust that would belong 
to the 'resilient' type of trust of Smith-Ring (1997). The only other kind of 
interpersonal relation (a relation between persons as persons), which can satisfy the 
condition of extensive and enduring trust, is friendship (Hawthorn, 1988). Casson 
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and della Guista (2004) argue that trust produced from personal relations is the 
fundamental basis of co-operation. 
With respect to economic activities, trust is important as it has been argued that, 
among others, strong interpersonal trust can facilitate investment, especially where a 
lack of assets limits access to bank credit (Knack and Keefer, 1997). On the other 
hand, low trust can discourage innovation among entrepreneurs, who would be 
devoting more time to monitoring possible malfeasance by partners (ibid., 1997). 
Thus, . trust triggers greater investment and other economic actions such as 
immigrants enterprises in the US (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), as discussed in 
Section 7.2. 
7.3.2. The measurement of trust 
In the existing literature, there are 2 methods by which trust is measured: 1) the 
survey method based on questions from the National Opinion Research Centre's 
General Social Survey (GSS) or the World Value Survey (WVS); and 2) the 
monetary experiment method, which was designed by Berg et al. (1995). In this 
thesis, we were not able to use an experimental approach because it is impossible for 
us to gather our respondents, who are from disparate co-operatives throughout the 
country, within a particular premise at a particular time. The empirical literature that 
uses the experimental method often makes use of undergraduates (see, for example, 
Berg et aI., 1995; Glaeser et aI., 2000). 
Studies by Alesina and la Ferarra (2002), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Whiteley 
(2000) focus on responses to the following GSS question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in 
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dealing with people?,,76 This particular GSS trust question measures the general 
level of trust in a society or a country. It has been argued that if a high percentage of 
people in a society or in a country indicates that most people can be trusted, this 
would generally indicate a society or a country with a high level of general trust, for 
example Scandinavia, where almost two thirds of the responses to the GSS trust 
question indicated that most people can be trusted (La Porta et aI., 1997). 
Glaeser et aI. (2000) argue that measuring trust with this GSS question is a great 
lacuna, because the question is vague, abstract and hard to interpret. They noted that 
subject responses to the GSS trust question are difficult to interpret as variations in 
responses might arise for numerous reasons such as differences in the interpretation 
of who comprises "most people" and differences in the interpretation of what it 
means to be able to trust someone. It also depends on the identity of the person the 
respondent has in mind when answering the question (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Haddad and Maluccio, 2003). Glaeser et aI. (2000) therefore use other trust 
questions from the GSS: questions on fairness and helpfulness. The former asked: 
"Do you think that most people will try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance or would they try to be fair?" The latter asked: "Would you say that most of 
the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for 
themselves?" In addition, Glaeser et aI. (2000) also design other trust questions 
which differ from the GSS trust question, such as questions that elicit past trusting 
behaviour, for example, how often their subjects lend money or personal possessions 
to a friend or how often do they leave their room unlocked. 
With respect to the argument in Casson (1995) on participation in a group, which is 
a consequence of some underlying belief about the behaviour of other people, which 
76 The GSS trust question is a primary source for U.S. evidence on trust and social capital. It started 
in 1972 and the GSS trust question has been adopted in numerous studies. 
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relates to the question of 'who can be trusted', Whiteley (2000) argues that the basic 
groups would be families, friends and strangers. Whiteley also argues that the level 
of trust in a society or a country is indicated by the willingness to trust others, often 
strangers. In addition, Casson and della Guista (2004) argue that, at the individual 
level, the questions to be asked should be not only 'who', but also 'how much', 
'how' and 'when' they trust. 
The empirical analysis presented in the following sections leans towards the 
methodology of the WVS, but rather than simply importing questions from the 
WVS, we elected to design questions for the questionnaire of Malaysian co-
operatives. Besides asking co-operators to indicate their level of trust in co-
operatives, the trust questions in the questionnaire survey of Malaysian co-
operatives (as discussed in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5) also constitute questions that 
asked co-operators to indicate their levels of trust in their families, friends and 
strangers as well as the GSS trust question that measures the general trust level. In 
addition, we designed additional trust questions: trust in lending money; trust that 
the money lent out would be repaid; and trust in values. The questions on trust in 
values were based on the GSS attitudinal question pertaining to fairness and 
helpfulness, but which were modified to relate to co-operatives. 
7.3.3. The Determinants o/Trust 
The role of trust has been analysed in various studies, such as in the analysis of 
governmental efficiency (Putnam, 1993), in the analysis of economic growth (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997) in the analysis of the performance of large firms (La Porta et aI., 
1997) and in the analysis of community participation in different types of groups 
(Alesina and la Ferrara, 2000). The various studies have found that various 
characteristics of the individual such as age, gender, level of income, level of 
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education, race and nationality and the characteristics of a group, from where the 
individual comes, such as group homogeneity, group size, social distance, repeated 
interactions and past experience may influence the level of trust of the individual, 
thus affecting the efficiency or performance of organisations and institutions (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; Glaeser et aI., 2000; Ole Borgen, 2001; Alesina and la Ferrara, 
2002; and Eckel and Wilson, 2004). For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) test the 
effect of income inequality and education rates on trust in 29 market economies 
(including countries from Europe, Latin America, South Africa and Asia), finding 
that low levels of income inequality and low levels of education are associated with 
low trust. They also found that the lack of trust can be used to explain why some 
countries in the world are less successful economically. La Porta et ai. (1997) argue 
that trust is higher in richer countries (see Appendix A7.2 for a summary of the vast 
literature exploring the determinants of trust). 
The various individual and group characteristics described above have been used to 
test the level of trust in a country or a society in general, in conjunction with the 
kind of analysis carried out, i.e. for example, the analysis of government efficiency 
and economic growth ofa country (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). In this 
chapter, however, where we specifically analyse the level of trust in co-operatives, 
we are not testing what determines the level of trust in general but rather we will 
explore what determines the level of trust in co-operatives. Therefore, some of the 
determinants mentioned above may not be appropriate for our analysis, given the 
nature of co-operatives in the Malaysian co-operative movement. For example, to 
test whether co-operative members' income affects trust in co-operatives may not be 
appropriate as the discussion on the composition of co-operative members in 
Chapter 4, indicates that a large number of co-operative members are employees of 
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an organisation, indicating that members do not earn their income from the activity 
of the co-operative. In general, one might predict that trust in co-operatives would 
be determined by factors different from the factors that determine the general level 
of trust in a society. We will review such factors in the following section. 
7.4. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Co-operators' Trust 
In this section, we present econometric analysis of: i) the determinants of co-
operator's trust in co-operatives in Section 7.4.1; ii) the relationship between co-
operator's trust in co-operatives and other types of trust in Section 7.4.2; and iii) the 
relationship between co-operators' willingness to invest in a co-operative business 
and trust in co-operatives in Section 7.4.3 to explore whether trust in the co-
operative may influence the amount of share capital raised. Finally, we compare the 
general level of and pattern of trust for the sample of co-operators with a more 
general sample of individuals in Malaysia in Section 7.4.4 to ascertain to what extent 
the level of trust for the sample of co-operators differs from that of the general 
Malaysian sample. 
7.4.1. Co-operators' Trust in the Co-operative Institution 
The survey question that asked co-operators to indicate their level of trust in the co-
operative (i.e. Question 29) is measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 0 (do not trust at 
all); 1 (do not trust very much); 2 (neither trust nor distrust); 3 (trust a little); and 4 
(trust completely).77 Figure 7.1 below summarises the responses to the question 
regarding the level of trust in the co-operative. 
It is apparent that 60.4% of the co-operators have complete trust in the co-operative, 
25.5% have little trust in the co-operative, 11.3% neither trust nor distrust the co-
77 Following Whiteley (2000), we use the 5-point Likert scale to measure the level of trust for all 
other trust questions in the survey, i.e. Questions 21 to 29. 
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operative and 2.8% do not trust the co-operative very much. None of the 
respondents do not trust the co-operative at all. 
Figure 7.1: The Co-operators' Trust in the Co-operative 
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Responses for Trust in Co-operatives 
These responses do not accord with our expectations as we had expected that the 
level of co-operator's trust in the co-operative would be low. We based our 
expectations on the argument put forward by Ole Borgen (2001) that members' 
strong identification with the co-operative, which is present in co-operatives where 
the co-operative activity and the members ' business activity are related, should be 
reflected in higher levels of trust in the co-operative. Therefore, where co-operative 
members are largely fixed-income earners, as in the case of co-operatives in 
Malaysia as discussed in Chapter 4, it seems reasonable to predict that, in general, 
the activity of the co-operatives does not reflect what their members are doing for 
their living. One possible explanation for the reported high level of trust in co-
operatives from the responses, relates to the supporting letter from the DCD for the 
research project, which was attached to the questionnaire. The letter, which 
indicates that the researcher is an officer with the DCD, may have prompted co-
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operators to give such a positive response to the question about the level of trust in 
co-operatives, which may have biased the responses.78 
In the following analysis, we analyse the factors that explain the level of co-
operators' trust in the co-operative. Our dependent variable represents the level of 
trust of co-operator i in co-operative (Cj), which is defined as: 
o if the co-operator does not trust the co-operative at all 
1 if the co-operator does not trust the co-operative very much 
Cj = 2 if the co-operator neither trust nor distrust the co-operative 
3 if the co-operator trusts the co-operative a little 
4 if the co-operator trusts the co-operative completely 
The dependent variable, i.e. the level of co-operators' trust in the co-operative (Cj), 
is an index that is inherently ordered in a sequence. Therefore, for the econometric 
analysis of the determinants of Cj , we specify an ordered pro bit model. 
As discussed in Section 7.3.3, various factors may determine the level of trust , 
which may be categorised into: i) trust determinants representing individual 
characteristics; and ii) trust determinants representing group characteristics. In the 
analysis of the determinants of the co-operator's trust in the co-operative, we do not 
include all the determinants of trust as discussed in Section 7.3.3 as some may not 
be necessary for this study. In this study of co-operatives in Malaysia, the trust 
determinants that we analyse are mostly factors reflecting the group characteristics 
of the co-operatives. Information on individual characteristics is limited because of 
the methods used to collect the data, i.e. the mail survey questionnaire as discussed 
78 Omitting the official letter from the DeD may have, however, lowered the response rate. 
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in Chapter 5. We were concerned that if we included more questions or personal 
questions, this may affect the response rate adversly. 
Our explanatory variables thus include both individual and group characteristics. 
For the group characteristics, we explore factors that are specifically related to the 
characteristics of co-operatives, which include the homogeneity of the primary co-
operative group, the types of primary co-operative and the primary co-operative 
membership in secondary co-operatives. In accordance with the argument in 
Alesina and la Lerrara (2002) that trust is lower in groups, which are less 
homogeneous in terms of, for example, racial and ethnic composition, in the context 
of the co-operatives in our sample, we therefore expect that co-operators from co-
operatives that are homogeneous in terms of members' occupation (HOCCUP) and 
the racial composition of members (SRACE) would have higher levels of trust in the 
co-operative. 
We also include two other co-operative characteristics to explain the co-operator's 
level of trust in the co-operative: the co-operative area of operation; and the 
distribution of co-operative members. In terms of membership size, co-operatives 
that operate on a regional scale (REGIOP) and co-operatives that have regionally 
distributed members (REGIME) are relatively smaller than co-operatives that 
operate on a nationwide scale and co-operatives that have nationwide distributed 
members, respectively. Being relatively small and local, trust in the co-operative 
can be expected to be relatively higher than in larger groups because large 
membership may lead to conflicting interests, which makes the process of trust 
building complicated (Ole Borgen, 2001).79 
79 The relationship between trust in co-operatives and size of membership will be explicitly analysed 
in the next chapter (Chapter 8). 
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In addition, we also include the main activity of the co-operative (MAINACT), which 
comprises 8 categories of co-operative activity (Le. credit, consumer, transportation, 
construction, plantation, housing, services and small/cottage industry) as explanatory 
variables. This is because strong identification of members with the co-operative, 
which serves as a mechanism for generating trust in the co-operative, can be induced 
in co-operatives where the co-operative activity relates to the members' own 
business (Ole Borgen, 2001). We therefore expect that, in Malaysia, trust in the co-
operative is likely to be higher in co-operatives whose members are more likely to 
be engaged in economic activities that are reflected in the activity of the co-
operative, such as the transport co-operatives or the small/cottage industry co-
operatives. We also control for membership in a secondary co-operative (SECOOP) 
to explore whether a higher level of trust in the co-operative exists among co-
operators whose co-operative is a member of a secondary co-operative. 
As the responses pertaining to trust in the co-operative reflect the individual co-
operator's view, we include the age of the co-operator (AGE) in the set of 
explanatory variables. While the first group of variables that constitute co-operative 
characteristics (Le. HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT and 
SECOOP) would indicate which co-operators from which type of co-operative are 
more likely to trust the co-operative, the individual characteristic (AGE) would 
indicate whether younger or older co-operators trust the co-operative more. 
The variables HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, SECOOP and MAINACT, as 
described in Chapter 6, are dummy variables, which take the value of 1 if the 
primary co-operative comprises members with the same occupation (HOCCUP), if 
the co-operative members are single-raced (SRACE), if the co-operative operates on 
a regional scale (REGIOP), if the members of the co-operative are distributed 
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regionally (REGIMB) and if the co-operative is a member of a secondary co-
operative (SECOOP). As for the 8 categories of co-operative activity under 
MAINACT, the value is 1 if the main activity of the co-operative falls under either 
one of the eight activities: credit; consumer; transportation; construction; plantation; 
housing; services; and small/cottage industries. The age of the respondent (AGE) 
consists of four categories: aged less than 30 years;80 aged between 31 and 40 years; 
aged between 41 and 50 years; and above 50 years old. 8.5% of the respondents are 
under 30 years old, 16% are between 31 and 40 years old, 34% are between 41 and 
50 years old and 41.5% are over 50 years old. 
The Results 
Table 7.1 in Appendix A7.1 81 presents the results of the ordered probit analysis of 
the determinants of co-operators' trust in co-operatives based on the above model, 
where the set of explanatory variables constitutes variables that represent co-
operative and individual characteristics. It is apparent in Table 7.1 that the estimated 
coefficient representing co-operators from co-operatives that operate on a regional 
scale is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient representing 
co-operators from co-operatives that have members distributed regionally is negative 
and statistically significant. Also negative and statistically significant are the 
estimated coefficients representing co-operators from transport, services and 
small/cottage industry co-operatives. The finding pertaining to co-operatives that 
operate on a regional area accords with our expectations that co-operators from this 
type of co-operative would have higher levels of trust in the co-operative. However, 
the finding pertaining to co-operatives, whose members are regionally distributed, 
80 We collapsed the age category 'under 20' and the ag~ category '21 - 30 years old' into a category 
'less than 30 years old', because there are only 2 cases In the former age category and 7 cases in the 
latter age category. . ' 
81 All remaining tables are placed In AppendiX A 7.l. 
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does not accord with our expectations. The findings for co-operators from transport 
co-operatives and from small/cottage industry co-operatives also do not accord with 
our expectations that they would have higher levels of trust in the co-operative. 
The marginal effects of the variables with statistically significant estimated 
coefficients are presented in Table 7.2. There is a 13% lower probability that co-
operators from co-operatives that operate on a regional area have little trust in the 
co-operative relative to co-operators from co-operatives that operate on a nationwide 
scale. However, for co-operators from co-operatives whose members are regionally 
distributed, there is a 22% higher probability that they trust the co-operative a little, 
relative to co-operators from co-operatives whose members are distributed all over 
the country. There is a 36% higher probability that co-operators from the co-
operatives having the former characteristics have complete trust in the co-operative, 
but there is a 37% lower probability that co-operators from the latter group of co-
operatives completely trust co-operatives. It may be the case that the higher 
probability of trusting the co-operative completely among co-operators from co-
operatives that operate on a regional area could be because local co-operatives offer 
better opportunities for members to engage in incremental and repeated exchanges, 
which is one mechanism that facilitates the development of trust (Ole Borgen, 
2001). In addition, members may be better informed about what is going on in the 
co-operative and can, therefore, monitor their co-operatives on a more frequent 
basis. 
Relative to the credit co-operatives, there is a 16% higher probability for co-
operators in transport co-operatives and services co-operatives and a 25% higher 
probability for co-operators in small/cottage industry activity to neither trust nor 
distrust the co-operative. The level of their trust in co-operative decreases, with co-
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operators in transport co-operatives and in services co-operatives, each having a 
11 % higher probability of trusting co-operatives a little, while co-operators in 
small/cottage industry co-operatives have a 6% higher probability of trusting the co-
operative a little. The probability of having complete trust in the co-operative is 
36% lower for co-operators in transport cooperatives and services co-operatives and 
50% lower for co-operators in small/cottage industry co-operatives. The results for 
transport co-operatives and small/cottage industry co-operatives do not tie with our 
expectations because these are the types of co-operatives in which the members 
would most likely be individuals whose economic activity is reflected in the activity 
of their co-operative, for example, the taxi co-operatives for taxi owners/drivers. 
We would, therefore, expect co-operators from transport co-operatives and from 
small/cottage industry co-operatives to show relatively high levels of trust in the co-
operative. 
The Extended Model 
In this subsection, we explore additional factors that may explain the level of co-
operator's trust in the co-operative by extending the above model to include 
additional dummy variables. We control for the benefits that the co-operatives 
received from their secondary co-operatives because it may be the case that the high 
levels of trust in the co-operative indicated from the responses is because the co-
operator, as a member of the co-operative Board (i.e. a co-operative representative), 
is more likely to indicate trust if he/she recognises that the primary co-operative 
benefits from membership in a secondary co-operative. Ole Borgen (2001) argues 
that the roles played by representatives of a co-operative are intimately related to 
identity and identification. We include 6 additional controls: whether the co-
operative uses the services provided by secondary co-operatives; whether the co-
operative gets its needs supplied by secondary co-operatives; whether the co-
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operative receives dividends or rebates from secondary co-operatives; whether there 
is an increase in the income of the co-operative; whether there is an improvement in 
the products or services of the co-operative; and whether there is an increase in the 
number of members of the co-operative. This allows us to analyse whether any 
particular benefit affects the co-operators' level of trust in co-operatives. 
Table 7.3 presents the results of the ordered probit analysis of the determinants of 
co-operators' trust in their co-operatives controlling for the six benefit variables. 
The estimated coefficient representing co-operatives that operate on a regional area 
remains positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients 
representing co-operatives with regionally distributed members, services co-
operatives and small/cottage industry co-operatives also remain negative and 
statistically significant. With respect to the additional benefit variables, the 
estimated coefficient for co-operatives that benefit from an increase in co-operative 
income from membership in secondary co-operatives is negative and statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient representing co-operatives that benefit from 
an increase in membership is positive and statistically significant. The marginal 
effects for the statistically significant explanatory variables are presented in Table 
7.4. 
There is a 15% higher probability of co-operators from co-operatives that benefited 
from an increase in co-operative income from membership in secondary co-
operatives having little trust in co-operatives and a 36% lower probability of trusting 
co-operatives completely, relative to those whose co-operative did not experience 
such a benefit. On the other hand, co-operators from co-operatives that benefited 
from an increase in membership are more likely to trust co-operatives more. There 
is a 10% lower probability of neither trusting nor distrusting co-operatives, a 19% 
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lower probability of trusting co-operatives a little and a 31 % higher probability of 
having complete trust in co-operatives, relative to co-operators whose co-operative 
did not experience an increase in membership. The results suggest that the high 
level of co-operator's trust in co-operatives is not influenced by the benefits the co-
operative received from membership in secondary co-operative, except where there 
is an increase of the co-operative membership. 
Summary 
To summarise, in general, the high percentage of responses indicating complete trust 
in co-operatives is a healthy indication that the co-operative institution in Malaysia 
is well accepted among co-operators. However, in the multivariate analysis, the 
high level of trust in co-operatives is only indicated by co-operators from co-
operatives that operate on a regional scale. Given the nature of co-operatives in the 
Malaysian co-operative movement as discussed in Chapter 4, where co-operatives 
largely comprise members with fixed-income employment, we expected that co-
operators in Malaysia would not indicate high levels of trust in co-operatives. We 
also expected that co-operators from co-operatives such as transport co-operatives 
and small/cottage industry co-operatives, whose activity, to some extent, reflects the 
activities that the members are engaged in, would have relatively high levels of trust 
in the co-operatives. Our findings did not, however, support this. Our findings 
suggest that co-operators in the different types of co-operatives in Malaysia do not 
identify with their co-operative because if they did, then it would be indicated in a 
high level of trust in co-operatives from co-operators representing the different types 
of co-operatives (Ole Borgen, 2001). Only co-operators from co-operatives that 
experienced an increase in membership from the co-operative's membership In 
secondary co-operatives indicate a high level of trust in the co-operative. 
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In the following section, we analyse the co-operator's trust in co-operatives in 
relation to other types of trust, i.e. in relation to trust in various groups of people and 
trust in values. 
7.4.2. Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Co-operators' Trust in 
Co-operatives and Other Types of Trust 
In the survey, we asked co-operators to indicate their level of trust in their family 
members, in their friends and in strangers (Questions 22 and 25). We have defined 
trust in strangers according to three categories in terms of geographical distance: 
trust in people from the same district as them; trust in people from the same state as 
them; and trust in their countrymen. In Table 7.5, we present summary statistics of 
the co-operators' levels of trust in the various groups of people. 
It is apparent from Table 7.5 that, among the Malaysian co-operators, the percentage 
which have complete trust in their family is lower than the percentage, which have 
complete trust in the co-operative. Only 27.4% of co-operators trust their family 
members completely as compared to 60.4%, who completely trust co-operatives (see 
Section 7.4.1). If we take the scales 0 (do not trust at all) and 1 (do not trust very 
much), to indicate distrust and the scales 3 (trust a little) and 4 (trust completely) to 
indicate trust, 74.5% of the respondents trust family members, while only 9.4% do 
not trust them. 54.7% trust their friends, while 16.0% do not trust them. As with 
trust in strangers/fellow nationals, 35.9% trust people coming from the same district 
as them, while 21.7% do not trust them. Meanwhile, 32.1 % trust people coming 
from the same state as them and 24.5% do not trust them. 22.6% of the respondents 
trust their countrymen but an even larger percentage (27.4%) do not trust them.82 
82 The three categories for trust in strangers are in accordance with Whiteley's (2000) trust in fellow 
nationals. 
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If we compare the pattern of trust for fellow nationals with Whiteley (2000),83 the 
pattern of trust for fellow nationals in Whiteley (2000) shows a higher level of trust 
in fellow nationals, with 64.1 % indicating trust in fellow nationals as compared to 
the pattern of trust in fellow nationals among our sample of Malaysian co-operators 
(Le. an average of 30.2% for the three categories of trust in fellow nationals). While 
the findings in Whiteley (2000) demonstrate that 44.4% trust fellow nationals a little 
and 19.7% trust them completely, our sample of co-operators in Malaysia indicates 
that, on average, 34.9% trust fellow nationals a little and 0.6% trust them 
completely. Only 13.3% of the sample in Whiteley's study show distrust in fellow 
nationals as compared to, on average, 24.5% in our sample of co-operators in 
Malaysia. Although the sample in Whiteley (2000) may be more representative than 
ours (our sample consists of only co-operators), in general, the level of trust in 
fellow nationals in our sample of co-operators, appears to be relatively low. 
In addition to trust in the various groups of people, we also asked co-operators (in 
Questions 26 to 28) to indicate their trust in people having three specific values: 
trust that people, in general, will be honest; trust that people, in general, will not take 
advantage; and trust that people, in general, will put the interest of others first. 
Summary statistics of co-operators' levels of trust in values are presented in Table 
7.5. A large percentage of the respondents in our sample (56%) indicate that they 
trust that people will be honest, compared to 23% who indicate that they do not trust 
that people will be honest. 65% trust that people will not take advantage, while 17% 
do not trust that people will not take advantage. However, the percentage that 
responded that they trust that people will put the interest of others first is lower 
83 Whiteley (2000) used three databases of nationals from forty-five countries (not including 
Malaysia) carried out between 1990 and 1993. 
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(32%) as compared to 48% that do not trust that people will put the interest of others 
first. 
In Table 7.6, we present a correlation matrix between trust in co-operatives, trust in 
the various groups of people and trust in values. Trust in co-operatives has a 
positive correlation with trust in family members, a modest positive correlation with 
trust in friends and a modest positive correlation with trust in people from the same 
district. Trust in co-operatives has no correlation with trust in people from the same 
state and trust in countrymen. The correlation matrix also indicates that trust in 
family members has a positive correlation with trust in friends, a modest positive 
correlation with trust in people from the same district, a modest positive correlation _ 
with people from the same state and almost no relationship with trust in countrymen. 
The correlations of the relationships across the various groups of people become 
smaller as the people became further apart from each other in terms of personal, 
social and geographical distance. This finding accords with the arguments in Macy 
and Skvoretz (1998) and Glaeser et al. (2000) that trust increases when individuals 
are closer socially. 
Trust in co-operatives has a modest positive correlation with trust that people are 
honest and a positive correlation with trust that people will not take advantage yet no 
relationship with trust that people will put the interests of others first, suggesting that 
trusting the co-operative does not seem to relate very much to trusting that people, in 
general, have the values upheld by co-operatives such as honesty, solidarity and 
caring for others. This may again be taken to confirm the argument in Spear (2000) 
that it is the values upheld by co-operatives that make them trustworthy. 
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We now adopt multivariate analysis to explore the relationship between trust in co-
operatives and the other types of trust stated above, i.e. trust in the various groups of 
people and trust in values. With trust in co-operatives, which is an ordered variable, 
as the dependent variable, we again specify an ordered probit model. The dependent 
variable is defined in Section 7.4.1. We estimate 3 specifications: Specification 1 is 
a regression of trust in co-operatives on trust in the various groups of people; 
Specification 2 is a regression of trust in co-operatives on trust in the various groups 
of people and trust in values; and Specification 3 is a regression of trust in co-
operative on trust in values only. The ordered probit results of the three 
Specifications are presented in Table 7.7. 
In Specification 1, the estimated coefficient representing trust in family members is 
positive and statistically significant and in Specification 3 the estimated coefficient 
representing trust that people will not take advantage is positive and statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficients for trust in family members and trust that 
people will not take advantage remain positive and significant in Specification 2. 
The marginal effects of the significant estimated coefficients for Specification 2, 
which has a larger pseudo R-squared are also presented Table 7.7. The results 
indicate that an increase in the level of trust in family members and in the level of 
trust that people will not take advantage is more likely to influence trust in co-
operatives relative to trust in other groups of people and trust in the other two 
categories of values, respectively, with both types of trust having a 7% lower 
probability of trusting co-operatives a little and a 14% higher probability of 
completely trusting co-operatives. 
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Summary 
According to the line of reasoning in La Porta et al. (2002), who argue that strong 
family ties are bad for the development of firms based on their findings of 20 large 
firms, where the coefficient of trust in people is higher than the coefficient of trust in 
family, our findings in Table 7.7, which, in general, indicate that the estimated 
coefficient of trust in family is higher than the estimated coefficients of trust in any 
of the three groups of people in the 'stranger' category, would suggest that trust in 
the family is good for building trust in co-operatives. By encouraging family 
businesses or businesses among people who trust each other highly to be fonned as 
co-operatives, members might be induced to identify strongly with their co-operative 
and, therefore, enhance trust in the co-operative. 
7.4.3 Empirical Analysis of Willingness to Invest in a Co-operative Business 
and Trust in Co-operatives 
Based on the findings in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 above, it is interesting to explore 
the relationship between co-operators' trust in co-operatives and the degree of 
entrepreneurial spirit of co-operators in tenns of their willingness to make a 
financial commitment. Davis (1999) argues that it is the absence of a substantial 
degree of entrepreneurial spirit in a co-operative group that makes it difficult for co-
operatives to raise adequate capital. The absence of entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial 
spirit in a co-operative can be reflected in the tendency of the co-operative members 
to keep their contribution to the co-operative's capital to the minimum [de Drimer, 
1997], which makes it necessary for a co-operative to have a large number of 
members for the co-operative to be able to acquire adequate capital. 
In the survey, in Question 31, we include a hypothetical business opportunity on a. 
co-operative basis, where we asked co-operators to indicate their willingness to 
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financially commit towards the start-up capital of a business opportunity to be run 
co-operatively with a group of people, whom they are familiar with (i.e. not 
strangers), with possible responses: not willing to contribute yet; willing to 
contribute the minimum 5% required; or willing to contribute the maximum 15% 
allowed. There are two shortcomings to this question, which with hindsight we 
would have included: firstly, we did not indicate the amount of capital required; and 
secondly, the size of the group in question. We stated a minimum of a 5% financial 
commitment because if we state only 'minimum', it may be taken as a minimum 
contribution as in the contribution to the share capital of co-operatives.84 We also 
stated a maximum of 15% of financial commitment so as not to exceed the 
restriction on shareholding in a co-operative in Malaysia.85 61.3% responded that 
they would wait and see, which we take to mean 'no' in the first instance. Only 
27.4% responded that they are willing to contribute the minimum amount required 
(i.e. 5%) and 11.3% would contribute the maximum allowed (i.e. 15%). 
It is reasonable to expect that co-operators who expressed Willingness to commit 
more in terms of a monetary contribution towards a co-operatively planned 
economic activity would be more likely to have higher levels of trust in co-
operatives. In this case, the responses to Question 31 above may be a determinant of 
the co-operator's trust in the co-operative. Therefore, w~ use the same model as in 
Section 7.4.1 to analyse the relationship between the co-operator's willingness to 
make the financial commitment and the co-operator's trust in the co-operative. We, 
however, extend the model to include the responses to Question 31 as additional 
explanatory variables. 
84 In general, the minimum contribution of a member to the share capital of the co-operative in 
Malaysia is the minimum share required to be a member of the co-operative and for the member to 
exercise hislher membership rights. 
85 Section 33 of the Co-operative Act 1993 states that "no member, other than a registered society, 
shall hold more than one-fifth ofthe share capital of any registered society". 
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The Results 
Table 7.8 presents the ordered probit results of the determinants of co-operators' 
trust in co-operatives with the additional explanatory variables. Based on the results 
of the main model in Table 7.l, it is apparent from Table 7.8, that the estimated 
coefficients on the secondary co-operative dummy variable and the consumer co-
operative dummy variable have become negative and statistically significant. The 
estimated coefficients for the dummy variables representing co-operatives in 
transport, services and small/cottage industry remain negative and statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient representing willingness to financially commit 
the maximum amount allowed for a business is positive and statistically significant. 
The marginal effects for the statistically significant variables are presented in Table 
7.9. 
Relative to co-operators from co-operatives that are not members of a secondary co-
operative, there is a 7% higher probability of co-operators from co-operatives that 
are secondary co-operative members to neither trust nor distrust the co-operative, a 
10% higher probability to trust the co-operative a little and a 19% lower probability 
to completely trust the co-operative. Based on the discussion of secondary co-
operatives in Chapter 4, it seems reasonable to predict that it is less likely that 
membership in a secondary co-operative would have a positive influence on a co-
operator's trust in the co-operative institution, especially where the secondary co-
operatives do not seem to play the role of supporting, strengthening and promoting 
the primary cooperatives as suggested by the analysis of the relationship between 
primary and secondary co-operatives in Chapter 6. 
The decreasing pattern of probabilities for the consumer co-operatives is similar to 
that for the transport, services and small/cottage industry co-operatives discussed in 
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Section 7.4.1. There is a 12% higher probability of co-operators in consumer co-
operatives having 'a little trust' in the co-operative and a 30% lower probability of 
completely trusting the co-operative. This result for consumer co-operatives ties in 
with our expectations as co-operatives that run consumer activities in Malaysia, in 
general, are those that operate mini markets and provision stores at the site of an 
organisation where the members are the employees. Unlike consumer co-operatives 
in the UK and in Japan, for example, which are also involved in other social 
activities such as promoting a healthy way of life and environmental issues, this is 
not the case with consumer co-operatives in Malaysia. Hence, it would be less 
likely that members of consumer co-operatives would have complete trust in co-
operatives, where the co-operative is simply a convenience store. One might also 
predict that these consumer co-operatives would provide only a limited range of 
goods that probably not all members would need. 
Co-operators, who expressed willingness to contribute the full amount allowed for 
the business, have a 8% lower probability of neither trusting nor distrusting co-
operatives, a 17% lower probability of trusting co-operatives a little and a 27% 
higher probability of having complete trust in co-operatives relative to co-operators, 
who are not willing to make any financial contribution. This finding accords with 
our expectations that co-operators, who indicate willingness to commit the 
maximum amount would be those, who have a high level of trust in co-operatives, 
because arguably, only those who have high levels of trust in co-operatives would be 
willing to commit the maximum amount of financial capital for a business activity to 
be run co-operatively by a group of people they are familiar with. 
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Summary 
The findings pertaining to the co-operator's willingness to commit financially 
towards a collective business reveal the side of the co-operator as a 'business co-
operator' (Ole Borgen, 2001). The findings suggest that there exist among the co-
operators, individuals who have entrepreneurial spirit, whose trust in co-operatives 
makes them willing to venture into a business with a group of 'familiar faces' on a 
co-operative basis. It also suggests that co-operatives have been accepted as an 
alternative way to start a business with a small group of people comprising people 
who know each other, which could be due to the awareness among co-operators that 
there are opportunities for support from the DCD, especially in terms of financial 
support from the funds managed by the DCD as discussed in Chapter 4. 
7.4.4. Comparing the General Level of and Pattern of Trust of Co-operators 
with a General Sample of Individuals 
In this section, we compare the trust patterns of our sample of co-operators with that 
of a more general sample of individuals in Malaysia in order to consider the 
possibility of generalising the findings as policy implications, since the progress of 
the co-operative movement in Malaysia would also have to take into account 
potential co-operators among the general Malaysian population. 
The measures of the co-operators' trust in family members, trust in friends and trust 
in strangers provides another perspective for analysing the general level of trust 
among the co-operators. As has been discussed in Section 7.3.2, most of the 
empirical literature that measures the general level of trust of a society or people of a 
country focuses on responses to the GSS trust question: "Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people?" With our sample of co-operators, only 11.3% responded that most 
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people can be trusted, 88.7% responded that they cannot be too careful in dealing 
with people, indicating an astonishingly low level of trust among co-operators in 
Malaysia. The high levels of general trust in the US and in Japan, as noted in 
Buchan et al. (2002), are measured at 35.8% in the US in 1999 and 43.1 % in Japan 
in 2000.86 Singapore, Malaysia's nearest neighbour, also demonstrates high levels 
of general trust with 43.1 % indicating that most people can be trusted. 
As there is no available data on trust for Malaysia to compare the general level of 
and pattern of trust among co-operators with,87 we conducted a short electronic 
survey (see Appendix A 7.3) based on some of the trust questions from the co-
operative survey and sent them via electronic mail to a sample of individuals in 
Malaysia. It should be acknowledged that this is one of the weaknesses of our 
survey: it is based on a biased sample of individuals with access to computers. In 
addition, according to Selwyn and Robson (1998), the validity of the e-mail 
questionnaire is compromised by means of the automatic inclusion of respondents' 
e-mail addresses in their reply. But this e-mail survey does provide some 
background information to enable a comparison of the trust questions in the co-
operative survey. We exclude the question related to the level of trust in co-
operatives. We sent the e-mail trust questionnaire to 1167 e-mail addresses derived 
from a search on the internet. The e-mail questionnaire was sent in 5 stages over the 
period from 25th October 2005 till 10th November 2005. The e-mail addresses were 
randomly selected from organisations of the public and private sector and non-
governmental organisations (NGO's). We did not fix a time frame for the 
respondents to respond to the questionnaire. The responses came in from the 
16 Data analysed online from the World Value Survey Website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/ 
services/i ndex. htm I 
17 The organization of the World Value Survey (WVS) conducted the ass on 80 countries. Malaysia 
is not in the list of countries surveyed by the WVS. 
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following day onwards (i.e. 26th October 2005) and the last one was received on 18th 
December 2005. We achieved a 14.2% response rate (i.e. 166 responses). 
The responses to the GSS trust question indicate a lower general level of trust 
among the general sample of individuals relative to the sample of co-operators. 9% 
of the sample of individuals responded that most people can be trusted (11.3% in the 
sample of co-operators), whilst 91% responded that they cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people. The summary statistics of the various measures of trust for our 
general sample of individuals are presented in Table 7.10. Except for trust in family 
members, there is not much difference in the pattern of trust for trust in the other 
groups of people (i.e. trust in friends and trust in strangers) and for trust in values 
between the sample of individuals (in Table 7.1 0) and the sample of co-operators (in 
Table 7.5). The mean value for trust in family members (3.42) is much higher in our 
general sample of individuals than in our sample of co-operators (2.92). There is, 
however, not much difference in the means for the level of trust for the categories of 
trust in values, i.e. trust that, in general, people will be honest, trust that, in general, 
people will not take advantage, and trust that, in general, people will put the interest 
of others first. 
There are additional questions pertaining to trust in the questionnaire survey to co-
operators and in the electronic survey, which we can use to further compare the 
pattern of trust among our sample of co-operators with the more general sample of 
individuals in Malaysia. These questions asked about trust in lending money to their 
family members and to their friends. 88 68.8% of the co-operators (see Table 7.11) 
indicate that they trust a little or trust completely when lending money to their 
8. We did not ask the respondents whether they would lend money to strangers as Hart (1988) noted 
that loans were never made to strangers; borrowers often invoke friendship as a way of soliciting a 
loan. We are of the opinion that only banks will give loans to strangers. 
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family members. With respect to lending their money to friends, 42.5% responded 
that they trust their friends a little but none of the respondents trust their friends 
completely when it comes to lending their money to them. The mean for trust in 
lending to family members (2.75) is higher than the mean for trust in lending to 
friends (2.03), which indicates higher trust in family members relative to trust in 
friends. Our general sample of individuals also indicates higher trust in their family 
members relative to trust in their friends as indicated by the higher mean (3.33) in 
trust in lending to family members as compared to the mean (2.24) in trust in 
lending to friends (see Table 7.11). 
We have discussed in Section 7.3.2 that, according to Portes (1998), what really 
motivates those to make resources available to a person normally comes with the 
expectation that they will be repaid in the future. We explore the possibility that 
trust in lending to family members and to friends is related to the trust of the co-
operators that these groups of people would repay them the money. Questions 23 
and 24 in the co-operators survey asked the co-operators to indicate their levels of 
trust that family members and friends would pay them back their money. 68.9% 
responded that they trust (i.e. trust a little or trust completely) that their family 
members will repay the money lent to them, while 43.4% responded that they trust 
(Le. trust a little or trust completely) their friends would repay them (see Table 
7.11). With respect to getting their money repaid, the general sample of individuals 
also trusts their family members more. The mean (3.14) trust that family members 
will repay the money is higher than the mean (2.51) trust that friends will repay 
them the money. 
With respect to willingness to invest in a business opportunity, 44.0% of our general 
sample of individuals indicate that they would wait and see (61.3% in the co-
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operative sample), 43.4% indicate that they are willing to contribute the 5% 
minimum amount required (27.4% in the co-operative sample) and 12.7% indicate 
that they would contribute the 15% maximum allowed (11.3% in our co-operative 
sample). Thus, the general sample of individuals indicates more willingness to 
venture into the risky business world. Although the percentage of individuals in the 
sample that indicate willingness to commit the minimum is large relative to the 
sample of co-operators, the 0.6867 mean for the sample of individuals with a 
standard deviation of 0.6863 indicates not much difference from the mean for the 
sample of co-operators (0.5). 
A possible explanation for the lower levels of trust in the sample of co-operators 
relative to the general sample of individuals, as indicated in their responses 
presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.10 respectively, could be because our general sample 
of individuals consists of more young individuals. 39.8% of the respondents in the 
general sample of individuals are under 30 years old as compared to only 7.5% in 
our sample of co-operators. 29.5% of the respondents in the former are over 40 
years old while in the latter, it is 75.4%. Alesina and la Ferrara (2002) argue that at 
the individual level, trust is lower for people who are older. 
Summary 
The analysis suggests that there is not much difference in the level of general trust 
between both the samples, thus allowing the possibility of general ising the findings 
on the level of and pattern of trust of co-operators for policy implications to aid the 
progress of the Malaysian co-operative movement. The responses to the trust 
questions discussed so far provide an insight into the general level of trust and the 
pattern of trust among the Malaysian co-operators. In general, the level of trust 
among co-operators appears to be low, with co-operators indicating high levels of 
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trust in family members and a low level of trust in strangers. However, from the 
discussion of co-operatives in Malaysia in Chapter 4, it appears that co-operatives in 
Malaysia comprise largely of groups of individuals who do not belong to high trust 
social structures, i.e. family members and friends. As a form of financial group, 
membership of co-operative groups should be conditioned on trust (Haddad and 
Maluccio, 2003), which would mean co-operatives being formed among people 
from high trust social structures to help overcome problems of adequate capital 
acquisition, which co-operatives face in general, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
7.5. Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented empirical analysis of the determinants of 
Malaysian co-operators' trust in co-operatives and analysis of the general level of 
and the pattern of trust among co-operators using a wide variety of measures of trust 
and trust in values. Trust in co-operatives is arguably generated by members' strong 
identification with the co-operative (Ole Borgen, 2001), which should be the case 
with co-operatives, in which the members' business is related to the co-operative 
activity. The high level of trust in co-operatives among the Malaysian co-operators, 
however, does not seem to reflect co-operators' strong identification with their co-
operative. Not even co-operators in co-operatives such as the transport co-
operatives or the small/cottage industry co-operatives, whose members are 
supposed, to some extent, to be engaged in activity reflected by their co-operatives, 
indicate high levels of trust in the co-operative. A high level of trust in the co-
operative is only indicated by co-operators from co-operatives that experienced an 
increase in the co-operatives' members as a result of the co-operative membership in 
secondary co-operatives. 
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The Malaysian co-operators' level of trust in co-operatives is higher than their levels 
of trust in family members. The high levels of co-operators' trust in co-operatives 
are not related to high levels of trust in values that people have, except with trust that 
people will not take advantage, which suggests that it may be the values upheld by 
co-operatives that make them trustworthy (Spear, 2000). In the analysis of the 
relationship between co-operators' trust in co-operatives and trust in the various 
groups of people, the estimated coefficient of trust in the family is higher than the 
estimated coefficients of trust in the other groups of people, which according to the 
line of reasoning in La Porta et al. (2002) would suggest that trust in family is good 
for building trust in co-operatives. The high level of trust in co-operatives is also 
related to co-operators indicating willingness to make capital resources available 
towards a hypothetical business opportunity scenario with people they are familiar 
with on a co-operative basis. As people whom one is familiar with would normally 
belong to family members and friends, allowing co-operatives to be formed among 
people who trust each other highly may help to overcome the general problems 
faced by co-operatives as an economic group, i.e. the problem of inadequate capital. 
Thus allowing co-operatives to be formed among people from high trust social 
structures may be used to enhance high levels of trust in co-operatives. Allowing 
co-operatives to be formed among people who trust each other highly relates to the 
population as a whole, as our data suggest that the general level of and pattern of 
trust among the Malaysian co-operators reflects the general level of and pattern of 
trust among the general Malaysian population. 
The findings related to the absence of members' identification with the co-operative 
could be the consequence of large membership size (Ole Borgen, 2001). 
Membership of co-operatives in Malaysia tends to be large not only because co-
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operatives have grown in size, but also because it has been large from when the co-
operatives were formed (Le. at least 100 members). If we compare the structural 
changes in co-operatives worldwide towards reducing the number of members for 
the formation of co-operatives to a minimum of three members (de Drimer, 1997), it 
is obvious that the 100 members required to form a co-operative in Malaysia is 
relatively high. Arguably, the large number required to form a co-operative will 
induce the formation of co-operatives among individuals with no common activity 
because it is difficult to group together many people within in a particular region, 
who are engaged in the same business or economic activity. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the number of members will affect trust in co-operatives, 
which will be analysed in the next chapter (i.e. Chapter 8). 
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Appendix A 7.1: Results Tables 
Table 7.1: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust In Co-operatives 
Explanatory Variable 
Homogeneous occupation of members 
Single-raced 
Regional operation 
Regionally distributed members 
Membership in secondary co-op 
Main Area of Activity. 
- Consumerism 
- Transportation 
- Construction 
- Plantation 
- Housing 
- Services 
- Small/cottage industry 
Age of respondent: 
- between 31 and 40 years old 
- between 41 and 50 years old 
- over 50 years old 
Cut Off Point 1 
Cut Off Point 2 
Cut Off Point 3 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared (15) 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
. 
Notes: i) Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Coefficient 
-0.0938 
0.2435 
. 
0.9328 
-
-1.1800 
-0.3648 
-.0.6292 
-
-0.9349 
0.1207 
-0.5518 
-0.7667 
-
-0.9380 
-
-1.4053 
-0.0657 
-0.0862 
0.0835 
-3.0033 
-2.0815 
-1.1584 
Ii) Omitted AGE category: aged less than 30 years 
iii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
T-statistic 
-0.32 
0.81 
1.70 
-1.95 
-1.36 
-1.48 
-2.07 
0.17 
-0.99 
-1.52 
-2.14 
-2.54 
-0.13 
-0.18 
0.18 
0.6628 
0.6091 
0.5907 
106 
20.74 
-95.6860 
0.0978 
iv) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-statistics 
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Table 7.2: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients in 
Table 7.1 
Dependent Variable =Trust in Co-op 
Do not trust Neither 
very much trust nor 
Explanatory Variables distrust 
(1) (2) 
ME ME 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Regional operation -0.0629 -0.1601 
(-0.97) (-1.53) 
Regionally distributed 0.0281 -0.1218 
members (1.45) (2.44) 
Transport 0.0738 0.1683 
. 
(1.09) (1.81) 
Services . 0.0753 0.1696 
(1.14) (1.83) 
Small/cottage industry --0.1866 0.2518 
(1.22) (2.68) 
. 
Notes: _ Statistically significant at the 10% level 
__ Statistically significant at the 5% level 
Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Trust a little 
(3) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
-
-0.1348 
(-2.42) 
-0.2211 
(2.24) 
--0.1178 
(2.99) 
--0.1160 
(3.02) 
0.0604 
(0.73) 
Trust 
completely 
(4) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
. 
0.3577 
(1.79) 
--
-0.3711 
(-2.59) 
-
-0.3598 
(-2.23) 
-
-0.3609 
(-2.30) 
--
-0.4988 
(-3.52) 
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Table 7.3: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operatives ContrOlling 
for Benefits from Membership in Secondary Co-operatives 
Explanatory Variable 
Homogeneous occupation of members 
Single-raced 
Regional operation 
Regionally distributed members 
Membership in secondary co-op 
Main Area of Activity. 
- Consumerism 
- Transportation 
- Construction 
- Plantation 
- Housing 
- Services 
- Small/cottage industry 
Age of respondent: 
- between 31 and 40 years old 
- between 41 and 50 years old 
- over 50 years old 
Benefit from membership in secondary co-op: 
Co-op uses the services provided 
Secondary co-op supplied co-op needs 
Co-op received dividend or rebate 
Co-op income increased 
Co-op product/services improved 
Co-op members increased 
Cut Off Point 1 
Cut Off Point 2 
Cut Off Point 3 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared (21) 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
ii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
Coefficient 
-0.0182 
0.1297 
-1.2147 
-
-1.5347 
-0.5168 
-0.4201 
-0.6270 
-0.2169 
-0.7144 
-0.7022 
-
-0.9521 
-
-1.2435 
-0.4311 
-0.2916 
-0.1881 
0.0251 
0.0709 
0.6377 
. 
-0.9320 
-0.1420 
. 
0.9180 
-3.3478 
-2.3725 
-1.4107 
iii) Omitted AGE category: aged less than 30 years 
T-statistic 
-0.06 
0.39 
2.10 
-2.37 
-1.29 
-0.94 
-1.30 
-0.27 
-1.25 
-1.36 
-2.12 
-2.14 
-0.79 
-0.58 
-0.37 
0.05 
0.17 
1.49 
-1.89 
-0.28 
1.92 
0.7097 
0.6462 
0.6258 
106 
28.18 
-91.9628 
0.1329 
iv) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-statistics 
256 
Chapter 7 An Empirical Analysis ofthe Determinants of the Level of Trust among Malaysian Co-operators 
Table 7.4: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients in Table 7.3 
Dependent Variable =Trust in Co-op 
Do not trust 
very much 
Explanatory Variables 
(1 ) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
Regional operation -0.813 
(-1.04) 
Regionally distributed 0.0272 
members (1.39) 
Services 0.0638 
(1.08) 
Small/cottage industry 0.1246 
(0.99) 
Co-op income increased 0.0488 
(1.02) 
Co-op members increased -0.0200 
(-1.30) 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
.. Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Neither Trust a little 
trust nor 
distrust 
(2) (3) 
ME ME 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
-0.2130 
. 
-0.1619 
... 
(-1.88) (-3.23) 
0.1389- 0.2765 -
(2.83) (3.11 ) 
0.1740 
. 
0.1282 -
(1.76) (3.08) 
.. 
0.2382 0.0943 
(2.05) (1.39) 
-0.1567 0.1504 
(1.62) (2.46) 
-0.1031 
.. 
-0.1853 
.. 
(-2.08) (-2.01) 
Trust 
completely 
(4) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
.. 
0.4562 
(2.35) 
-
-0.4426 
(-3.58) 
.. 
-0.3659 
(-2.29) 
-
-0.4572 
(-2.66) 
-0.3559 .. 
(-1.95) 
.. 
0.3084 
(2.24) 
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Table 7.5: Summary Statistics of Co-operators' Levels of Trust in Various 
Groups of People and Trust in Values 
Level of Trust· 
0 1 2 3 4 
1. Trust in various 
groups of people: 
- Trust in family 1 9 16 51 29 
(0.9) (8.5) (15.1 ) (48.1) (27.4) 
- Trust in friends 0 17 31 57 1 
(.0) (16.0) (29.3) (53.8) (0.9) 
- Trust in fellow 
nationals/strangers: 
i. people from the 6 17 45 37 1 
same district (5.7) (16.0) (42.5) (34.9) (0.9) 
ii. people from the 7 19 46 33 1 
same state (6.6) (17.9) (43.4) (31.1 ) (0.9) 
iii. people from the 8 21 53 24 0 
same country (7.6) (19.8) (50.0) (22.6) (.O) 
2. Trust in Values: 
- trust that people 2 21 27 55 1 
will be honest (1.9) (19.8) (25.5) (51.9) (0.9) 
- trust that people 0 17 24 58 7 
would not take (.0) (16.0) (22.6) (54.7) (6.6) 
advantage 
- trust that people 13 35 26 31 1 
would put the (12.3) (33.0) (24.5) (29.3) (0.9) 
interests of others 
first 
Notes: i)· 0= do not trust at all, 1= do not trust very much, 2= neither 
trust nor distrust, 3= trust a little, 4= trust completely. 
ii) Figures in parentheses denote percentages. 
iii) Number of observations = 106 
Mean 
2.9245 
2.3962 
2.1887 
2.0189 
1.8774 
2.3019 
2.5189 
1.7358 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.9227 
0.7644 
0.9167 
0.8942 
0.8474 
0.8638 
0.8421 
1.0447 
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Table 7.6: Correlation Matrix between the Different Types of Trust from the Sample of Co-operators 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Trust in co-op 1.000 
(2) Trust in family 0.3779 1.000 
(3) Trust in friends 0.1358 0.3804 1.000 
(4) Trust in people from the 0.1839 0.1616 0.3408 1.000 
same district 
(5) Trust in people from the 0.0547 0.1518 0.5045 0.7250 1.000 
same state 
(6) Trust in countrymen 0.0648 0.0489 0.3698 0.5913 0.7571 1.000 
(7) Trust that people will be 0.2070 0.3156 0.3796 0.3888 0.3994 0.4024 1.000 
honest 
(8) Trust that people will not 0.3390 0.3941 0.4173 0.4610 0.3916 0.2635 0.5682 1.000 
take advantage 
(9) Trust that people will put 0.0357 -0.0209 0.1681 0.2972 0.3214 0.3288 0.3108 0.3521 1.000 
the interests of others 
first 
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Table 7.7: Trust in Various Groups of People and Trust in Values as the 
Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operative 
Explanatory Variable 
Trust in family 
Trust in friends 
Trust in people from the same 
district 
Trust in people from the same 
state 
Trust in countrymen 
Trust that people will be honest 
Trust that people will not take 
advantage 
Trust that people will put the 
interest of others first 
Cut Off Point 1 
Cut Off Point 2 
Cut Off Point 3 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Categories of Trust in Co-
operative 
Do not trust very much 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Trust a little 
Trust completely 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Coefficient 
(T-statistic) 
0.4556'-
(3.17) 
0.0429 
(0.23) 
0.3180 
(1.56) 
-0.3152 
(-1.24) 
0.0743 
(0.34) 
-0.6226 
(0.5039) 
0.4284 
(0.4984) 
1.3481 
(0.5083) 
106 
16.32 
-97.8919 
0.0770 
Coefficient 
( T-statistic) 
0.3733-
(2.44) 
-0.0293 
(-0.15) 
0.2194 
(1.04) 
-0.3298 
(-1.29) 
0.1129 
(0.50) 
0.0016 
(0.01) 
0.3569" 
(1.85) 
-0.0681 
(-0.51) 
-0.4909 
(0.5245) 
0.6089 
(0.5214) 
1.5525 
(0.5341) 
106 
20.53 
-95.7888 
0.0968 
Coefficient 
( T-statistic) 
0.0558 
(0.32) 
0.4803-
(2.74) 
-0.1361 
(-1.08) 
-1.0030 
(0.4189) 
-0.0477 
(0.3884) 
0.8331 
(0.3983) 
106 
12.02 
-100.0449 
0.0567 
Marginal Effects for Specification 2 
Trust in family Trust that people will not 
(t-statistic) take advantage 
-0.0105 (-1.31) 
-0.0617- (-2.11) 
-0.0718- (-2.14) 
0.1440- (2.43) 
(t-statistic) 
0.0100 (-1.18) 
-0.0590' (-1.72) 
-0.0686' (-1.71) 
0.1377"(1.85) 
Notes: i)' Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
ii) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-statistics. 
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Table 7.8: Determinants of Co-operators' Trust in Co-operatives Controlling 
for Willingness to make Financial Commitments 
Explanatory Variable 
Homogeneous occupation of members 
Single-raced 
Regional operation 
Regionally distributed members 
Membership in secondary co-op 
Main Area of Activity: 
- Consumerism 
- Transportation 
- Construction 
- Plantation 
- Housing 
- Services 
- Small/cottage industry 
Age of respondent: 
- between 31 and 40 years old 
- between 41 and 50 years old 
- over 50 years old 
Respondent's willingness to invest: 
- the minimum amount required 
- the maximum amount allowed 
Cut Off Point 1 
Cut Off Point 2 
Cut Off Point 3 
Number of Observations 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared (17) 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R Squared 
Notes: i) • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
ii) Omitted main area of activity: credit. 
Coefficient 
-0.0333 
0.2003 
0.8727 
-0.9409 
-0.500t 
-0.7808" 
-0.9339" 
0.3036 
-0.5669 
-0.6472 
-0.9737" 
-1.4675"-
-0.0432 
-0.2296 
-0.0476 
0.1148 
0.8735" 
-3.0582 
-2.1081 
-1.1598 
iii) Omitted AGE category: aged less than 30 years 
T-statistic 
-0.11 
0.66 
1.58 
-1.52 
-1.80 
-1.78 
-2.05 
0.41 
-1.01 
-1.27 
-2.20 
-2.60 
-0.08 
-0.47 
-0.10 
0.40 
1.75 
0.6707 
0.6145 
0.5948 
106 
24.47 
-93.8208 
0.1153 
iv) Omitted category for willingness to invest: will not commit 
v) For the cut-off points', standard errors are shown, rather than t-
statistics 
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Table 7.9: Marginal Effects for the Statistically Significant Coefficients in Table 7.8 
Dependent Variable =Trust in Co-op 
Do not trust Neither 
very much trust nor 
Explanatory Variables distrust 
(1 ) (2) 
ME ME 
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Membership in secondary 0.0167 · 0.0702 
co-op (1.24) (1.70) 
Consumer 0.0469 0.1363 
(0.99) (1.53) 
Transport 0.0663 0.1688 · 
(1.05) (1.76) 
Services 0.0725 · 0.1775 
(1.13) (1.86) 
Small/cottage industry 0.1881 0.2667 -
(1.21) (2.75) 
Respondent's willingness -0.0152 -0.0834 -
to invest: the maximum ( -1.40) (-2.36) 
amount allowed 
Notes: • Statistically significant at the 10% level 
- Statistically significant at the 5% level 
- Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
Trust a little 
(3) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
. 
0.0995 
(1.74) 
-0.1195 
(2.39) 
-0.1243 
(2.98) 
-0.1236 
(3.08) 
0.0600 
(0.66) 
-
-0.1748 
(-1.93) 
Trust 
completely 
(4) 
ME 
(t-statistic) 
. 
-0.1863 
(-1.85) 
. 
-0.3028 
(-1.85) 
-
-0.3595 
(-2.20) 
-
-0.3736 
(-2.38) 
-0.5148 -
(-3.76) 
0.2734 -
(2.31 ) 
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Table 7.10: Summary Statistics of Trust in Various Groups of People and 
Trust in Values (Sample = Respondents from E-mail Survey) 
Level of Trust* 
0 1 2 3 4 Mean 
1. Trust in various 
groups of people: 
- Trust in family 0 8 16 41 101 3.4157 
(.0) (4.8) (9.6) (24.7) (60.8) 
- Trust in friends 0 30 32 84 19 2.5576 
(.0) (18.2) (19.4) (50.9) (11.5) 
- Trust in fellow 
nationals/strangers: 
i. people from the 5 30 61 66 4 2.2048 
same district (3.01 ) (18.1 ) (36.8) (39.8) (2.4) 
ii. people from the 5 39 57 65 0 2.0964 
same state (3.01 ) (23.5) (34.3) (39.2) (.0) 
iii. people from the 6 39 69 50 2 2.0181 
same country (3.61) (23.5) (41.6) (30.1 ) (1.2) 
2. Trust in Values: 
- trust that people 2 37 41 76 10 2.3313 
will be honest (1.2) (22.3) (24.7) (45.7) (6.0) 
- trust that people 3 25 28 90 19 2.5879 
would not take (1.8) (15.2) (17.0) (54.6) (11.5) 
advantage 
- trust that people 21 41 41 58 5 1.9096 
would put the (12.7) (24.7) (24.7) (34.9) (3.0) 
interest of others 
first 
Notes: i) * 0= do not trust at all, 1 = do not trust very much, 2= neither trust 
nor distrust, 3= trust a little, 4= trust completely. 
ii) Figures in parentheses denote percentages. 
iii) Number of observations = 166 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.8539 
0.9196 
0.8705 
0.8615 
0.8562 
0.9302 
0.9434 
1.1055 
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Table 7.11: Summary Statistics of Trust in Lending between the Sample of Co-
operators and the Sample of Individuals from the E-mail Survey 
No. of Observations (%) 
Sample of General Sample of 
Co-oRerators Individuals 
Trust lending to family members: 
(0) do not trust at all 4 (3.8) 0(.0) 
(1) do not trust very much 11 (10.4) 8 (4.8) 
(2) neither trust nor distrust 18 (17.0) 13(7.8) 
(3) trust a little 47 (44.3) 62 (37.4) 
(4) trust completely 26 (24.5) 83 (50.0) 
Total 106 (100.0) 166 (100.0) 
Mean 2.7547 3.3253 
Standard Deviation 1.0584 0.8181 
Trust lending to friends: 
(0) do not trust at all 5 (4.7) 6 (3.6) 
(1) do not trust very much 32 (30.1) 46 (27.7) 
(2) neither trust nor distrust 24 (22.6) 25(15.1) 
(3) trust a little 45 (42.5) 80 (48.2) 
(4) trust completely 0(.0) 9 (5.4) 
Total 106 (100.0) 166 (100.0) 
Mean 2.0283 2.2410 
Standard Deviation 0.9607 1.0339 
Trust family members will repay: 
(0) do not trust at all 2 (1.9) 1 (0.6) 
(1) do not trust very much 15 (14.2) 17 (10.2) 
(2) neither trust nor distrust 16 (15.1) 12 (7.2) 
(3) trust a little 44 (41.5) 64 (38.6) 
(4) trust completely 29 (27.4) 72 (43.4) 
Total 106 (100.0) 166 (100.0) 
Mean 2.7830 3.1386 
Standard Deviation 1.0601 0.9780 
Trust friends will repay: 
(0) do not trust at all 3 (2.8) 5 (3.0) 
(1) do not trust very much 24 (22.6) 34 (20.5) 
(2) neither trust nor distrust 33(31.1) 19 (11.5) 
(3) trust a little 43 (40.6) 87 (52.4) 
(4) trust completely 3 (2.8) 21 (12.7) 
Total 106 (100.0) 166 (100.0) 
Mean 2.0283 2.5120 
Standard Deviation 0.9607 1.0487 
264 
Chapter 7 An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of the Level of Trust among Malaysian C<H>perators 
Appendix A 7.2: Summary of the vast literature exploring the determinants 
of trust 
Determinants Studies 
Age Trust is lower for people who are older (Alesina and la 
Ferrara, 2002). 
Homogeneity Trust is relatively less the more heterogeneous the 
community is, in terms of racial, ethnic or religious 
composition (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and la 
Ferrara, 2002). 
Gender Women, who belong to a group that has been discriminated 
against, are less trusting. 
Level of education Level and type of education received may influence trust. 
Low levels of education are associated with low trust (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). 
Income/Wealth Countries with very low levels of income inequality are 
countries with the highest levels of trust. Trust is higher in 
richer countries (La Porta et aI, 1997). 
Group membership Participation in social groups is positively correlated with 
trust (Putnam, 1993; Alesina and la Ferrara, 2000). Knack 
and Keefer (1997) found that membership in groups may not 
be associated with trust. 
Size of group Basis of identification is likely to change in large groups, 
affecting thus the building of trust (Ole Borgen, 2001). 
Ethnic origin/religious Religious belief may be important since different religions 
belief may have different attitudes towards social interaction 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
Familiarity/Social Unfamiliarity with the others may reduce trust (Ales ina and 
distance/ Knowledge of la Ferrara, 2002). People may trust more in family members 
counterpart or members of the same social, racial and ethnic group 
(Eckel and Wilson, 2004). 
Opportunities to engage People may trust others more with whom they have had a 
in incremental and longer interaction. Trust may increased by an expectation of 
repeated exchanges repeated transaction in the future (Ole Borgen, 2001; Alesina 
and la Ferrara, 2002). 
Past (traumatic) A recent history of traumatic experiences is associated with 
experience low trust. If an individual has been hurt in past interactions 
with others, he or she may trust less. One trusts others if 
he/she used to being treated fairly by others. If a group has 
been discriminated against, de jure or de facto, members of 
the group will not expect to be treated fairly in the future and 
therefore will trust less (Ales ina and la Ferrara, 2002). 
Values Shared norms and values are fundamental to build the 
required degree of trust (Ole Borgen, 2001). 
Legal institutions In a community where criminal behaviour is effectively 
prosecuted, individuals will trust more because they will feel 
more protected (Alesina and la Ferrara, 2002). 
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Appendix A 7.3: Translation of the e-mail introducing the survey and the 
attached e-mail questionnaire 
i) The e-mail 
Dear SirlMdm., 
Can you spare me a few minutes of your time? 
I am currently a research student at the University of Sheffield in England. As 
part of my research, I need to collect data on the level of and pattern of trust 
among Malaysians. I have prepared 10 simple questions that would not take 
more than 3 minutes of your time to respond. I attach herewith the questionnaire 
set. All you need to do is, to double-click on the answer of your choice and e-
mail the attachment back to me. 
I hope to get your response. I assure you that all information given will be used 
strictly for academic purposes. 
Your co-operation is very much appreciated. Thank you very much. 
-------------------------------------
Juliawati Janius 
Department of Economics 
The University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S 1 4DT 
United Kingdom 
Tel: 01142223343 
Fax: 01142223458 
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ii) The attached questionnaire 
A Survey on Trust of Malaysians 
To tick 0 click 2x on the box 0 
1. Generally speaking, can you trust: 
o O. Do not trust at all 
a. Your family members? o 1. Do not trust very much 
02. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
04. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
b. Your friends? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
04. Trust completek 
2. Do you trust the following people to 
lend them your money: 
o O. Do not trust at all 
a. Your family members? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
03. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
b. Your friends? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
03. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
3. Do you trust the following people to 
repay your money that you lend 
them? 
o O. Do not trust at all 
a. Your family members? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
b. Your friends? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
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4. Describe your level of trust in the 
following people: 
o O. Do not trust at all 
a. people from the same district? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
h. people from the same state? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
03. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
c. people from the same country? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
5. How often do you get help from: 
DO. Never 
a. individuals? o 1. Once a while 
02. Often 
DO. Never 
h. organisations/institutions (including o 1. Once a while 
government)? 02. Often 
6. You are interested in a business o O. will not contribute yet 
opportunity planned by a group of o 1. minimum 5% people you are familiar with. You are 02. the full 15% invited to join in by contributing 
between S to IS percent towards the 
start-up capital. You can afford it, 
but how much are you willing to 
contribute? 
7. Generally speaking, do you trust 
that: 
o O. Do not trust at all 
a. people will he honest? o 1. Do not trust very much 
02. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
04. Trust completely 
o O. Do not trust at all 
h. people would not take advantage? o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
o 3. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
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c. people would put the interests of 
others first? 
8. Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or 
that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
9. Your age? 
o O. Do not trust at all 
o 1. Do not trust very much 
o 2. Neither trust nor distrust 
03. Trust a little 
o 4. Trust completely 
o Most people can be trusted 
o Can't be too careful 
00. under 20 
o l. 21- 30 yeas old 
o 2. 31 - 40 years old 
03.41- 50 years old 
04. above 50 
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CO-OPERATIVE SIZE AND TRUST IN THE CO-OPERATIVE 
8.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 6, we analysed the relationship between primary and secondary co-
operatives in Malaysia, where the findings suggested that primary co-operatives that 
are members of secondary co-operatives are likely to be large in size in terms of the 
number of primary co-operative members. In addition, the empirical analysis in 
Chapter 7 suggested a negative, but statistically insignificant relationship, between 
membership in secondary co-operatives and the level of trust in the primary co-
operative. A related point, therefore, concerns the relationship between trust in the 
co-operative and co-operative size. It seems reasonable to predict that the level of 
trust in the co-operative may be low where co-operatives are of large size (Ole 
Borgen, 2001). 
Trust in the co-operative may be a consequence of the members' identification with 
the co-operative, which is likely to be achieved if the members' business is related 
to the activity of the co-operative (Ole Borgen, 2001). Therefore, one way to 
ascertain whether members identify with the co-operative is through the presence of 
trust in the co-operative. Where a co-operative movement has been noted as making 
a significant contribution to the economy, such as in the Western European 
countries, the co-operative movement has been represented by large secondary co-
operatives, whose effective functioning depends on the nature of the primary co-
operatives. As discussed in Chapter 6, the presence of co-operatives whose activity 
is related to members' business plays an important role in the effective functioning 
of secondary co-operatives that may lead to secondary co-operatives making a 
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significant economic contribution. Hence, the presence of primary co-operatives, 
whose activity reflects the business of members, may be related to the presence of 
trust in the co-operative. Trust in the co-operative may be regarded, therefore, as a 
proxy for having a co-operative, where the co-operative activity reflects the 
members' business. 
A related point concerns the legal requirement of having 100 members to form a 
primary co-operative in Malaysia. which is high relative to that in other countries, 
such as in Germany and Switzerland, where 7 members are required to form a co-
operative. If trust in the co-operative is inversely associated with co-operative size 
(Ole Borgen, 2001), it may be the case that institutional barriers in Malaysia are 
restricting the development of trust in co-operatives. As trust in the co-operative is 
supposed to be high in co-operatives, whose activity and members' business are 
related, restricting the formation of such co-operatives may restrict the level of trust 
in co-operatives. As pointed out in Chapter 7, the kind of co-operatives where the 
members' business and co-operative activity are related, are producer co-operatives, 
such as agricultural marketing co-operatives and worker co-operatives. The worker 
co-operatives, for example, are usually relatively small co-operatives in term of 
membership size (Enriquez, 1986). 
The 100 member requirement for forming a primary co-operative may have 
restricted the establishment of small producer primary co-operatives. The absence 
of this type of primary co-operative, which may influence the effective functioning 
of secondary co-operatives, may hinder the progress of the co-operative movement 
in Malaysia. Therefore, one possibility is to lower the size requirement to encourage 
smaller co-operatives to engender trust in co-operatives or indirectly, to encourage 
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co-operatives, where members' business is reflected in the activity of the co-
operative. 
In this chapter, we therefore analyse the relationship between trust in co-operatives 
and co-operative size in Malaysia to explore whether co-operative size affects the 
development of trust in the co-operative. Initially, in Section 8.2, we present a 
background discussion of the existing literature related to trust and the size of a co-
operative group. In Section 8.3, we present empirical analysis of the relationship 
between trust in the co-operative and co-operative size in Malaysia, where we use 3 
different models: the probit model; the ordered pro bit model; and the bivariate pro bit 
model. In Section 8.4, we analyse the relationship between trust in the co-operative 
and co-operative performance, where the measures of co-operative performance are: 
share capital; assets; income; and the profits of the co-operative. Finally, concluding 
comments are presented in Section 8.5. 
8.2. Trust in the co-operative and the size of a co-operative group 
Trust in co-operatives can be generated in co-operatives where the members' 
business is related to the activity of the co-operative. Such co-operatives are 
common among producer co-operatives, such as agricultural marketing co-
operatives and worker co-operatives. In general, there are two types of co-
operatives: the 'producer' co-operatives as stated above; and the 'consumer' co-
operatives, such as housing co-operatives, services co-operatives and credit unions. 
Zeuli et al. (2003) argue that 'consumer' co-operatives may play an important role in 
a local economy but they are not major engines of economic growth. In general, the 
'consumer' co-operatives have a larger membership relative to the 'producer' co-
operatives. Since trust in the co-operative is common in co-operatives, whose 
activity and the members' business are related and since this type of co-operative is 
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common in relatively small 'producer' co-operatives (Ole Borgen, 2001; Enriquez, 
1986), then trust in the co-operative appears to be associated with small co-operative 
size. 
There is no one fixed number for defining the membership size of primary co-
operatives as 'small' indicated in the literature. However, it has been argued that 
small co-operative groups at the primary level are important not only for the 
organisation and functioning of secondary co-operatives, but also for encouraging 
entrepreneurs into co-operatives (de Drimer, 1997). If primary co-operatives 
comprise entrepreneurs as members, it is likely that the members' businesses would 
be reflected in the activity of the co-operative and that members will ensure the 
survival of the co-operative as the members' living depends on the survival of the 
co-operative. Small co-operatives will develop alternative organisational strategies, 
such as integrating vertically to insulate themselves from competition, in this case 
by forming secondary co-operatives, to have joint production, goals and strategy 
with the purpose of enhancing the economic activity of members with respect to 
efficiency and effectiveness (Drimer, 1997; Schwarz, 1997; Ole Borgen, 2001). 
Thus, certain measures have been implemented in some countries in the West to 
ensure small membership size in co-operatives, for example in Spain (Romero and 
Perez, 2003) and in the US (Benham and Keefer, 1991), where membership in a co-
operative group is restricted to people who trust each other highly, such as family 
members and friends. To some extent, the small number required to form a primary 
co-operative in Germany and in Switzerland (Le. 7 members) can be seen as another 
way of encouraging people, who have personal relationships and who trust each 
other highly, to join together as entrepreneurs to form a co-operative. In addition, de 
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Drimer (1997) noted that in some legislatures the number has reduced to a minimum 
of five, four or even three members. 
As a form of a financial group, Van Bastelaer (2002) argues that the institutional 
design of group lending that admits only certain individuals into the group may be 
appropriate for cooperatives. Nevertheless, even with financial groups, the optimal 
group size is not apparent.89 For example, the Grameen Bank groups are set at 5 
individuals, a figure arrived at, through a process of trial and error (Ghatak and 
Guinnane, 1999). When Mosley and Dahal (1985, quoted in Ghatak and Guinnane, 
1999), who in the context of a Nepalanese program argue that the group size of a 
financial group should not be larger than twenty persons, Ghatak and Guinnane are 
of the opinion that "even 20 persons are very large by the standard of most (financial 
group) programs in existence today" (ibid. :217). 
In Malaysia, it is not only potentially problematic that 100 individuals are required 
to form a primary co-operative but also, as described in Chapter 4, co-operatives in 
Malaysia comprise largely the 'consumer' co-operatives such as credit unions, 
consumer co-operatives and services co-operatives, which, according to Zeuli et al. 
(2003), are not major engines of economic growth. Based on the comments related 
to the small size of co-operatives in, for example, Germany, it can be argued that the 
100 members requirement in Malaysia is relatively high, which may restrict the 
level of trust in co-operatives. In the following section, we analyse the relationship 
between co-operative size and trust in co-operatives in Malaysia. 
89 A small number of members is especiaJly preferred in financial groups, such as in the case of joint 
liability group lending, because the advantages of superior information and the ability to impose non-
financial sanctions are most likely to be diluted in large groups (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). 
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8.3. Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Trust in the Co-
operative and Co-operative Size 
In this section we present econometric analysis of the relationship between trust in 
the co-operative and co-operative size in Malaysia. We, firstly, specify trust in co-
operatives as the dependent variable and co-operative size as one of the explanatory 
variables in Section 8.3.1 to analyse the effect of co-operative size on trust in the co-
operative. Secondly, we specify co-operative size as the dependent variable and 
trust in co-operatives as one of the explanatory variables in Section 8.3.2 to analyse 
the effect of the level of trust in the co-operative on the different categories of co-
operative size. Thirdly, we specify both trust in co-operatives and co-operative size 
as the dependent variables in a two equation model in Section 8.3.3. In the first 
equation, trust in co-operatives is the dependent variable and, in the second 
equation, co-operative size is the dependent variable. 
8.3.1. The Effect olCo-operative Size on Trust in the Co-operative 
Ole Borgen (2001) argues that increasing the size of membership may complicate 
the building of trust in co-operatives. Therefore, it seems reasonable to predict that 
co-operative size in terms of membership is inversely associated with the level of 
trust in the co-operative: trust in the co-operative decreases as the size of the 
membership increases. Trust in co-operatives may be specified, therefore, as a 
function of the number of members of the primary co-operative. Hence, we specify 
the measure of co-operator's trust in co-operatives as the dependent variable. For 
simplicity, we collapse the 5 indexes of trust in co-operatives into a dummy variable 
(BITRUS1): 0 denotes do not trust; and 1 denotes trust. BITRUST equals 1 if the co-
operators' trust in the co-operative lies in the top two trust categories, i.e. trust a 
little (category 3) or trust completely (category 4) and equals 0 if it is in the lower 
three trust categories, i.e. do not trust at all (category 0), do not trust very much 
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(category 1) and neither trust nor distrust (category 2). Since the dependent variable 
(BITRUS1) is a dummy variable, we specify a probit model for the analysis of the 
effect of the number of members of a co-operative on the presence of trust in the co-
operative.9o 
The explanatory variable denoting co-operative size, i.e. the number of members, is 
an index, which comprises 5 categories: 0 if the co-operative has 100 members or 
less; 1 if the co-operative has 101 to 500 members; 2 if the co-operative has 501 to 
1000 members; 3 if the co-operative has 1001 to 1500 members; and 4 if the co-
operative has more than 1500 members. In addition, we control for other variables 
that may also affect the level of trust in co-operatives, as discussed in Chapter 7: the 
homogeneity in members' occupation (HOCCUP); the racial composition of the 
members (SRACE); the distribution of co-operative members (REGIOP); the co-
operative's area of operation (REGIMB); the main activity of the co-operative 
(MAINAC1); and membership in secondary co-operatives (SECOOP). The 
explanatory variables HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT and 
SECOOP are dummy variables, as defined in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1. 
We summarise the probit analysis of specifying trust as a function of co-operative 
size in terms of the number of members of the primary co-operative in Table 8.1 in 
Appendix A8.1. We only present the results for co-operative size: we do not present 
the results for the other explanatory variables as there is no difference with the 
results presented in Table 7.1 in Chapter 7, with respect to the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients: the estimated coefficients representing co-
operatives that operate on a regional scale, the transport, the services and the 
small/cottage industry co-operatives all remain negative and statistically significant. 
90 Using the index of trust as the dependent variable does not yield any difference in the estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
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It is apparent from Table 8.1 that the estimated coefficient for the number of 
members is negative and statistically significant.91 
The marginal effect for the number of members, which, calculated at -0.0525 and 
with a t-statistic of -2.20, is statistically significant at the 5% level. The marginal 
effects indicate that an increase by 1 % in the number of members decreases the 
probability of trusting the co-operative by 5%. The findings, which suggest an 
inverse relationship between co-operative size and trust in the co-operative, accord 
with Ole Borgen (2001), who argues that as co-operatives grow in membership size, 
this affects the building of trust in the co-operative. 
To ascertain which category of co-operative size has the largest effect on the 
presence of trust in the co-operative, we also regress BITRUST on a set of dummy 
variables (rather than an index) for co-operative size. The model is the same as the 
above pro bit model, except that we have replaced the index of co-operative size with 
dummy variables generated for the 5 categories of co-operative size: i) if the co-
operative has not more than 100 members; ii) if the co-operative has 101 to 500 
members; iii) if the co-operative has 501 to 1000 members; iv) 3 if the co-operative 
has 1001 to 1500 members; and v) if the co-operative has more than 1500 members; 
where the smallest size category is the omitted category. 
Again, we only present in Table 8.1, the results for the dummy variables denoting 
co-operative size. For the set of 5 dummy variables denoting co-operative size, the 
estimated coefficient for the dummy variable representing co-operatives with more 
than 1500 members is negative and statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficients for co-operatives that operate on a regional scale, the transport, the 
91 Regressing the index of trust in the co-operative on the membership index did not change the 
negative coefficient for membership (i.e. -0.0423). 
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services and the small/cottage industry co-operatives all remain negative and 
statistically significant. Co-operatives with more than 1500 members have a 62% 
lower probability of having trust in the co-operative relative to co-operatives with 
not more than 100 members. 
The findings above suggest that trust in the co-operative is associated with small co-
operative size, i.e. the findings support an inverse relationship between trust in the 
co-operative and membership. Therefore, to engender trust in co-operatives, it may 
be necessary to allow the formation of co-operatives with a small membership size. 
In the following section, we will further explore the relationship between the level of 
trust in co-operatives and the different categories of co-operative size in Malaysia. 
8.3.2. The Level a/Trust in Co-operatives and Different Categories a/Co-
operative Size 
It is apparent that our findings so far say nothing about the direction of causality. 
We can specify the dependent variable as the 5-point index of co-operative size. 
Since the membership index is an ordered variable, we adopt, therefore, an ordered 
probit model to analyse the relationship between level of trust in co-operatives and 
the different categories of co-operative size. We use the same explanatory variables 
as above: HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT and SECOOP, except 
that now we include the dummy variable trust in co-operatives (BITRUS1) in the set 
of explanatory variables in place of the number of members, which is now the 
dependent variable.92 
92 We have also regressed the membership index on the trust index and on a set of dummy variables 
for each value of the trust index. In the former, the estimated coefficient for trust in the co-operative 
remains negative. In the latter, the estimated coefficients for 'complete trust' and 'trust a little' in co-
operatives are also negative, whilst the estimated coefficient for 'neither trust nor distrust' co-
operatives is positive. 
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In Table 8.1, we summarise the ordered pro bit analysis of the relationship between 
the level of trust in the co-operative and the different categories of co-operative 
size.93 The estimated coefficients representing co-operatives with members 
distributed regionally, the transport, the construction, the plantation, the services and 
the small/cottage industry co-operatives all remain negative and statistically 
significant as in the model in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6. The estimated coefficient 
representing trust in the co-operative (BITRUST) is negative and statistically 
significant. 
The marginal effects relating to the ordered probit analysis of the effect of the level 
of trust in co-operatives on the 5 categories of co-operative size are presented in 
Table 8.1. There is a 28% higher probability of trusting the co-operative for co-
operatives with membership between 101 to 500 relative to co-operatives with less 
than 100 members and a 31 % lower probability of trusting the co-operative in co-
operatives with more than 1500 members relative to co-operatives with less than 100 
members. 
The results confirm that trust in co-operatives is likely to be associated with a lower 
membership size. It is difficult, however, to rationalise why trust in co-operatives 
may lower membership size as opposed to trust in the co-operative being lower in 
large co-operatives. From a statistical perspective, however, causality may operate 
in both directions. In the following section, we further explore the relationship 
between trust in the co-operative and co-operative size. 
9J In Table 8.1, we present only the results relating to trust in the co-operative and co-operative size 
for the various models analysed in this chapter, i.e. the probit model in Section 8.3.1, the ordered 
probit model in Section 8.3.2 and the bivariate probit model in Section 8.3.3. 
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8.3.3. Trust in the Co-operative and Membership Size: Bivariate Pro bit 
Analysis 
The bivariate pro bit analysis allows us to explore the relationship between trust in 
the co-operative and co-operative size allowing for a joint modelling approach. In 
this case, we model the joint outcome of trust in the co-operative and co-operative 
size. The bivariate probit model is an extension of the the probit model to allow for 
more than one equation, with correlated disturbances. A bivariate probit model will 
therefore estimate a pair of probit models. The general specification of the two-
equation model with the possibility of different sets of explanatory variables in each, 
is as follows: 94 
YI = 1 if Y; > 0, 0 otherwise 
Y2 = 1 if Y; > 0, 0 otherwise (9) 
where the dependent variables YI and Y2 are binary variables and XI and X2 are lists of 
variable names for the two regressor vectors. The two equations use the same 
explanatory variables as those in the pro bit models. The random error terms, Gl and 
G2 in the equations are assumed to be correlated. 
The benefit of a joint modelling approach is that, it indicates whether a bivariate 
probit model is more efficient than estimating two separate probit models. Bivariate 
probit estimation returns a correlation coefficient ('rho'), which is the correlation 
coefficient between the residuals of each of the two probit models. If rho is 
statistically significantly different from zero, then estimating the two probit models 
simultaneously is efficient. If rho is not statistically significantly different from 
zero, then there are no efficiency gains from joint estimation. 
9.4 The technical analysis in equation 9 is taken from Greene (1997). 
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As we have collapsed the 5 categories of trust in the co-operative into a dummy 
variable (BITRUST), we do the same for the 5 categories of membership size. We 
generate a dummy variable for membership size (BINUM): 0 denotes small size; and 
1 denotes large size co-operative. BINUM equals 1 if the co-operative is in the top 
three membership categories, i.e. 501 to 1000 members (category 2), 1001 to 1500 
members (category 3) and more than 1500 members (category 4). BINUM equals 0 
if membership size is in the lowerst two membership categories, i.e. less than 100 
members (category 1) and 101 to 500 members (category 2). 
The independent variables in the model are as follows: i) where the dependent 
variable is BITR UST, the independent variables are the explanatory variables in 
Table 7.1 in Chapter 7 (i.e. HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT, 
SECOOP and AGE) plus the dummy variable indicating a large co-operative in 
terms of membership (BINUM); ii) where BINUM is the dependent variable, the 
independent variables are the explanatory variables in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 (i.e. 
HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT and SECOOP) plus BITRUST. 
In addition, in the second equation we include the share capital and assets of co-
operatives as over-identifying instruments, i.e. variables, which are not in the trust 
equation that are likely to be associated with co-operative size but not with trust in 
the co-operative.95 
The estimated coefficient of co-operative size is negative and statistically significant 
(see Table 8.1), indicating that a large size co-operative in terms of the number of 
members decreases the likelihood of having trust in the co-operative. The 
correlation coefficient of the bivariate pro bit, which is the correlation coefficient 
95 This set of over-identifying instruments appears to be valid since if we include share capital and 
assets in the trust equation, the coefficients for share capital (0.1774 ) and assets (-0.0735 ) are 
insignificant, with a t-statistics of 1.10 and -0.33, respectively. 
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between the residuals of each of the pro bit models suggests that the joint modelling 
approach is an efficient way to model the relationship between co-operative size and 
trust in the co-operative. However, the very large t-statistic as indicated by the very 
low standard error means that the result should be interpreted with caution.96 
In the analysis of the relationship between trust in the co-operative and co-operative 
size presented in Section 8.3, the findings from all three modelling approaches 
support an inverse relationship between trust in the co-operative and co-operative 
size, suggesting robustness of this finding. Our findings, however, do not say 
anything about the direction of causality although we would predict that it runs from 
size to trust given the minimum size requirement of co-operatives in Malaysia. The 
legal requirement of having at least 100 members for forming a co-operative in 
Malaysia, which is high relative to that in other countries such as in Germany and in 
Switzerland, may be an institutional barrier, which has hindered the building of trust 
in co-operatives in Malaysia. 
8.4. Trust in the Co-operative and Co-operative Performance 
Trust has been used to measure the performance of organisations and institutions. 
For example, political scientists such as Putnam (1993) have explored how measures 
of trust influence government efficiency, whilst economists such as Knack and 
Keefer (1997) analyse how measures of trust influence economic growth. La Porta 
et al. (1997) analyse the effect of trust on the size of the largest 20 firms (by sales) in 
40 countries. Thus, in this section we analyse the effect of the level of trust in the 
co-operative on measures of co-operative financial performance (FPi) including: the 
96 We ran a separate probit regression of BITRUST on BINUM plus the other regressors (Le. 
HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT, SECOOP and AGE). The estimated coefficient 
of co-operative size was negative. 
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level of share capital, the level of assets, income and the profits of the co-operative. 
To be specific, we analyse the relationship between FPi and BITRUST as follows: 
(10) 
Where eJ"P denotes the random error term. We, firstly, specify two ordered probit 
models with share capital and assets of the co-operative as the dependent variables. 
The explanatory variables for both share capital and assets are the same variables as 
in the model presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.6 in Chapter 6, i.e. HOCCUP, SRACE, 
REGIOP, REGIMB, MAINACT and SECOOP. In addition, we control for the 
number of members of the co-operative (an index). 
There is a lack of information related to monetary measures of the performance of 
co-operatives in the co-operative survey. In the primary data collection as described 
in Chapter 5, we did not gather information on co-operative performance, such as 
income and profits, as we were concerned that if we had requested such information, 
the response rate may have been even lower. Instead, we have obtained income and 
profit data from a secondary source, i.e. from the DCD's database, the INFOKOP 
(see Appendix 8.2 for the data on the income and profits of the co-operatives in the 
sample for the financial year ending 31.12.2003, obtained from the INFOKOP). 
Out of the 106 co-operatives in the sample, we managed to gather income and profit 
data for 93 co-operatives. Hence, there are 13 missing values due to either the name 
of the co-operative not being indicated in the survey response to allow us to match 
in its income and profit data (5 co-operatives) or there is no income and profit data 
available for the co-operative in the DCD's database (8 co-operatives). The lowest 
income reported is RM460.00 and the highest is RM24.8 million, the mean for 
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income is RMl,611,459 .00 with standard deviation 3439741.97 Figure 8.1 below 
presents the distribution of income data.98 36.6% of the co-operatives have less than 
RM200,000.00 in income, 15.1 % have income between RM20 1,000.00 and 
RM400,000.00, 7.5% have income between RM401 ,000.00 and RM600,000.OO, 
6.5% have income between RM601,000.00 and RM800,000.OO, 5.4% have income 
between RM801,000.00 and RMI milion and 29.0% have more than RMl million in 
income.99 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of Income across the Co-operatives in the Sample 
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The profit data in Appendix 8.2 comprises data for both profit and losses. The 
accumulated losses range from RM61 0.00 to RM 1.6 million. lOo The lowest profit is 
RMl ,159.00 and the highest is RM5.4 million. 101 The mean profit is RMI97,560.80 
with standard deviation 900483.4. Figure 8.2 below presents the distribution of 
profit. 36 of the 93 co-operatives (40.9%) experience losses, 28.0% make less than 
RM I 00,000.00 in profits, 16.1 % make between RM 101,000.00 and RM200,000.OO 
in profits, 2.2% make between RM201,OOO.00 and RM500,000.00 in profits, 5.4% 
97 The income and profit figures are specified in the Malaysian Ringgit (RM), where the exchange 
rate in 2007 is £1 for approximately RM7: RM460.00 is equivalent to £66.00; RM24.8 million is 
equivalent to £3.5 million. 
98 I F· . 
n Igures 8.1 , 8.2 and 8.3 , we exclude the co-operattves with missing values. 99 
RM200,000.00 is equivalent to £28,500.00; RM400,000.00 is equivalent to £57,000.00; 
RM600,000.00 is equivalent to £86,000.00; RM800,000.00 is equivalent to £114,000.00; RMI 
million is equivalent to £0.14 million. 
:: RM610.00 is equivalent to £87.00; RM1.6 million is equivalent to £0.2 million. 
RM 1,159.00 is equivalent to £ 166.00; RM5.4 million is equivalent to £0 .8 million. 
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make between RM501 ,OOO.OO and RMI million in profit and 7.5% make over RMI 
million in profit. 102 
Figure 8.2: Distribution of Profit of the Co-operatives in the Sample 
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Figure 8.3 below presents a scatter plot of the income and profit data. It suggests 
that income and profit may not be related: a co-operative with a high income may 
not necessarily have high profits. The scatter plot also suggests that co-operatives 
that experience losses tend to have low income. 
Figure 8.3: Scatter Plot of the Relationship between Income 
and Profit for the Co-operatives in the Sample 
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102 RM500,000.00 is equivalent to £71,000.00. 
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With log(income) and log(profit) as dependent variables for the analysis of the 
relationship between trust in the co-operative and co-operative performance as in 
Equation 10 above, we conduct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis because 
income and profit are continuous variables. 103 The explanatory variables are the 
same as the explanatory variables for share capital and assets described above. 
In Table 8.2, we only present the estimated coefficient of BITRUST. 104 The analysis 
of the relationship between the level of trust in the co-operative and measures of co-
operative financial performance, i.e. the level of share capital, the level of assets, 
income and the profits of the co-operative yields estimated coefficients for the trust 
in the co-operative (BITRUS1) dummy variable, which are positive but statistically 
insignificant for share capital and the income of the co-operative. The estimated 
coefficients for BITRUST are negative and statistically insignificant for the assets 
and the profits of the co-operative. The overall regression results for the OLS 
estimations of BIRUST on the income and profit of the co-operative do not yield 
large F-statistics, indicating that the overall regression is not a good fit. As income, 
for example, is usually affected by factors such as education, training and work 
experience of individuals, the poor overall regression diagnostics may reflect 
omitted variables. In general, the findings suggest that trust in the co-operative is 
not related to the financial performance of co-operatives. lOS 
103 Where losses are recorded, the dependent variable is specified as (-I) • log(llossesl). 
104 In accordance with the results in Table 8.2, changing the nature of the dependent variable 
BITRUST, firstly into an index and secondly into a set of dummy variables from the index 
did not yield a significant relationship between performance and trust. 
lOS We also regressed the financial performance of the co-operative on other measures of trust (i.e. 
trust in family members, friends and strangers). The findings suggest that these measures of trust are 
also not related to the co-operative's financial performance. 
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8.5. Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented empirical analysis of the relationship between 
trust in the co-operative and co-operative size_ We found that the number of 
members of co-operatives is inversely related to trust in the co-operative as argued 
by Ole Borgen (2001). The findings indicate that an increase by 1 % in the number 
of members decreases the probability of trusting the co-operative by 5%_ We also 
found that there is a higher probability of having trust in the co-operative in a 
smaller co-operative group, which is in accordance with the previous finding_ 
On the other hand, our findings do not suggest a positive relationship between trust 
in the co-operative and the financial performance of co-operatives (as measured by 
share capital, assets, income and profits). A possible explanation for why trust is not 
positively related to financial performance may be because the co-operatives in 
Malaysia are large co-operatives. As small co-operatives do not exist in Malaysia, 
we are not able to study the relationship between trust and financial performance 
within such smaller groups. When co-operatives are large, the process of trust 
building is more complicated and resource consuming due to, for example, 
conflicting interests among a large number of members (Ole Borgen, 2001). Also 
the structural complexity of large organisations means that members often lack the 
opportunity to engage in incremental and repeated exchanges, which facilitate the 
development of trust (ibid., 2001). Therefore, it is possible that the Malaysian co-
operative movement would benefit from small size co-operatives, where members' 
business is related to the activity of the co-operative. The presence of such primary 
co-operatives may lead to the effective functioning of secondary co-operatives, 
which has been the hallmark of many successful co-operative movements in other 
countries. 
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It should be acknowledged that the aIm of this chapter is not necessarily to 
demonstrate the importance of trust in the co-operative within the existing co-
operative movement but rather to suggest possible ways to encourage a new type of 
co-operatives characterised by high levels of trust amongst co-operators. The 
empirical findings suggest that trust in the co-operative is low, where primary co-
operative membership is large. Therefore, one possibility is to lower the size 
requirement for forming a primary co-operative in Malaysia to encourage smaller 
groups of primary co-operatives to engender trust in the co-operative. Indirectly, 
this may lead to more primary co-operatives, where the members' business is related 
to the activity of the co-operative. 
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Appendix AS.I: Results Tables 
Table 8.1: Relationship between Trust in the Co-operative and Co-operative Size 
Coefficient t-stat ME t-stat 
I. The Probit Estimates Dependent Variable = a/TRUST 
Number of Members (an index) -0.4280 .. -2.35 -0.0528 .. -2.20 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 20.84 
statistics (14 df) 
Log likelihood -31.7957 
Pseudo R Squared 0.2643 
ii. The Probit Estimates Dependent Variable = a/TRUST 
Number of Members (dummy 
variables): 
101-500 members -1.6226 -1.21 
-0.2886 -0.91 
501-1000 members -1.5260 -1.09 
-0.3665 -0.77 
1001-1500 members -2.2472 -1.44 
-0.6566 -1.31 
more than 1500 members . -2.8173 -1.91 
. 
-0.6210 -1.70 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 24.33 
statistics (17 df) 
Log likelihood 
-31.0521 
Pseudo R Squared 0.2815 
iii. The Ordered Probit Estimates Dependent Variable = Number of Members (Index) 
BITRUST 
-0.8694 
.. 
-2.33 
BITRUST: 101-500 members 0.2720 - 2.88 
a/TRUST: 501-1000 members 0.0608 1.14 
a/TRUST: 1001-1500 members -0.0270 -1.32 
a/TRUST: more than 1500 members -0.3093 - -2.17 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared 98.70 
statistics (18 df) 
Log likelihood 
-98.2009 
Pseudo R Squared 0.3345 
Coefficient (t-stat) of the Dependent Variables: 
iv. The Bivarate Probit Estimates a/TRUST alNUM 
BINUM 
-1.4442 (-3.78) 
a/TRUST 
-1.5302··· (-3.68) 
Chi2 (1 dt) 20.9736 
.' Notes: I) Statistically sIgnIficant at the 10% level; StatIstically sIgnIficant at the 5% 
level; ... Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
ii) Number of observations = 106 
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Table 8.2: Trust in the Co-operative and Co-operative Financial Performance 
Dependent variable Explanatory Variable = BITRUST 
(Measures of Financial Performance) Coefficient t-statistic 
The Ordered Pro bit Estimates: 
Share Capital 0.2420 0.76 
Number of Observations 106 
likelihood Ratio Chi Squared statistics 43.82 
(14 df) 
Log likelihood -157.9532 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1218 
The Ordered Probit Estimates: 
Assets -0.1035 -0.31 
Number of Observations 106 
Likelihood Ratio Chi Squared statistics 51.11 
(14 df) 
Log likelihood -120.7768 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1746 
The OLS Estimates: 
Log(lncome) 0.2190 0.39 
Number of Observations 93 
F-stat (17 df) 2.94 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2640 
The OLS Estimates: 
Log(Profit) -5.2889 -1.50 
Number of Observations 93 
F-stat (17 df) 1.98 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1536 
Notes: 1) All the regressIOns above control for the other explanatory vanables (I.e. 
HOCCUP, SRACE, REGIOP, REGIME, MAINACT, and SECOOP) 
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Appendix A8.2: Co-operative's Income and Profit!Loss for year ending 
31.12.2003 
Co-op Income from all activities Profit! (Loss) Serial 
Number (RM) (RM) 
001 652 (610) 
002 71,665 2,997 
003* 313,040 (1,569,372) 
004 52,474 (85,792) 
005 35,685 1,794 
006 801,197 (196,691) 
007 76,961 22,939 
008 3,890,870 52,827 
009 56,091 (187,184) 
010 9,300 (26,593) 
011 842,157 93,427 
012 130,416 (119,304) 
013 113,133 61,282 
014 n.a. n.a. 
015 n.a. n.a. 
016 24,798,861 386,312 
017 735,648 (29,371) 
018 n.a. n.a. 
019 3,479,565 125,190 
020 24,210 1,159 
021 n.a. n.a. 
022 2,473,205 1,310,506 
023 n.a n.a. 
024 n.a. n.a. 
025 214,350 138,496 
026 1,551,922 862,162 
027 n.a. n.a. 
028 344,804 124,585 
029 517,491 (195,922) 
030 47,494 (35,056) 
031 642,360 8,383 
032 378,632 174,414 
033 36,452 (11,229) 
034 52,748 16,516 
035 1,581,917 1,048,626 
036 149,335 (91,773) 
037 6,779,644 4,079,377 
038 4,025,835 (118,961) 
039 1,014,298 (541,822) 
040 621,466 161,685 
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Co-operative's Income and Profit!Loss for year ending 31.12.2003 
(continued) 
Co-op Income from all activities Profit! (Loss) Serial 
Number (RM) (RM) 
041 593,717 138,002 
042 3,176 (2,126) 
043 22,340 (379) 
044 252,959 (486,578) 
045 1,868,503 62,746 
046 704,661 (209,908) 
047 149,391 (314,568) 
048 162,400 (138,831) 
049 64,343 20,392 
050 3,059,311 (724,324) 
051 990,617 91,470 
052 345,000 (373,839) 
053 312,447 (164,509) 
054 n.a. n.a. 
055 80,839 56,576 
056 526,969 88,828 
057 10,295,433 1,066,468 
058 915,723 115,718 
059+ 278,454 76,368 
060 675,630 217,482 
061 140,250 (30,581) 
062 241,125 (100,407) 
063 5,014,306 103,705 
064 n.a. n.a. 
065 5,559 1,792 
066 83,285 11,369 
067 543,678 135,867 
068 135,540 99,294 
069 760,703 (1,507) 
070 4,741,099 1,775,826 
071 5,634,266 4,100,078 
072 921,872 12,367 
073 n.a. n.a. 
074 165,578 46,790 
075 306,037 (116,189) 
076 3,917,145 872,016 
077 14,613,408 5,392,065 
078 108,574 (194,876) 
079 1,117,246 7,707 
080 460 (11,651) 
081 400,981 8,356 
082 201,655 157,806 
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Co-operative's Income and ProfitlLoss for year ending 31.12.2003 
(continued) 
Co-op Income from all activities Profitl (Loss) Serial 
Number (RM) (RM) 
083 50,869 28,670 
084 n.a. n.a. 
085 350,800 (40,121) 
086 1,906,959 6,762 
087 561,188 (562,836) 
088 93,961 (151,709) 
089 173,056 (85,347) 
090 1,415,970 (204,164) 
091 n.a. n.a. 
092 n.a. n.a. 
093 2,914,121 890,275 
094 1,023,718 562,656 
095 8,545,561 184,453 
096 2,142,321 693,976 
097 8,288,691 187,212 
098 57,190 (11,149) 
099 6,560 (4,297) 
100 546,986 195,652 
101 3,353,692 107,504 
102 1,414,707 46,129 
103 21,817 (615,835) 
104 387,407 113,111 
105 326,395 56,999 
106 69,114 (276,570) 
Notes: I) * Co-operatlve's Income and Profit/Loss for year ending 31.12.2002 
ii} * Co-operative's Income and Profit/Loss for year ending 31.12.2005 
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CONCLUSION 
The number of co-operatives in Malaysia has reached thousands and is likely to 
increase in the future. But nevertheless, even after almost a century of the existence 
of the co-operative movement in Malaysia, there is no available data to gauge the 
significance of its economic contribution such as the number of employees 
accounted for by the co-operative sector. The growth of the co-operative movement 
in Malaysia can, generally, be assessed in terms of the growth in the number of co-
operatives, the number of co-operative members, the share capital and the assets of 
co-operatives. The 25 largest co-operatives in terms of membership and in terms of 
share capital in 2004 are all primary co-operatives. The main aim of this thesis was 
to explore weaknesses of the Malaysian co-operative movement, which may have 
diminished the economic presence of the co-operative sector and to suggest possible 
avenues by which the co-operative movement could be improved. The Malaysian 
co-operative movement differs from the successful co-operative movement in the 
West, where co-operative organisations at a higher level than the primary co-
operatives, i.e. the secondary co-operatives, have played a key role. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, empirical evidence suggests that in Malaysia, the co-operative movement 
as a Whole may be hampered by the weaknesses of the secondary co-operatives. 
This thesis has reviewed three important aspects of co-operatives in Malaysia: the 
relationship between primary and secondary co-operatives; the level of trust among 
Co-operators; and the relationship between co-operative size and trust in co-
operatives in Malaysia. In order to explore the Malaysian co-operative movement, 
we had to collect our own primary data, especially data pertaining to the relationship 
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between primary and secondary co-operatives and data on trust among co-operators 
in Malaysia. Data pertaining to the relationship between primary and secondary co-
operatives and data on trust among co-operators in Malaysia do not exist, as this is 
an under-researched area for Malaysia. Furthermore, due to the nature of co-
operatives in the Malaysian co-operative movement, there were problems collecting 
data especially pertaining to the relationship between primary and secondary co-
operatives. Nevertheless, the unique econometric analysis of an original data 
source, constructed for this thesis, represents a significant original contribution to 
this area of research. 
It has been argued that a co-operative "must develop strategies to maintain and 
develop its market share, strengthen its membership base, reduce its cost base and 
develop its suppliers' capacity to meet the co-operative members' need" (Davis, 
1999:64), to be able to compete in free markets. For co-operatives in the Western 
European countries, these are areas for secondary co-operatives to develop. In order 
to be able to function effectively, there has to be close cooperation between the 
secondary co-operatives and the primary co-operatives that make up their members 
(Kissling, 1992). Close co-operation between primary and secondary co-operatives 
is determined by how related the activities of the secondary co-operatives and the 
primary co-operatives are, where the latter run activities that are related to members' 
businesses. Thus, the kind of primary co-operatives, where the members' business 
is related to the co-operative activity appears to be a prerequisite for the efficiency 
of secondary co-operatives, enabling them to enhance the effectiveness of the co-
operative movement. This kind of primary co-operative is common among producer 
co-operatives such as agricultural marketing co-operatives and worker co-operatives. 
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The discussion in Chapter 4 on co-operatives in Malaysia, where primary co-
operatives are largely consumer co-operatives as opposed to producer co-operatives, 
did not suggest that the type of primary co-operatives, where the members' business 
is reflected in the primary co-operative activity, is present in Malaysia. In Malaysia, 
where secondary co-operatives largely have different types of primary co-operatives 
as members and where the activity of secondary co-operatives does not reflect the 
activities ofthe different types of primary co-operatives that make up their members, 
it is less likely that the secondary co-operative acts as an integrated unit with the 
primary co-operatives, failing to achieve economies of scale, greater negotiating 
power in the market and greater efficiency for the primary co-operative. 
In Chapter 6, we analysed the primary-secondary co-operative relationship in terms 
of the effect of membership in secondary co-operatives on the number of members, 
the share capital and the assets of the primary co-operatives. Our findings suggest 
that membership in secondary co-operatives has a significant positive effect only on 
the number of members of the primary co-operatives, especially among primary co-
operatives that have a long-standing relationship with their secondary co-operative. 
We did not find evidence of a positive effect of membership in secondary co-
operatives on the share capital or assets of the primary co-operatives. This result 
suggests that membership in secondary co-operatives does not attract members of 
primary co-operatives to invest more in the co-operative capital, which could reflect 
the level of the members' economic involvement in the co-operative. To be specific, 
where members do not depend on the co-operative for a living, the benefit of the 
primary co-operative's membership in the secondary co-operative may not be felt by 
members. Thus, members of the primary co-operative may not be induced to invest 
more in the co-operative's capital. Members may not be inclined to increase their 
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share capital in the co-operatives, other than, perhaps, what is needed either to 
become a member, or to be eligible for the co-operative's product/services 
(especially loans) or to exercise their rights as members of the co-operative. 
The economic involvement of the co-operative's members in the co-operative is 
reflected in the average share capital per member of a co-operative: in credit co-
operatives it is RM2,400.00; in the plantation activity co-operatives it is RMl121.00 
per member; RM 1 ,007.00 per member in the services activity co-operatives; 
RM995.00 per member in the housing activity co-operatives; less than RM400.00 
per member in the transport and in the consumer co-operatives; and less than 
RM200.00 in the construction activity and in the smalVcottage industry activity co-
operatives. I06 These figures relating to a member's average contribution to the share 
capital are not particularly high, suggesting that it is necessary for co-operatives to 
have a large number of members to have large share capital as suggested by the 
positive relationship between the number of members and the share capital of co-
operatives (see Chapter 6). This may explain the finding in Chapter 6 that suggests 
that primary co-operatives, which experience an increase in membership due to 
membership in a secondary co-operative, are likely to be in favour of secondary co-
operatives as this may indirectly enhance their share capital. Although secondary 
Co-operatives in Malaysia do not seem to be particularly resourceful towards their 
primary members, some degree of satisfaction with secondary co-operatives and 
support for their existence is reported in Chapter 6, which can be regarded as 
demonstrating the relevance of secondary co-operatives in Malaysia. 
In Chapter 7, we have explored the determinants of the level of trust in co-operatives 
among Co-operators in Malaysia as it has been argued that where the co-operative's 
106 
These figures for 2003 are calculated from the figures in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in Chapter 4. 
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. activity and the members' businesses are related, this may induce members to 
identify with the co-operative, which serves as a mechanism for generating trust in 
the co-operative (Ole Borgen, 2001). We found that not even co-operators in the 
transport co-operatives or the smalVcottage industry co-operatives, where we 
expected members to indicate high levels of trust in the co-operative, reflect a high 
level of trust in co-operatives. The findings suggest that in Malaysia, the activities 
of the primary co-operatives are less likely to reflect members' businesses, which 
could probably be due to co-operatives being large. We also found that trust in co-
operatives is positively associated with high levels of trust in the family, suggesting 
that allowing co-operatives to be formed among people from high trust social 
structures is good for building trust in co-operatives. This suggestion can be 
generalised for the general population as we found that the general level of and 
pattern of trust among the Malaysian co-operators reflects the general level of and 
pattern of trust among the general Malaysian population. 
In the empirical analysis of the relationship between the level of trust in the co-
operative and co-operative size in Malaysia presented in Chapter 8, we found that 
the number of members of co-operatives is inversely related to the level of trust in 
the co-operative as argued in Ole Borgen (2001) and, in accordance with this 
finding, we also found that there is a higher probability of having trust in the co-
operative in a smaller co-operative group. Although, in the existing literature, high 
levels of trust have been found to be positively associated with the performance of 
organisations or institutions, our findings, however, do not suggest a positive 
relationship between trust in the co-operative and the financial performance of co-
operatives as measured by co-operatives' share capital, assets, income and profits. 
This finding may be related to the relatively large membership size of the Malaysian 
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primary co-operatives, given that the minimum number of individuals required to 
form a co-operative is set at 100 members as compared to that in Germany and 
Switzerland, for example, where only 7 members are required to form a primary co-
operative. 
Arguably, the large number of individuals required to form a co-operative in 
Malaysia will induce the formation of co-operatives among individuals with no 
common activity because it is difficult to group together so many individuals within 
a particular region, who are engaged in the same business or economic activity. In 
addition, as an economic group, where the financial contribution to the capital of the 
business is important, large membership size does not accord with the low level of 
general trust (Le. where trust in others is relatively low), indicated among co-
operators in Malaysia, in particular and among the general sample of Malaysians, as 
indicated in the responses to the e-mail survey analysed in Chapter 7. In a low trust 
society such as Malaysia, it appears to be the case that co-operatives proliferate 
among people, who are less likely to trust each other highly such as among 
employees of organisations. In such a situation, it is less likely that co-operative 
members would be willing to make large financial contributions to the co-
operative's capital, other than the minimum requirement. 
The relatively high membership requirement hinders the proliferation of small 
groups of entrepreneurs to form co-operatives in Malaysia as indicated by the 
responses to the co-operators' survey analysed in Chapter 5: 57.6% of the co-
operatives in the sample have more than 500 members, which is not likely to reflect 
small groups of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, even the relatively smaller groups (Le. 
co-operatives with 100 to 500 members) are unlikely to reflect groups of 
entrepreneurs. The formation of a primary co-operative group in Malaysia is based 
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on 'common interest', a term not specifically defined by the Registrar for co-
operatives in Malaysia. In addition, the Government supports the large co-
operatives formed based on the 100 membership requirement in the form of, for 
example, grants and 'soft' loans, which may be regarded as merely encouraging co-
operatives to venture into entrepreneurial activity rather than encouraging 
entrepreneurs to join co-operatives. 
Therefore, allowing co-operatives to be formed among people from high trust social 
structures, i.e. among family members and friends, may encourage entrepreneurs to 
form co-operatives that are more focused in their activity. Granovetter (1995:130) 
argues that before the 1970s, the organisation of economic activity around kin and 
friends may be regarded as fundamentally backward, but the general orientation of 
the 'New Institutional Economics' has brought about its reinterpretation "that 
transformed it from a retrograde vestige of traditional times to a clever solution for a 
difficult problem". The formation of co-operatives among low trust social structures 
may have resulted in multipurpose co-operatives going into businesses that are not 
clearly related to one another, picking up and adding whatever activity that could 
generate income to the co-operative, to enable the co-operative to distribute 
dividends to members (Hogeland, 2003). These multipurpose co-operatives then 
become large co-operatives that can survive individually without having to depend 
on secondary co-operatives. In contrast, where co-operatives compnse 
entrepreneurs as members, it is the type of co-operative where the member's 
business is reflected in the activity of the co-operative, which is common in 
producer co-operatives, such as worker co-operatives. Allowing for small groups in 
co-operatives will allow individuals to choose who they trust to go into business 
with and to commit to it financially and spiritually. 
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Based on the original empirical analysis presented in this thesis, we conclude that 
restrictive government policies related to the formation of co-operatives such as 
imposing a requirement of a large number of individuals to form a co-operative, may 
affect individuals' choices, which, in turn, may affect co-operative development. 
Entrepreneurs might be dissuaded to choose the co-operative form as a way to start a 
business. Therefore, lowering the size requirement for forming a primary co-
operative as a way to encourage smaller groups of primary co-operatives to be 
formed, leading to the establishment of a new type of primary co-operative, where 
the members' business is related to the activity of the co-operative, may play an 
important role in enhancing the co-operative movement in Malaysia, leading to the 
effective functioning of secondary co-operatives. The new type of co-operatives, 
due to their small size, may need to co-operate with other small co-operatives with 
the same interests to form larger organisations to survive. The survival of the co-
operative becomes important, therefore, for the survival of the members' business. 
As there is no one fixed number for defining 'small' membership size of a primary 
co-operative suggested in the literature, we suggest that an unspecified number of 
individuals is stipulated, which may be not less than 5 persons, to allow the second 
principle of co-operatives to prevail, i.e. democratic control to be exercised. We 
base this number requirement on the Edinburgh Bicycle Co-operative in the UK and 
on the institutional design of the Grameen Bank financial groups in Bangladesh, 
which have been widely acknowledged for their success. 
Reducing the number of individuals required for the formation of co-operatives may 
encourage a proliferation of worker co-operatives in the Malaysian co-operative 
movement, in which case the present institutional arrangements for co-operatives 
will not suit this new level of economic activity. As such, amendments to the co-
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operative law in Malaysia would have to be made not only to allow for small groups 
of primary co-operatives to be formed but also in anticipation of the birth of a new 
form of co-operative. Such amendments would pertain to: firstly, Section 5 and 
Section 8 of the Co-operative Act 1993 relating to the minimum requirement to form 
a co-operative; and secondly, Regulation 16 of the Co-operative Societies 
Regulations 1995 pertaining to the appointment to and the vacation of members of 
the co-operative Board. Regulations 16(1)(a) and (b) specify that at least one-third 
of the members of the co-operative Board shall vacate their posts annually at the 
annual general meeting, which is to be repeated in rotation annually so that all 
members of the Board, at least once, have to vacate their post. This regulation may 
not suit co-operatives with a small membership size. 
In addition to legal matters, the DCD would also have to restructure its resources 
towards supporting a new dimension of the co-operative movement in Malaysia. Its 
extension programme would have to be expanded to create public awareness of the 
presence of and the opportunities related to an alternative way for starting and 
running a business. The DCD would also have to co-ordinate and work closely with 
the various small entrepreneur development agencies to build a national network of 
support and to develop wiqer trading opportunities for the new type of co-operative. 
Eventually, this role could be handed over to the secondary co-operatives formed by 
the new co-operatives. 
An interesting avenue for future research lies in investigating the degree of 
complementarity between trust and participation in co-operatives, i.e. whether trust 
can be linked to higher or lower participation in large or small co-operatives. It 
should be noted, however, that in order to conduct further research on co-operatives 
in Malaysia, the collection of further co-operative level data is essential. 
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